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This issue begins with a familiar landscape: the eastern border area of Afghani-
stan, specifically the Paktika valley region. Major Mike Hutchinson gives a per-
sonal account of the work he and his team, ODA 3325, did to dislodge the Taliban 
from an area considered to be one of their strongholds. In the process, not only 
was the team able to defeat the insurgents militarily, but more importantly, 
they found a way to reverse the trend of economic decay that years of fighting 
had brought to the population. Following this article is a thoughtful discussion 
by Captain Caleb Slayton of the ways in which U.S. military education about 
Islam falls short of its goal of preparing operators to effectively and respectfully 
navigate within the Muslim world. The urge to fit Muslims into “good” and 
“bad” categories through coded language, he tells us, is doing a serious disservice 
to both Islam and our forces.
Up next is Julia McClenon, who describes the devastating effects that official 
discrimination and injustice are having on the indigenous Uyghur population 
in Xinjiang Province in western China. From McClenon’s perspective (she 
has been living and working in China), Xinjiang represents a living primer on 
how to drive an oppressed people to terrorist violence. This article is followed 
by Captain David Hammond’s essay on the unintended consequences that an 
incomplete understanding of the rules of engagement can have on SOF who 
operate in highly volatile and uncertain conditions. Based on his experience as 
a judge advocate general (military lawyer), Hammond offers five methods by 
which higher commanders can defuse a sense of disenfranchisement and the 
subsequent loss of morale among deployed forces.
Major Margus Kuul takes a hard look at NATO’s expectation that NATO SOF 
must fulfill three Special Operations mission sets: direct action, special recon-
naissance, and military assistance. Given the reality that most SOF contributors 
cannot afford to meet these three mission requirements on their own, he asks 
whether it’s time to reassess. Colonel Imre Porkoláb then brings us another in 
a series of essays on SOF in the era of “cool war.” As the nature of future warfare 
becomes more irregular, disruptive, and secretive, what does this mean for 
innovative leadership? 
The final feature article in this issue, by Dr. Ali Fisher and Dr. Nico Prucha, 
describes and analyzes the way in which jihadist networks are becoming increas-
ingly resilient by using Twitter accounts and nodes to spread both doctrine and 
information. They illustrate how messages from some principal users are repeat-
edly retweeted in a way that may make the networks impervious to disruption. 
The CTAP interview with former DEA officer Kirk Meyer focuses on his work 
from 2008–2011 to establish the first Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell. Through 
utter determination and a willingness to make the most of every available asset, 
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Meyer’s team was able to develop an in-depth understanding of local drug trafficking and crime networks, their relation-
ships with the Taliban, and their potential breaking points. 
CTX ’s own Ryan Stuart contributes a review of Phil Klay’s book, Redeployment, a collection of short stories about 
American servicemen in and around Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq. The stories Klay tells are fiction, but, as Stuart 
implies, probably not by much. 
I’m writing this letter from New Delhi, where I’m meeting with CT professionals to discuss the various kinds of terrorism 
India faces, and what India has been doing to combat them—a reminder that all sectors of the globe deserve attention 
from CTX, not only the Middle East. So, please keep those contributions coming.
Look for back issues of CTX at GlobalECCO.org/journal and “like” Global ECCO on Facebook, where you can stay 
up-to-date on news, events, and the CTFP community. The quality of CTX depends on our readers, who are our main 
contributors. We’d appreciate getting your feedback at GlobalECCO.org.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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Dr. Ali Fisher specializes in delivering insight into complex information 
ecosystems through network analysis and big data. Using insights from 
data analysis, Dr. Fisher has worked as an advisor, strategist, and author 
on methods of achieving influence across a range of disciplines, including 
public diplomacy and strategic communication, counterterrorism, child 
protection, human security, and public health. His books include Col-
laborative Public Diplomacy (2012), The Connective Mindshift (2013), and 
Trails of Engagement (2010). He received his PhD from the University of 
Birmingham.
Captain David Hammond is a judge advocate in the U.S. Army. He 
is presently assigned as the battalion judge advocate for 2d Battalion, 
1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 
Washington. CPT Hammond’s previous assignments include com-
mand judge advocate, Special Operations Task Force–West, Helmand 
Province, Afghanistan, 2013–2014; operational law attorney, Task Force 
Spartan, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 2011–2012; trial counsel, 3d 
Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, 
2010–2011; and trial counsel, U.S. Army Research, Development, and En-
gineering Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 2008–2010.
Major Michael Hutchinson graduated from the United States Military 
Academy at West Point in 2003 with a BS in Arabic and Middle Eastern 
Studies. He deployed to Anbar Province, Iraq, with 1st Battalion, 506th 
Infantry Regiment from 2004 to 2005. Upon completion of the Special 
Forces Qualification Course in 2008, he was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 
3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), leading Operational Detachment–
Alpha (ODA) 3325 in Paktika Province, Afghanistan, during two deploy-
ments between 2009 to 2012. ODA 3325 became one of the first Village 
Stability Operations teams, and returned to the same location in Paktika 
Province for a total deployment period of 20 months. MAJ Hutchinson 
is currently attending the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and 
expects to graduate with an MS in Defense Analysis in December 2014.
Major Margus Kuul has been on active duty in the Estonian armed 
forces since 1998; he joined the Estonian Military Intelligence Battalion 
in 2008, where he continues to serve. MAJ Kuul graduated from the 
U.S. Marine Corps Basic Officer Course and Infantry Officer Course in 
2001, and the Estonian National Defence College Basic Officer Training 
course in 2003. MAJ Kuul was deployed in Iraq in 2005 as a light 
infantry platoon commander.
Julia McClenon is a writer, researcher, and editor who helped found 
and develop the Combating Terrorism Exchange journal at NPS in 2011. 
She then served as a U.S. Foreign Service officer in China from 2012 to 
2014, where she was the inaugural chairwoman for the Ambassador’s 
Civil Society Subgroup on Religion (title translated from the Chinese). 
In 2014, McClenon helped open the Sino-U.S. Friendship Association 
for Guangzhou University. She has presented to Chinese audiences 
on topics ranging from American civil liberties and the mechanics of 
four-stroke engines, to the poetics and history of hip hop and spoken-
word poetry. Her BA in Interdisciplinary Studies is from Global College, 
Long Island University. 
Kirk E. Meyer served for 23 years with the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) as an assistant special agent in charge of the multi-state 
Chicago Field Division. His last two overseas assignments were in 
Afghanistan, where he served from 2006 to 2008 as the DEA assistant 
country attaché. From 2008 to 2011, he was the founding director of the 
Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell, which worked to identify and disrupt 
funding streams to terrorist organizations and to target high-level public 
corruption. Meyer received numerous performance awards from the 
DEA, and in 2011 was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal by General 
David H. Petraeus. Since retiring from the DEA, he has been the senior 
manager of the Financial Intelligence Unit at GE Capital, Americas.
Colonel Imre Porkoláb is presently the Hungarian National Liaison 
representative at NATO Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, 
Virginia. COL Porkoláb played a pivotal role in developing the Hun-
garian Defence Forces’ SOF capability while serving with the Ministry of 
Defence, Joint Forces Command, and then as commander of Hungary’s 
SF battalion. He has served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. COL Porkoláb 
holds a PhD in military leadership.
Dr. Nico Prucha of the University of Vienna focuses on jihadi online 
activities related to Syria and the organized opposition. He is also a 
fellow at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University 
of Hamburg. His research centers on textual and audiovisual content 
analysis of jihadist activity online, specifically focusing on extremist 
shari’a interpretations of hostage taking and executions. He has written 
frequently on the subject and blogs for Jihadica.com.
Captain Caleb Slayton is an active-duty officer in the U.S. Air Force, 
where he serves as director of the AFRICOM Theater course for Special 
Operations Forces. He completed a master’s degree in Middle East and 
Africa Security Studies from NPS and graduated with honors in Arabic 
from the Defense Language Institute. Capt. Slayton lived for 10 years in 
various regions of Africa, and completed study immersions in Cameroon 
and Tunisia. Capt. Slayton writes on African security issues, religious 
dynamics, and military operational culture.
Ryan Stuart is the layout and design director for Combating Terrorism 
Exchange. She is a voracious reader of books on many subjects and is one 
of Goodreads.com’s Top 100 Reviewers. She earned her BA in English 
from California State University, Sacramento and has taught English as a 
Second Language, as well as classes in fiction and nonfiction writing. She 
has written hundreds of short stories, four screenplays, one stage play, 
and two unfinished novels. Stuart is currently finishing (much to her 




alpha team I had the good 
fortune to lead from 2009 to 
2012 brought together a notable 
collection of oddly useful skills. 
This was a land of isolation 
and deprivation, hardly worth a 
fight, and yet it had witnessed 
some of the nine-year conflict’s 
most violent confrontations.
Building the Future: An Unlikely Coalition and a Road in Rural 
Afghanistan
MAJ Mike Hutchinson, U.S. ArmyA Special Forces operational detachment–alpha (ODA) com-
prises 12 soldiers with different specialties and roles: leadership, intelligence, 
weapons, engineering, communications, and medical. In that regard, ODA 3325 
was not unlike any other team, but the team I had the good fortune to lead from 
2009 to 2012 brought together a notable collection of oddly useful skills. Our 
intelligence sergeant possessed a degree in geology and a strong mathemati-
cal background. Our senior engineer held a degree in 
molecular biology and had been a local politician prior to 
joining the Army. Our senior communications sergeant 
was a professional motocross1 racer whose mechanical 
and technical skills surpassed those of even the contracted 
maintenance personnel we encountered. Seven members 
of the team had completed the Army Ranger School, 
three had previously served in the 75th Ranger Regiment, 
and all but I were graduates of the grueling Combat Diver 
Qualification Course. The team’s personality, therefore, 
was highly aggressive, extroverted, and detail-oriented. 
Taken at face value, such a personality may seem ill-
suited to counterinsurgency operations; however, in one 
place, at one time, it was a perfect fit. Despite numerous 
mistakes and obstacles, the team persevered toward a 
grand dream: creating a new economic corridor in restive 
Paktika Province, Afghanistan.
In light of nine years of war, insurgency, and occupation, it is no wonder that 
events in Paktika unfolded as they did from 2010 to 2012; everything that hap-
pened during our time there was predictable, except perhaps the outcome. If the 
enemy of progress is isolation, then its best friend must be connection. That is why 
we were on the rugged southeastern border of Afghanistan trying to build a road. 
Shkin: January 2010
Shkin is the evilest place in Afghanistan.
 — Colonel Rodney Davis, 20032 
As our helicopter swooped downward in ever-shrinking circles toward the 
landing zone, we surveyed the physical terrain that would frame our problem. 
Small adobe-and-stone houses punctuated a landscape of hard-scrabble farm 
plots in the valley. A shuttered bazaar sat visible on the Pakistani border, while 
a rutted dirt road snaked away westward into the snow-topped mountains 
of Paktika Province in southeastern Afghanistan. We saw neither pedestrian 
nor vehicle traffic; this was a land of isolation and deprivation, hardly worth 
a fight, and yet it had witnessed some of the nine-year conflict’s most violent 
confrontations. 
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To say that Aziz—called 
Karwan, or “Commander,” 
by his soldiers and close 
allies—despised the Taliban 
is a gross understatement.
Upon arrival, we met the infamous Commander Aziz. His 
battlefield record in the region was long and distinguished—
perhaps as long as the list of third-hand criminal accusations 
leveled at him by journalists in Kabul. He was stocky, with 
a thick, black beard, and sported a pressed set of modified 
fatigues in a black-and-green-tiger-stripe pattern. He wore 
a crisp, clean baseball cap with new Oakley sunglasses 
perched on the brim. To say that Aziz—called Karwan, or 
“Commander,” by his soldiers and close allies—despised the 
Taliban is a gross understatement. He described in detail the 
predations of foreign fighters, his imprisonment in the 1990s, 
and his near assassination in 2006. He outlined the enemy 
disposition surrounding Shkin, from indirect-fire positions 
to infiltration routes. Aziz saw himself as the gatekeeper. He 
protected the only “good” tribes of Paktika—those immedi-
ately surrounding his base—with a laser focus commensurate 
with his responsibilities. In his eyes, however, those responsi-
bilities ended at the borders of Barmal District, in which the 
informal district of Shkin was located. Through this limited 
perceptual lens, which essentially extended no further than 
the range of his aftermarket rifle optics, there was nothing 
beyond Shkin but the enemy, and his fellow Afghans were 
derelict in their duty to fight.
On the third day, we prepared to participate as partners in the first of what 
would eventually be several hundred shuras.3 Mohammad Azzam sat nervously 
in the briefing room with us. Azzam was the district governor of Shkin, and 
since Shkin was not recognized by the central government in Kabul, neither was 
he.4 Aziz outlined for us the talking points for the meeting: reporting procedures 
for the discovery of IEDs, theft of the Ahmadzai Waziri tribe’s commercial trucks 
by the Kharoti tribesmen in the village cluster of Rabat, and a religious appeal 
for Afghan patriotism. Azzam’s role, as usual, would be as the religious foil to 
Aziz’s iron fist. When I finally was able to speak, I asked Aziz, “What should I 
say?” “Nothing,” he replied. “Not this time. I will introduce you, but that is all. 
Until you see the area and hear how the people argue, and see how the Pakistanis 
keep the fire burning, you might say the wrong thing.”
We walked through the main gate and over to the shura building, which was a 
simple plywood structure with a sand-filled blast wall on its east side to protect 
against rocket fragmentation. The wall had done its job; pockmarked from 
shrapnel and beginning to split at its seams, the barrier ensured that the building 
would collapse from extensive rot and a leaky roof rather than from explosions. 
The scene, in fact, provided a perfect allegory for Aziz’s protection of eastern 
Paktika Province. Aziz entered first, followed by Azzam, with me and my best 
interpreter in trail. We were the last to arrive, as is customary 
in these meetings. On the border, he with the most guns and 
money is most honored, and the simple tribes of Shkin were 
no match for our firepower and deep pockets. Our thrones 
were therefore the most intact of the plastic lawn chairs 
arrayed around the room.
Following the mullah’s opening prayer, the script began. Sher 
Nawaz stood first to speak, which was his right as the leader 
Commander Aziz demonstrates the scale of an improvised 
explosive device detonation in Spedar Pass; his engineers found 
and cleared this IED prior to our convoy’s reaching it.
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It was no wonder the previous 
Special Forces team had praised 
the functioning local governance 
of Shkin: despite its rustic 
trappings, the shura might have 
been televised on C-SPAN.
of the most powerful tribe, the Ahmadzai Waziri. He 
was followed by the Banzai Kharoti leader, Mir Afzal. 
Azzam punctuated the series of monologues with a 
tirade regarding the un-Islamic practices of the Taliban 
in a forceful, authoritative tone that seemed completely 
contradictory to his previously timid demeanor. It was 
as though he spent the course of each week hoarding his 
energy for a two-minute burst of emotion. I sat silently 
behind Aziz as my interpreter whispered the main points 
of this political theater. No debatable observations or 
inflammatory statements emerged. It was no wonder the 
previous Special Forces team had praised the functioning 
local governance of Shkin: despite its rustic trappings, 
the shura might have been televised on C-SPAN.5
Before Aziz could conclude the meeting, however, a 
younger man stood up, pointed his finger at the Kharoti elders, and began to 
shout. A disgruntled murmur passed through the assembly, as I turned to my 
interpreter with a quizzical look. “That is Daria Khan, a Langikhel Kharoti from 
the town of Rabat,” he stated. “He used to work for Aziz, but now he is just a 
thief and a troublemaker. He is probably the one who stole the Waziri trucks.” 
“What’s he saying?” I asked in a clear tone, as the roar of the argument began to 
rise. “He says the elders in Rabat are all Talibs that pay money to Chamtu, a very 
bad guy. He wants to raise a force to fight the Talibs and says Aziz and the other 
Kharoti leaders need to support him.” Aziz deftly defused the tension, adjourned 
the meeting, and led our contingent out of the building. My curiosity was 
piqued; addressing Aziz by his title, I said, “Tell me about Rabat, Karwan.”
“Money as a Weapon System”: 17 March 2010
A large, laminated map of eastern Paktika hung from a piece of ¾-inch plywood 
in the briefing room. Aziz’s military map-reading skills were adequate to visually 
depict for us Rabat’s internal and external tribal conflicts, as well as its attractive-
ness as an insurgent facilitation hub and piracy mecca. Five clans were spread 
across a confluence of intermittent streams that together formed a small but 
permanent river. Over about the past decade, as the snowpack from the moun-
tains melted in April, Rabat had been experiencing increasingly destructive 
annual flash floods that eroded the villagers’ best plots of land. As the arable 
land shifted, so did the balance of power among the five tribes, and by 2010, 
things had reached a critical juncture. The Issakhel and Langikhel were now 
competing for the orchards, as the Abbaskhel slowly encroached on grazing land 
from the north. To the east, the neighboring Othmanzai Waziri tribe maintained 
a shaky truce with the Kharoti in Rabat; the slightest provocation could ignite a 
tribal war.6  
Aziz traced the crumbling dirt road from the border at 
Shkin, northwest through Tora Tangay, on to Rabat, and 
then jabbed his finger forcefully on a narrow pass north of 
the town. 
“This is Spedar. It is the worst of places. Many ambushes—
one of the 7th Group engineers was killed there a few years 
ago. Every time I go there, it is a fight.” 
Rabat had been experiencing 
increasingly destructive annual 
flash floods that eroded the 
villagers’ best plots of land. 
As the arable land shifted, 
so did the balance of power 
among the five tribes.
Sher Nawaz, head elder of the Ahmadzai 
Waziri tribe, speaks to Commander Aziz
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“Why is it so important?” I asked. “There are other routes around further in the 
mountains.” 
“Those routes are hard to drive. The trucks might break. If the trucks break, the 
Talibs will mine all the ways out, and it will cost us.” 
Having seen the incredible ability of an Afghan to drive a low-riding Honda 
Civic over the roughest of passes, I wondered aloud whether the road’s condition 
similarly affected the large “jingle” trucks, which carried commercial supplies. 
“It is possible, just like for us,” Aziz acknowledged. “But if they break, it is 
expensive in time and money. That’s why they pay the toll in Spedar.” 
This toll went not only to the Taliban and Chamtu, the local Taliban leader 
whose name had come up in the shura. As Chamtu’s group left Rabat and moved 
on to other camps and ambush sites, the tribesmen of Rabat essentially took 
turns extorting any through-traffic. Aziz stated plainly that it was their best 
means of making money. 
“When can we go to Rabat?” I asked him. “The team needs to see it firsthand.” 
Aziz quickly replied, “We can go tomorrow. We will summon the maliks, the 
leaders of each clan, when we arrive. You will see how they act.” 7
The drive to Rabat, though only 15 kilometers from Shkin, took more than two 
hours. To call the route at that time a “road” is an insult to civil engineers world-
wide. As we emerged from the mountains and descended toward the cluster of 
clan villages that composed the town, the area appeared from a distance to be a 
dustbowl. Once we had dismounted our vehicles and proceeded on foot along 
the flanks of the convoy, however, we walked through the most lush greenery 
and orchards we had seen so far in the region. This land was indeed worth 
fighting over. We entered the Rabat bazaar, a shanty town of closed mud huts, 
by way of a circuitous path that revealed a defaced and abandoned elementary 
school. Numerous crumbling masonry culverts and dams dotted the route. 
Our interpreter noted our surprise at the engineering attempt and informed us, 
“CARE International put them here when the Taliban was in charge. But they are 
hollow like this place now.”
We entered the lone teahouse situated beside the lone auto shop, which was 
adjacent to the lone pharmacy. Even the mosque seemed decrepit. The maliks of 
Rabat slowly arrived, and our interpreter provided me with a hushed biography 
of each as he entered. “That is Malik Asgrar. He is the biggest Talib supporter 
here. Malik Bengal is an okay guy, but he is afraid,” and so on. When Malik 
Abdul entered the room, all rose, including Aziz. Apparently, Abdul was the 
man upon whom the sentiment of the town turned. He led the Langikhel clan, 
whose superior agricultural land provided them with a relative degree of power 
over their similar-sized neighbors. The Langikhel and Issakhel maintained a 
non-violent but increasingly tense dispute regarding ownership of the produc-
tive orchards on the southern side of Rabat’s central stream. Both clans were 
similarly suspicious of the northern Abbaskhel clan’s intentions vis-à-vis grazing 
rights. All clans agreed that their eastern neighbors, the Othmanzai Waziri, 
provided the primary threat to Rabat’s land and water. Consequently, the clans 
viewed the local Taliban group as a necessary evil; it maintained the status quo 
As Chamtu’s group left Rabat 
and moved on to other camps 
and ambush sites, the tribesmen 
of Rabat essentially took turns 
extorting any through-traffic.
Our interpreter provided 
me with a hushed biography 
of each malik as he entered. 
“That is Malik Asgrar. He is the 
biggest Talib supporter here. 
Malik Bengal is an okay guy, 
but he is afraid,” and so on.
Our convoy enters the Spedar Pass from 
Rabat village as a storm is visible in the 
distance
A patrol moves toward Spedar
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by denying both Othmanzai encroachment and political power plays by any 
single clan in Rabat. The Taliban, for their part, adeptly manipulated each clan 
to aggrandize their own political power and ensure that their fighters had access 
to food, shelter, information, and protection. I shook Malik Abdul’s hand in the 
ritual manner, and as he proceeded to his seat beside Aziz, the invocation by the 
mullah began. 
We discussed Chamtu and his Taliban operatives, the theft of Waziri trucks, 
the extortion of commercial traffic—all the sins of Rabat’s clans. Malik Asgrar 
countered each point as it was raised, and Aziz’s patience began to falter. 
“Security is my responsibility. If you do not side with the government and stop 
supporting the Talibs, I will be back, and it will not be for tea,” Aziz warned the 
room. Asgrar sat silently this time, with a determined glare. 
“What are we to do?” asked Malik Abdul. “It is fine to say the government 
supports us, but who will get here first? This matter is not about supporting 
the Taliban; it is about our survival. Even if we stand, we will be weakened, and 
when we are weakened, the Othmanzai will come. Perhaps they will come with 
the Ahmadzai as well. The Banzai are safe by your base, but there are no bases 
here.” 
As we left the teahouse and the elders dispersed toward their respective villages, 
I saw Daria Khan. “What can we do to change things here? What will convince 
the elders?” I asked him. Without hesitation, he responded, “Kill Chamtu.”
In our operations center in Shkin, the team debated what was to be done. Spring 
had not yet arrived, and we had used the winter months to visit the majority of 
the region’s communities, which spanned five districts and approximately 644 
square kilometers. Every place we went, we witnessed the same passive accep-
tance of poverty and the psychological control that fear of the Taliban exerted. 
Abandoned bazaars, crumbling infrastructure, and failing crops throughout the 
valleys provided a visual context for this hopelessness. Most families reluctantly 
sent at least one son to join the Taliban ranks, while also sending a son to the 
government security forces; this was both to hedge their bets for the uncertain 
aftermath of the coalition forces’ withdrawal and to glean what little income 
they could from all available sources.
When we’d arrived in-country in January, we had expected to continue the pre-
vious ODAs’ strategy in Shkin: strengthen control of the border. This approach 
matched Aziz’s perception of the security situation, the desire of the supportive 
Shkin tribes, and even the doctrine put forward by the Army’s field manual on 
counterinsurgency. In 2010, however, a mission called Village Stability Opera-
tions (VSO), which was a grassroots effort to connect rural areas to the central 
government in Kabul through their respective district administrations, was en 
vogue. Under this construct, our team would need to find a strategically relevant 
community that actively desired to resist the Taliban. We would live in their 
village and mentor their security and local governance efforts, while delivering 
small-scale sustainable development projects to reward participation and slowly 
rebuild civil society. Given the political shift in our headquarters to support this 
nascent mission, and the debate in Kabul over the proposed Afghan Local Police 
(ALP) program, we knew we would soon receive a change of mission.
“What are we to do?” asked 
Malik Abdul. “It is fine to say 
the government supports us, 
but who will get here first? 
This matter is not about 
supporting the Taliban; it 
is about our survival.”
In 2010, a mission called 
Village Stability Operations, 
which was a grassroots effort 
to connect rural areas to the 
central government in Kabul 
through their respective district 
administrations, was en vogue.
“Jingle” truck
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As we scribbled notes and graphics on a six-foot-square map of the region, and 
glanced at hydro-topographical maps and graphics of population density, a 
subliminal outline emerged from the optical illusion of our military map. I drew 
the boundaries of a corridor running from Karachi, Pakistan, to the Ring Road 
highway in Ghazni, explaining: “This is where the people are, and this is where 
the chance for profit is. From the port at Karachi, north by rail to South Wa-
ziristan, then by road to Kabul and Kandahar, and it all cuts right through here.” 
Greg, our intelligence sergeant, chimed in, feverishly drawing circles on the map. 
“There’s a lot of potential, but we’ll have hard sells in Rabat and Surobi just to 
reach the hub in Orgun. And even if we convince Rabat, we’ll have to secure 
Spedar before we can do anything else.” He continued by highlighting the points 
of political pressure we could use to sway Rabat. Rob, the team’s engineer-cum-
resident politician, noted that political maneuvering could produce verbal and 
written commitment, but behavioral commitment was a step further. “They need 
to believe that the profit will come, and they need to believe it’ll stay after we 
leave. We can’t just secure the corridor; we need to pave it. At that point, they’ll 
be so invested they’ll have to fight for it.” Other team members noted that in the 
Money as a Weapon System–Afghanistan (MAAWS–A) directive, as well as our 
discussions with development organizations and the Provincial Reconstruction 
Team, no appetite for road paving existed.8 
Greg retorted, “ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and the Asian 
Development Bank already started paving the road from Sharana [the provincial 
capital] to Orgun, but had to stop when the Talibs took control of Sar Hawza. 
I know that a contract for the stretch from Orgun to Rabat was on the table 
before the development staffs decided to get out of the road-building business. 
A stretch from Rabat to Shkin would naturally tie into the road-paving project 
from Wana to Shkin that’s already underway. If we secure the corridor and the 
Afghans clearly rise up against the Talibs, and in return all that the people want 
is the road, ISAF will have no choice but to finish the road paving they started in 
Sharana. If we build it, they will come.”
I sat quietly for a moment, considering what the team had proposed, and then 
gave my assessment. “We’ll never sell this to the tribes in our words. We need 
Afghans to sell it for us. To convince them, we’ll need to inspire them. We’ll 
tell them they’re going to create a new Torkham Gate,9 without Kabul, without 
ISAF. They’ll build it, and they’ll own it. MAAWS–A is for dollars. This profit 
will be in rupees.” In other words, if the locals secured the corridor, they would 
make money regardless of the pending U.S. withdrawal of troops—and contract 
dollars—from Afghanistan. The most aggressive member of the team (which 
is quite an honorific, given his peers in the circle) stated the final point of the 
strategy plainly. “I love your theory, but these people respect strength. That’s 
why they respect the Talibs. Tell me where we get to fight someone to inspire 
the buy-in for the grand plan.” All eyes turned to a tiny point on the map to the 
northwest: Spedar.
Picking a Fight: 29 April 2010
Aziz’s assertions that every trip through the Spedar Pass resulted in a fight 
were not entirely accurate; when dismounted forces cleared the high ground 
that flanked the road prior to convoy arrival, the trip involved nothing beyond 
discovered IEDs. If we were to provoke an engagement, we needed to appear 
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vulnerable. Our convoy therefore consisted of only six lightly armored Humvees 
carrying 40 personnel—12 Americans and 28 of Aziz’s men—at the height of 
the midday sun, and we ceded the dominant high ground to the enemy. We also 
took pains to ensure that, shortly after our departure, the Taliban’s information 
network confirmed that our final destination was Orgun, which would require 
traveling through the pass. This allowed the enemy enough time to gather 
forces, but not enough to prepare and emplace complex explosive devices. Our 
firepower on these six vehicles would still outmatch what the enemy could 
realistically muster, but by allowing the Taliban access to the best ground and 
secure withdrawal routes, we knew they would fight. To further ensure a clash, 
we publicly reiterated our standing rule—one that endured throughout our two 
years in Paktika: so long as IEDs and mines were not used against us, we would 
not use air power or artillery. 
Aziz dispatched two of his most adept 
mine-spotters, dressed in full Taliban garb, 
through the pass on local motorcycles a 
half hour before our arrival. Our vehicles 
moved as quickly as the narrow, pitted road 
that climbed into the mountains north of 
Rabat would allow, with the result that 
intermittent bursts of speed were bracketed 
by slow crawls over eroded water crossings. 
The Taliban historically preferred to fight 
at the northern end of the pass, where the 
tall, craggy peaks provided a thick covering 
of cypress forest and commanding views 
of the road and the Orgun valley. Sure 
enough, as we rounded the final left turn 
into this traditional kill zone, the ambush 
we had been expecting began with a 
sustained burst of PKM machine gun fire. 
Only our first four vehicles could fit within 
the kill zone, and the rocky terrain pre-
vented mounted off-road maneuver, so our 
two trail vehicles were effectively neutral-
ized at the outset of the fight. Gunners in 
the lead vehicles returned fire with heavy weapons, while the remainder of the 
force dismounted and began a volley of rifle fire. Bullets pierced the thin turret 
armor of the Humvees as we emplaced our 60-millimeter mortar. The first round 
from this weapon, aimed directly at the enemy position less than 200 meters 
away, silenced the din. The trail vehicles’ dismounted personnel had organized a 
squad to flank the western high ground and started up the hill; by the time they 
completed the tiring ascent, the Talibs had retreated toward their stronghold in 
Hybati, carrying their equipment and casualties. Chamtu, as we found out, was 
unharmed. We nevertheless did not immediately attempt to pursue the Talibs. 
Our ultimate goal, then and throughout our time in the province, was to culti-
vate the perception of government strength at the expense of the Taliban, and 
we had achieved this. Controlling perceptions is more decisive than controlling 
physical terrain, and infinitely more important than attempts to kill the enemy.
We continued to the large base at Orgun, approximately 32 kilometers north of 
the pass, and received the infantry battalion commander’s blessing to focus our 
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tribal engagement efforts in Rabat. Successfully convincing 
the clans to secure the mountainous stretch from the Bermel 
Valley in the east through the Spedar Pass to the north would 
facilitate ground resupply of the commander’s isolated bases 
near the Pakistani border, as well as enable his holistic gov-
ernance and development objectives for eastern Paktika. He 
welcomed the ODA’s participation in the group’s meet-
ings, which provided an avenue to advance our concepts 
regarding the economic development that would follow 
security in the corridor. Once our scheme became a part of 
the Battlespace Owner’s larger plan, it would be difficult 
for our headquarters to disapprove the concept. We drove 
south toward Rabat, proceeding cautiously through Spedar 
without incident. As I surveyed the high ground, I considered how many points 
would require fixed fortifications to hold the road; it would be a daunting task of 
construction, if the political gambit even worked.  
We met again with the maliks, and Aziz pressured them for support. “Why are 
you afraid of Chamtu? We beat him easily, and you have hundreds more men,” 
he demanded. 
“You beat him this time, but he is still alive, and now he is surely angry,” replied 
Malik Bengal. “If he thinks we support you, he will come at night to our houses, 
not fight us in the pass.” Clearly, a comparison of available firepower would not 
sway them. I whispered in Aziz’s ear, “Tell them about your plan.” 
Aziz nodded, continued with his normal line of discussion, and once clear of 
the perception that I had influenced his words, he channeled his inner Socrates: 
“Malik Abdul, how many Jingle trucks come through here each week?” 
“Maybe a dozen, sometimes more.” 
“But a hundred reach the bazaar in Orgun each week, and this is the shortest 
route from Wana.” “True, but the route from Gomal is smoother, so they can 
make up the time.” 
The series of questions continued until the seed was planted. If the route through 
Rabat were secure and free of tolls, and the road were in good condition, more 
trucks would come. The truckers would prefer to stop in Rabat rather than in 
Surobi. An influx of trucks and weary travelers required more shops, service 
stations, and even hotels. Malik Abdul’s expression betrayed his agreement, 
although his words remained resolute: Rabat would not side 
against Chamtu.
We left the meeting, and as we approached the southeastern 
turn toward Shkin, Aziz’s ICOM radio crackled. A Taliban 
assassination cell had attempted to reach the house of Sher 
Nawaz, but not to fear, Aziz reassured us: the Ahmadzai 
had trapped them and killed them all. The route through the 
Bermel wadi to the east was faster than the one we were on, 
although much less secure, and after we turned onto it, our 
vehicles raced through the tree-lined washout to meet the 
Ahmadzai tribesmen. When we arrived, a group of Aziz’s 
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men from Shkin, sporting the proper policeman’s rubber gloves, was already there 
snapping photographs for evidence. The inventory of seized equipment suggested 
that this was a highly sophisticated team of killers. Their car’s rear axle sagged 
under the weight of a variety of specialized breaching charges, anti-personnel 
mines, handheld GPS devices, and an amount of small arms and ammunition that 
would have made the Irish Republican Army proud. Aziz took the four bodies 
to the Barmal District center for repatriation or burial, after which we returned 
to Shkin. As I sat in the operations center that evening writing my daily report, 
I knew that a crystal ball was not necessary to see our future; in short order, we 
would be re-missioned as a VSO team. Our headquarters would expect us to ally 
with the Ahmadzai, but in our minds, the tribe was merely the foothold—we 
needed another shura in Shkin, and we needed Rabat’s maliks to be there. 
Rabat’s Changing Allegiance: 5 May 2010 
The preparation for the shura between Shkin and Rabat was intensive: we held 
several preliminary meetings with the Shkin elders, collectively and individually. 
Azzam jotted copious notes and eventually produced a draft agreement that 
codified Rabat’s unequivocal support to the Afghan government. The maliks 
of Rabat would no doubt resist; so long as Chamtu lived, they would prefer the 
status quo to the risky venture of siding with the government. It was Aziz’s idea 
to produce formal, written agreements signed and sealed with a thumbprint. He 
explained to us that through the pressure of cultural norms, these agreements 
would deny the signatories the ability to provide financial or material support to 
the insurgency. Signed documents would not change private attitudes, but their 
existence would provide a framework free of meddling from resistant elders, 
which would make it possible to recruit the young people into a local defense 
force. Pending approval of the ALP decree, these chalwesti—the Pashtun tradi-
tional defense force—could make the transition into a legitimate security force 
under the Ministry of the Interior. 
Every Shkin elder memorized his role in the script and his key talking points 
in preparation for facing the maliks in the upcoming shura. Some elders would 
appear nervous concerning Rabat’s intentions toward the Gol Kot watershed 
on the border with the Othmanzai and worry that if Rabat failed to give full 
support to the government, a tribal war was inevitable. The veiled threat of 
a tribal war with Ahmadzai support against Rabat was, after all, the maliks’ 
worst-case scenario. Other elders would use self-fulfilling prophecies of Rabat’s 
inevitable commitment to the government to show solidarity with their Banzai 
Kharoti kinsmen in Shkin. The most vocal group would use Islamic principles 
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to denounce Chamtu and his group, suggesting that the Taliban-allied maliks 
were religiously flawed and therefore a legitimate target. Sher Nawaz, with 
his college-educated wisdom and eloquence, would mediate the discussion, 
providing a moderating force so as not to threaten the maliks too far. We were 
confident that, given enough collective pressure, the maliks’ only remaining 
argument would be a lack of defensive fortifications in the community. We 
began coordinating for the materials and heavy equipment required to construct 
these defensive positions. We would build it, and they would come. 
When the shura adjourned after less than two hours, the tribes’ and team’s 
combined preparations appeared to have worked: the maliks of Rabat emerged 
from Azzam’s office looking stunned. The nervous group, under Aziz’s escort, 
returned north to the village and sent word to Chamtu. It read simply, “You 
cannot come to Rabat. We have an agreement with the government. We have no 
choice.” Several days later, we received word that a delegation from Chamtu had 
indeed arrived and sat with the elders, where the message was reiterated. That 
night, several rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) struck the wall of Malik Abdul’s 
house. No one was hurt; Daria Khan arrived with a dozen heavily armed men to 
stand guard until dawn. Rabat was committed, albeit reluctantly. The onus was 
now on my team to find Chamtu. 
A Lucky Turn: 8 June 2010
For two weeks, we neglected our normal routines, shuras, and patrols. Chamtu 
was the only goal. Aziz and the ODA team repositioned to Orgun to shorten 
our response time to Rabat. We received additional resources from our chain of 
command to aid in the search, but after two weeks, we still had not found our 
“white whale.”10 Chamtu’s group attacked the Surobi district center with mortar 
fire, prompting another patrol. Aziz was clearly frustrated, as were the members 
of the team. 
“I’m not feeling well today,” Aziz told me as our patrol made ready to go out. 
“My deputy, Faqir, will lead the patrol.” 
This news further demoralized the team, because Faqir lacked Aziz’s competence 
and leadership skills, and had a volatile personality. All I could answer was 
“Alright, Aziz, we’ll tell you what we find.” We intended to head south along 
the western edge of the Orgun valley with a convoy of eight Humvees and 
45 personnel, along the foothills of the rugged mountains that divide east and 
west Paktika. At Zama, we would turn southeast toward the Surobi district 
center, meeting with locals in the bazaar and with the district governor to gain 
information regarding Chamtu’s whereabouts. Faqir nodded absentmindedly 
as we briefed the route and talking points for each meeting. His clear lack of 
comprehension, coupled with his subsequent abrasive barking of commands, 
did not bode well for the patrol’s prospects. We drove through the lush greenery 
lining Orgun’s southern approach with little hope of a productive day.
In short order, Faqir took a wrong turn, and we found ourselves drifting aimlessly 
through ominous mountain passes in the Taliban stronghold of Charbaran. Our 
attempts to guide Faqir back to the valley were unavailing, but finally our inter-
preter passed him the message, “Turn east at the next pass and keep going.” He 
obliged, and we found ourselves cresting the mountains through a dense alpine 
forest. As we descended, we were relieved that, if nothing else, we were heading 
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in the right direction. The forest continued to thin; my Humvee was third in line 
as we reached the tree line. I heard an excited shout from my gunner. My eyes 
shifted to the left, tracing the turn of his turret, and widened as I met the return 
gaze of Chamtu’s entire force, comfortably encamped perhaps 75 meters away. 
No orders were given; our convoy wheeled left and accelerated.
The rapid thump of heavy machine guns and the staccato racket of every light 
weapon was punctuated by intermittent explosions from our grenade launcher 
and enemy RPG-7s as our vehicles jostled over the uneven terrain. The shocked 
Talibs retreated in the only direction they could—into the open valley—and 
when the skirmish ended, 23 of them lay dead. With no additional enemy fire 
from the mountains, it seemed clear that none had escaped the assault. The 
fight was over almost before it began, and as we secured our final position, our 
intelligence sergeant frantically moved from body to body with a picture of 
Chamtu. “I think this is him, guys… I think we got him,” he finally called out. 
We gathered in a circle to look upon the white whale—there was little doubt in 
our minds that this was indeed Chamtu. What doubt remained was cast aside 
as the reports confirming our assumption flowed in to Aziz from villagers across 
Surobi District: “Chamtu is dead. They’re all dead.” 
Several days after the fight, we returned to Rabat with equipment and supplies 
to begin work on the town’s fort, and were welcomed as heroes.11 The men of the 
future ALP unit, emboldened by the patrol’s success, were standing in formation, 
ready to participate in the defense of their community. Working alongside Aziz 
and his soldiers, the once-contentious tribes erected their unified fort within 
three days. The maliks were overjoyed; freed from Chamtu’s influence, they 
began to believe that an economic revival was possible. As one elder later stated 
after the Rabat defense force became a full-fledged ALP unit, “Before there were 
ALP on this road, there were thieves. Now we have ALP, the bad guys are gone, 
and there is security on the roads. They’re solving a bigger problem, not just a 
small problem.”12 As the team drove away again toward Shkin, we spied a newly 
raised Afghan flag fluttering in the breeze on the highest peak above the town. 
Catastrophic Success: 5 August 2010
Word spread rapidly of Chamtu’s death, as well as of Aziz’s decisive victory two 
days later in an arranged fight against the Taliban stronghold of Pirkowti, about 
32 kilometers north of Rabat.13 Seventeen tribes from Orgun to Surobi quickly 
signed agreements to support the Afghan government. My thoughts were 
initially preoccupied by self-satisfaction, but that was short-lived. Frankly, I was 
not prepared for the effort needed to expand our activities into these newly won-
over areas so rapidly. Aziz’s original zone of responsibility around Shkin had 
encompassed roughly 10 square kilometers. The addition of Rabat had extended 
his bubble to 50 square kilometers, and with the new tribal signatories, we now 
found ourselves duty-bound to defend over 600 square kilometers and over 
100,000 people. We did not possess enough equipment and material to build 
any additional community fortifications, or to supply local defense forces with 
radio communication. I thought hopefully of the impending approval of the 
ALP decree, which promised to outfit our irregulars once they were properly 
trained and vetted by the Ministry of the Interior. Still, even if a signed decree 
materialized, no supplies had yet been procured; we had no means to supply, 
support, and mentor so many local police formations, especially over such 
distances.  
My eyes shifted to the left and 
widened as I met the return 
gaze of Chamtu’s entire force.
 I had failed to adequately plan 
for our best-case scenario, and it 
very nearly ended the expansion 
of the corridor at Rabat.
16
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 3
The Taliban, though weakened and off-balance, responded. A shopkeeper 
in the Surobi bazaar found the severed head of the most prominent elder of 
the Adikhel Kharoti tribe, a new and staunch supporter of VSO, sitting in the 
road. The killing sent shock waves through the Shkin-to-Orgun corridor. I had 
failed to adequately plan for our best-case scenario, and it very nearly ended the 
expansion of the corridor at Rabat. To complicate matters, our deployment was 
drawing to a close, and most of our equipment had already been packed and 
sent to Bagram. At that point, we were capable of little more than shuras and 
token patrols. Luckily, Aziz’s skill as a mediator held the fragile alliance together. 
Winter was coming, and our team was forecast to return in six months. The new 
team that arrived to replace us would later incorporate the Shkin and Rabat 
chalwesti into the nascent ALP program. I briefed our long-term plan, and left 
simple guidance: “Don’t lose ground.”
Entering the Next Phase: Spring 2011
ODA 3325 returned to Paktika Province in March 2011. This temporal and phys-
ical separation from the problem had allowed us to generate and validate creative 
solutions to solidify the gains of 2010. To fortify the corridor, we designed a 
relatively cheap but persistent program to furnish each district governor with a 
suite of rented heavy equipment, including flatbed trucks to move it. With this 
equipment, the governors were able to demonstrate a new level of responsiveness 
to local needs and grievances by digging culverts and trenches, grading pitted 
roads, and building earthen barriers to delimit land dispute resolutions. Just as 
importantly, when the equipment was not being used for these purposes, it was 
available to rapidly erect village fortifications. Our headquarters and supportive 
ISAF brethren provided a seemingly endless supply of reinforced barriers, 
plywood, and beams. By June 2011, over 400 ALP recruits defended 14 posts that 
secured the 60-kilometer stretch from Shkin to Orgun. The traffic began to flow, 
and as we predicted, the bazaars began to grow. Paving eventually resumed, con-
necting Orgun to Rabat with a ribbon of shimmering asphalt and stone bridges. 
Travel time diminished from two hours to 30 minutes. A later contract through 
the Asian Development Bank promised to pave the tortuous route from Rabat 
to Shkin as well.
Our political and administrative burdens mounted, however, as the effort to 
secure the corridor expanded. In the beginning, talk of the enemy dominated 
the shuras. Now, Aziz found himself mediating tribal disputes, assisting in the 
parking and sewage management of Orgun, and periodically answering sum-
mons to Kabul to speak with Afghan president Hamid Karzai. My team was 
stretched thin supporting the ALP against periodic attacks while still expanding 
the fortification of the corridor. Two additional communities located about 19 
kilometers to the north of Orgun had petitioned to participate in the ALP, which 
brought our influence to the edge of the Zadran tribe in Zerok District. VSO 
had moved far beyond the village concept in eastern Paktika, and signs of stress 
began to appear. In some communities, elders exercised their authority under 
the VSO construct to replace ALP leadership, in direct defiance of Aziz. Taliban 
supporters forwarded fabricated tales of ALP extortion to Kabul. The ODA team 
was simply overworked, and I was oblivious to their concerns; the road was all I 
saw anymore. As they relayed the sorry state of our vehicles and infrastructure, 
I would begin talking about potential expansion in Gayan District or Zerok 
District. Naively, perhaps, I told myself that with a concerted effort, we could 
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quickly secure the final district remaining to link the corridor to Ghazni and the 
Ring Road: Sar Hawza.  
The Edge of Influence: July 2011
Sar Hawza District was affectionately referred to as “the Taliban headquarters” 
by the citizens of Orgun. Some commercial traffic braved the route to the 
provincial capital of Sharana, but the burnt-out hulks of dozens of vehicles that 
lined the road testified to the truth of its lawless reputation. 
In particular, a sharp bend in the road, which Americans 
referred to as “Gulruddin” due to the inaccurate label on our 
military maps, was notorious as a convenient location for the 
extortion and execution of civilians, as well as for pitched 
ambushes on military convoys. The Afghans had a different 
name for this final hurdle on the road: Shwaykamar.  
Shwaykamar held a special form of psychological control 
over the population. Beaten dirt roads and several cuts led 
north to Marzak village, and then over the mountains to 
Naka District, the birthplace of the Haqqani family and the 
notorious Haqqani crime network.14 Marzak was the Tali-
ban’s rear area during Operation Anaconda in 2002 and had 
never truly been wrested from their control.15 From this base 
of operations, large groups of Taliban fighters projected at 
will a mere seven kilometers southeast into the Shwaykamar 
area. Few families in Orgun lacked a victim of beheading, 
and they all refused to drive west without military escort. As a result, no matter 
what progress our original corridor might make, without control of this terrain to 
the east, our stronghold of Paktika would remain, essentially, an island unto itself.
The Last Domino
The team’s original plan had envisioned reaching this point after 36 months of 
slow and steady expansion. Now, after a mere 16 months, from our latest village 
fortification on the hill above Shatowray village in Sar Hawza District, we found 
ourselves surveying the next move—the last move to open the road to Kabul. 
This push, however, would be different: no village existed from which to recruit 
ALP, and both the Sulaimankhel tribes and Hassankhel Kharoti clans populating 
the area were decidedly hostile to VSO. We also found that Aziz’s cult of per-
sonality had little sway across Sar Hawza. We had encountered obstacles from 
competing power brokers in the past; the Othmanzai of northern Bermel and 
the Pirkowti tribe had both successfully denied our political and military maneu-
vers. However, these tribal areas were easily isolated and bypassed as the corridor 
crept northwest. We could not bypass Shwaykamar, and so we could not bypass 
the influence of Mullah Yaquob. 
Yaquob was short and unimposing, and was missing his right arm below the 
elbow. He, like most of his generation, had fought the Russians in the 1980s, and 
done so very effectively. The veteran mujahedeen commanders who led the siege 
of Orgun and the defense of the Khost-Gardez Highway through the Sata-
Kandow Pass (1985–86) had returned home to the Sar Hawza and Zerok Dis-
tricts following the conflict. Their fame and influence still eclipsed the rising star 
of Commander Aziz, and he did not like to be reminded of this fact. Each shura 
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with Yaquob and his followers followed the same bad script: We exchanged 
greetings and pleasantries, extolled the value of the ALP program, and when that 
inevitably failed, reiterated the veiled threat of direct action against Marzak and 
Shwaykamar. The tribes were unimpressed; they knew, as we did, that without 
tribal support, we would have to convince the Afghan National Army (ANA) or 
Afghan National Police (ANP) from Sharana to come in and secure the point. 
We would probably have better luck convincing the Taliban’s Mullah Omar to 
provide constables than these suspicious tribesmen.
We first approached the ANA brigade commander to discuss options. Provincial 
governor Mohibullah Samim, perhaps our greatest political supporter, went so 
far as to order the commander to man a post if we built it for them. The political 
and economic reality of his brigade’s operations, however, would never allow 
such an action. The ANA units in Orgun and Sharana were adequate garrison 
troops and enjoyed a degree of popular respect. They also received some fringe 
financial benefits due to their proximity to the profitable businesses in the 
bazaars. Given the relative comfort and status of their routines, commanders 
were reluctant to risk open confrontations in the Taliban’s territory, especially 
if failure meant loss of prestige and position. The Afghan chain of command 
understood the political balancing act required to maintain officer morale; as a 
result, a common response to an undesired request for support was to forward 
the request to a higher rung in the chain of command, where the proposal was 
inevitably denied. In this manner, the ANA brigade commander, skilled in the 
political tactics of delay, avoided committing troops to Shwaykamar. Governor 
Samim persisted in his efforts, but we were impatient, as well as uncertain that 
we could overcome the institutional top-cover of the Ministry of Defense. Aziz 
therefore turned to another strong supporter, in words if not in deeds, for help 
manning the outpost: Paktika provincial chief of police Daulat Khan.
Daulat Khan was a thin, jovial man, always dressed in a pressed uniform adorned 
with as many badges as the bazaar could provide. His office was littered with 
parting gifts from American military advisors, and the walls were covered 
with pictures of him speaking at the most fashionable gatherings. He was not, 
however, a particularly ambitious man. Daulat did not desire promotion, but 
rather coveted a strong reputation in the province of his birth. He had pro-
vided Aziz with an increasing amount of administrative and logistical support as 
our effort expanded, and was more than happy to claim his share of credit for its 
success as a result. Aziz would, through this self-interested patriot, find the forces 
required to seize Shwaykamar from the Talibs. 
With the agreement to man the proposed outpost settled between Aziz and 
Khan, we began to consolidate a massive amount of construction material and 
the entirety of the region’s leased heavy equipment. This operation would 
unfold during the month of Ramadan, which provided its own set of limitations 
and complications. Nonetheless, the effort proceeded. On 20 August 2011, the 
advance guard of this enormous column of trucks and equipment, spearheaded 
by a platoon of Aziz’s men with ODA advisors, arrived in Shwaykamar and 
secured key terrain. Several hours later, a combat train of more than 50 vehicles 
began to arrive. Bulldozers and excavators slid down the ramps and set to 
work on the first task: cutting a road up the mountain. Within three days, 
the fortification was complete, and we prepared the defense in anticipation of 
Daulat Khan’s arrival. Each night, the Talibs probed the position by firing inac-
curate volleys of RPGs. We began to wonder whether Daulat Khan would honor 
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the agreement, but on the fourth day, 40 ANP arrived to man their posts. The 
probing attacks quickly ceased.
Aziz watched the men arrive and take their places, then unexpectedly jumped 
on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) and sped toward the town of Sharana, as my 
ATV and two Humvees raced to keep pace and ensure he arrived safely. When 
he reached the bustling Sharana bazaar, Aziz rode in a wide circle, announcing 
on his megaphone, “Shwaykamar is taken! The road is open!” Additional riders 
were dispatched to the Orgun bazaar to proclaim the news. With the final 
fortification manned and functioning, one third of the ODA remained to provide 
support while the rest of us returned to Orgun to refit the column and plan the 
next iteration of VSO expansion. We arrived in Orgun on 24 August, and on the 
morning of 26 August decided to purchase food from the bazaar to break the 
Ramadan fast with Aziz and his men. The scene that unfolded four days later was 
unimaginable.
Eid al-Fitr, the holiest of Islam’s holy days, marks the end of Ramadan; in 
2011, Eid fell on 30 August. Traditionally in Orgun, families reassemble from 
across the country, flooding the bazaar with revelers and music. The music had 
fallen silent in 2006, when the Taliban regained control of 
Shwaykamar and effectively isolated Orgun natives working 
in Kabul and beyond from their families. With the road now 
open for the first time in five years, we found that the bazaar, 
despite its significant expansion over the past several months, 
was woefully unprepared for the mass of the diaspora’s 
return. The streets bulged with arriving Hilux trucks and 
taxicabs ferrying hundreds and thousands of the previously 
displaced back to their ancestral home. On the night of 
Eid, we broke the fast in Aziz’s dining room, then drove 
toward the bazaar with our escorts. The music, cheering, 
and ceaseless snapping of celebratory rifle fire grew louder as 
we approached. The throng became too dense for our Land 
Cruiser to transit, so we paused and sat on the roof and the 
hood, watching the surreal scene in amazement. I turned 
to Paizullah, my perpetual bodyguard when I was walking 
among the people, and shook his hand as he smiled at the 
sight. 
Paizullah was killed the following month as we expanded into Sar Hawza. I like 
to think that in that moment in the bazaar, his smile reflected the underlying 
lesson I carry from Paktika. Aziz and I had made so many mistakes in the last 17 
months, and these mistakes were not without significant cost in resources and 
human suffering. The gains we had made remained fragile and reversible. But at 
least now, the villagers had seen what was possible; they saw for themselves that 
their hopelessness was unfounded, and that a motivated group of people can 
achieve what was previously accepted as impossible. Given enough motivation, 
there is no such thing as a no-win scenario. v
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NOTES
1  Motocross is a type of motorcycle racing that typically takes place 
on dirt-track courses with obstacles such as jumps and berms.
2  Tim Mcgirk, “Battle in ‘the Evilest Place,’” Time, 27 
October 2003: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,526466,00.html 
3  Shuras are traditional meetings of the communal and religious 
leadership to make decisions for the community.
4 Shkin is a community that lies at the southern tip of Barmal 
District on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and is officially 
recognized as a part of Barmal District. Due to intertribal feuds 
and an increasingly strong alliance with Aziz and his base at Shkin, 
however, the local tribes decided that Shkin should be its own 
district. These tribes first forwarded the proposal to the central 
government in Kabul in 2008, but to the author’s best knowledge, 
it is still an unofficial district with an unofficial governor. 
5  A television channel in the United States devoted to the live 
broadcasting of government hearings.
6 Rabat is composed of five Adikhel Kharoti clans with a total 
estimated population of 10,000. Each clan is roughly similar in 
size, although the agricultural quality of their land and access to 
water determines the relative power structure between them. The 
Langikhel clan is most powerful, followed by the Abbaskhel, the 
Issakhel, the Ibrahimkhel, and the Adikhel (not to be confused 
with the Adikhel sub-tribe, to which each clan belongs). Each clan 
occupies roughly three square kilometers of land that is generally 
delta-shaped; one point of each triangle converges on the Rabat 
Lgad stream near the town’s bazaar, while in the hills beyond the 
outer edge of each triangle is the clan’s grazing area. 
7 In Rabat, unlike the other communities of the region, the 
clan leader is called the malik (or “king,” in Arabic). Without 
the support of the maliks, it is difficult to achieve anything of 
substance in Afghanistan. And while it is possible to undercut the 
influence of one tribal leader in favor of another or a preferred 
coalition of leaders, we used this approach only as a last resort. 
We had to take such a tack, for example, in Sar Hawza.
8  United States Forces–Afghanistan, Money as a Weapon System—
Afghanistan: Commander’s Emergency Relief Program (CERP) 
SOP, USFOR–A Pub 1-06 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Forces–
Afghanistan, December 2009): http://www.usma.edu/cnrcd/
siteassets/sitepages/government%20publications/maaws-a,%20
usfor-a%20cerp%20sop%20(dec%2009).pdf 
9  The Torkham Gate is the primary entry point for commercial 
traffic into Nangarhar Province and eastern Afghanistan.
10 This is a reference to the white sperm whale that is hunted 
throughout the famous American novel Moby-Dick; or, The White 
Whale, by Herman Melville (1851). 
11 Yaroslav Trofimov, “U.S. Enlists New Afghan Village Forces,” Wall 
Street Journal, 1 July 2010: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052748704103904575336933258787038 
12 Lizette Hart, “Connecting Islands: ALP Brings Villages Together,” 
DVIDS, 23 December 2011: http://www.dvidshub.net/
news/81721/connecting-islands-alp-brings-villages-together#.
U4Tmyj7n8dV 
13 For a detailed account of this action, see Linda Robinson, One 
Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare 
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2013). 
14 See Lars W. Lilleby, “The Haqqani Network: 
Pursuing Feuds under the Guise of Jihad?,” CTX 3, 
no. 4 (November 2013): https://globalecco.org/
the-haqqani-network-pursuing-feuds-under-the-guise-of-jihad 
15 For a detailed account of Operation Anaconda, see Imre Porkoláb, 
“When the Goldfish Meets the Anaconda: A Modern Fable 
on Unconventional Leadership,” CTX 3, no. 3 (August 2013): 
https://globalecco.org/when-the-goldfish-meets-the-anaconda-a-
modern-fable-on-unconventional-leadership 
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Islam is and should be a core education topic for Special Opera-
tions units. Dozens of nations’ armed forces have been engaging enemies in 
Muslim-majority countries for decades. Besides violent engagements, Special 
Forces partnerships are growing in places like Morocco, Senegal, Niger, Chad, 
Somalia, and Kenya. In many Western countries, religion is a side note, an 
asterisk. But in West and East Africa, Islam determines much of life’s patterns. 
The aspects that think tanks, inter-religious foundations, universities, and formal 
military courses must strive to explain are the visible tension and variation inside 
Islam itself. This tension can lead to violence where Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike are the victims. Because militaries are in the business of security and stabil-
ity, understanding the causes of violence in any social context is obligatory.
The strategy for teaching Islam to Special Forces members has included various 
approaches, without losing sight of two very important objectives. The first 
objective is to gain an honest understanding of Islam, especially as it relates to 
military and diplomatic engagements. Security-sector assistance and long-term 
military partnerships are possible only when mutual cultural understanding is 
present. The second objective is to gain mutual respect through inter-religious 
dialogue, to correct misperceptions, and to avoid overgeneralizing the “source” 
of violent extremism.1 In this paper, I argue that while these objectives are noble, 
the method and specific instruction for achieving the objectives, which are influ-
enced by media accounts and even “moderate” Muslims, have been overgeneral-
ized to the point of becoming unhelpful and potentially dangerous. These sincere 
but misleading approaches will ultimately achieve the opposite of their intent.  
Furthermore, in recent contingencies, religion has been labeled a taboo topic. 
Special Operations forces are told to avoid the topic in every instance. This in-
junction ignores two important factors: (1) religious discussions do not harbor 
the same heated undertones in every region, even between Muslim regions, and 
(2) religion is often the most important, if not the favorite, topic for an African 
Muslim. How does one build a relationship when a prime topic of discussion is 
consciously avoided?
Instruction and the Media on Islam
This may be an optimistic assumption, but most Special Forces operators have 
received some kind of formal education on Islam. In initial education models, 
SF members learn the basic “five pillars” of Islam, which focus on praxis, or the 
outward expression of the religion. Members with a more personal interest may 
receive a deeper education on Islamic beliefs and the theological pillars, in-
cluding a discussion of tawhid, iman, ‘adl, and reward and punishment.2 Due to 
more recent events and the conflicts in the Middle East, Special Forces members 
are digging deeper to understand the sources of violent extremism, the roots of 
Islamist teachings, and dangerous takfiri ideology. In most curricula, the military 
member will be reminded that the violent extremist Salafist ideology represents a 
Education on Islam for Special Forces Needs an Overhaul:  
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very small minority of the world’s Muslims.3 That small percentage, however, can 
do a lot of damage physically, socially, and psychologically.   
The “takfiri” title used to describe today’s terrorist groups and activities is 
important. Takfiri is related in its root to the word kafr. Kafr can be translated 
as “unbeliever” and kufr as “unbelief.” Takfir is the practice of calling out un-
believers, specifically Muslims who have supposedly turned away from proper 
Islam. The takfiri terrorist takes this accusation to the extreme conclusion and 
deems “apostate” Muslims a legitimate target because they have abandoned 
Islam. Al Qaeda and its various branches—Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, 
Ansar al-Sharia in North Africa, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, to name a few—
are takfiri terrorist organizations.4 Most Muslims and non-Muslims alike agree 
that takfiri terrorism is the enemy of all.  
There are two additional items that must be clarified from the previous ex-
planation. First, despite the vigorous efforts of a few well-respected Muslims 
to remove teachings on apostasy from 
Islam altogether using Islamic methods of 
kalam (rational argument), the majority of 
Muslim clerics hold the belief that someone 
who leaves Islam deserves death.5 The 
takfiri terrorist, however, bypasses the mod-
erate Islamic justice system, which makes 
“proving” apostasy almost impossible and 
leaves the punishment up to God. Second, 
in expediting the punishment of supposed 
apostasy, the takfiri terrorist utilizes an 
extreme interpretation of shari’a law, often 
called Wahhabi Salafism, which bases 
all legal interpretation on the literal and 
legalistic reading of the Qur’an and Hadith 
and rejects other valid legal methods, such 
as consensus (ijma’a), analogy (qiyās), 
or personal judgment and independent 
reasoning (ijtihaad).6  
What begins as a simple explanation of Islam is necessarily transformed into a 
theological and legalistic discussion of what it means to be Muslim. The Salafist 
thought that can lead to violent takfiri extremism is often called an ideology. 
But as Anna Simons points out, this takfiri theology has been around since the 
beginning decades of Islam in 700 AD, and arises from a fundamentally religious 
outlook more than an easily corrected or logically defeated ideology.7 Ideology 
and religion aside, a correct understanding of this aspect of Islam can help coun-
terterrorism professionals to directly identify the perpetrator of unjust violence 
and the violator of human rights. In addition, this education for SF personnel 
can serve to correct stereotypical assumptions about all Muslims, thus righting 
destructive prejudices.8  
As is already made clear in the previous paragraphs, it is important to know who 
is defining the problem and who, overall, can claim to represent the Muslim 
ummah, the “global population of Muslims.” Media machines, policy think 
tanks, Muslim professors, and Western academics are striving to define and label 
these Islamic phenomena. Misrepresenting all Muslims as terrorists is just as 
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dangerous in the long run as the extreme counter-approach that the moderate 
moguls have come up with of late; nowadays, all Muslims tend to be placed 
neatly into one of two categories: “good” or “bad.”
Deciding Who Is Good or Bad 
Drawing from my own review of media (in Arabic, French, and English), 
think tank papers, research reports, and lectures from Special Operations 
curricula, I have developed a list of the terms most commonly used to 
describe these two categories, as shown in table 1.9
On the one hand, having a chart to give us the “answers” is very handy. 
In the struggle to define a Muslim, there will be those who claim to have 
the “correct” definition, which, at the political and diplomatic levels, 
might conceivably be useful to accept. This may aid in a very surface 
understanding of various Muslim movements, but there are simply too 
many social, cultural, historical, environmental, and self-interested actors 
in this “name game” to render such a dichotomy very useful, especially 
in regard to ground-level, relational interactions. A few of the labels 
are completely misleading but still very tempting for the secular Western 
audience to apply. The best analysis of Islam and Muslims, as with any other 
large ethnic or religious group, looks at each region, state, province, and village 
on its own merit. When Special Forces members are directly engaged in-country 
at these several levels, doing everything from assisting in combat to advising on 
civil-military relations, there is no one representative answer to what it means to 
be Muslim. 
The “Bad” List: Wahhabi and Salafi
Wahhabi Islam is a school of thought related to the Hanbali tradition of juris-
prudence. Wahhabis are found mostly in the Persian Gulf states, notably Saudi 
Arabia, where the ruling Saud monarchy continues a fragile power-sharing 
agreement with the Wahhabi religious establishment—each giving tacit and ac-
tive consent, and therefore legitimacy, to the other. Saudi Arabia is not officially 
categorized as a state sponsor of terrorism, but it is certainly difficult to balance 
the realpolitik of Saudi Arabia’s international relations when Wahhabi thought 
is so closely connected with more extreme Wahhabi teachings. The international 
political realm has a tightrope to walk in its relations with this enormously 
important country when considering the “bad” and “good” columns of table 1.10 
What is Salafism? According to the Jordanian Royal Islamic Strategic Studies 
Centre, Salafism is not regarded as a school of jurisprudence or theology.11 In 
most definitions, it is labeled as Salafi thought, which gives it more of a philo-
sophical or ideological connotation.12 According to The Muslim 500: The World’s 
500 Most Influential Muslims 2013/14, a publication by the Jordanian Royal 
Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, “Salafism seeks to revive the practice of Islam 
as it was at the time of Muhammad and can be critical of too much emphasis 
being placed on thinkers from after this period. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab 
(1703–1792 CE) was an important figure in the resurrection of this ideology, 
therefore Salafism is often simply known as Wahhabism.”13 
Salafi movements and their active and passive followers are too politically 
and economically influential to label as “bad” (even calling them a minority 
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undersells the impact), especially in the Arab world. The “Top 50” section of The 
Muslim 500 lists more than a dozen Salafi figures, and for at least the three edi-
tions prior to the 2013 edition the top slot went to a Salafi, Saudi Arabia’s King 
Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud.14 Salafi political parties exist in force from 
Morocco to Kuwait. Their leaders and religious teachers are avid Facebook users. 
They are often the respected voice defending Islam in disruptive areas such as 
Syria and Lebanon.15 Their movements are as varied as they are influential. Not 
only is it misleading to regard Salafi thought as a less-important minority sect, 
but labeling Salafism as “bad” per se completely disregards the diversity of its 
leaders and followers. Many Salafi thinkers trace their ideas to Wahhabi scholars. 
Other less-studious and more-zealous Salafis tend to focus on modern Muslims’ 
apparent decadence and lack of religious duty and practice. But there are Salafi 
movements that are leaning toward political compromise, others that reject 
violence, and still others that want nothing more than to retreat in silence and 
give themselves completely to the individual study of the Qur’an and Hadith.  
An Al Jazeera report on Salafism in West Africa described three types of Salafism. 
Purist Salafism is nonviolent and seeks to reform Islam away from Sufi and 
“heterodox” movements, basing its teachings on the Qur’an and Hadith alone. 
Political Salafism, which works alongside the political establishment in support 
of a political party or regime, could be considered a subset of general Islamism or 
political Islam. Finally, jihadi Salafism is the violent form of Salafi thought associ-
ated with takfiri groups.16 With these categories in mind, the Moroccan reformed 
jihadi Salafist Sheikh Fizazi believed that there was hope to bring Salafi followers 
away from violent extremism and focus on purist Salafism alone, a movement to 
which King Mohammed VI of Morocco gives active support.17
At the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, there were those who wanted to 
give the Salafist movements a chance and those who prophesied only chaos 
if Salafists were given a share of government. In some cases, the former were 
correct. The latter cases may have been examples of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Respected analysts like Robin Wright, in her book and corresponding blog titled 
The Islamists Are Coming, came down somewhere in the middle: the behavior 
of any Salafist movement completely depended on the country, its history, and 
its unique political environment.18 Depending on the context, during the Arab 
Spring many analysts and Arab Muslims applied a “let’s wait and see” attitude to 
Salafist and Islamist groups.
Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood
A large number of Muslim scholars are endorsing what they consider to be the 
“cure-all” for “bad” Islam: “good” religious education. As in Morocco and also in 
Mauritania, there are efforts to reform violent extremists by correcting their Islamic 
theology and takfiri ideas through re-education. More recently, the outspoken 
target for religious re-education has been Muslim Brotherhood supporters and 
sympathizers. Analysts, Muslim and non-Muslim, have been generally baffled by 
the split-offs, evolution, pacification, revolution, and resurgent extremism of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. There is a historical and ideological connection between 
Brotherhood teachings and violent Islamist groups, and it is well documented 
that some Muslim Brotherhood splinter groups formed the base of many of 
today’s takfiri groups. The various Brotherhood branches today, however, do not 
all maintain the same links and strategies. Some have played important roles in 
Egypt’s economic development and in political administration at the local level. 
Syria’s former president Hafez al-Assad and Egypt’s former president Hosni 
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Mubarak not only kept the Brotherhood on the “bad” list but also resorted to 
extreme measures to politically marginalize or even physically exterminate its 
members, a trend that has only deepened under each president’s successor. 
In 2012, a U.S. military officer instructor triggered a chain reaction of reform in 
the Department of Defense’s approach to teaching Islam when he was accused 
of indirectly describing all Muslims as the enemy and showcasing his research 
claiming that the Muslim Brotherhood is embedded in and seeking to dominate 
the American government.19 The partisan language and gross overgeneraliza-
tions of the instruction were not in line with the educational objectives of 
understanding and respecting Islam and Muslims. In Egypt today, however, 
the Muslim Brotherhood clearly remains on the “bad” list. The government of 
General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi not only banned all Muslim Brotherhood activity 
after deposing the Brotherhood’s elected president Mohamed Morsi, but also 
removed all Brotherhood associates from religious establishments and criminal-
ized any direct or indirect contact with the Brotherhood or its activities.20 The 
Egyptian courts have recently rounded up thousands of people suspected of 
being Muslim Brotherhood activists, and so far have condemned over 700 to 
death in questionably legal trials, most in absentia.21 
Egypt announced its stance on the Muslim Brotherhood to the rest of the 
world, tacitly encouraging neighboring countries to follow its lead.22 So far, only 
Saudi Arabia has done so to the extent that Egypt would like.23 Tunisia, Libya, 
Morocco, and Jordan are still working hard to come to a political compromise 
with their Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi parties; Tunisia and Bahrain reject 
the idea that the Muslim Brotherhood is globally united. Its various offshoots in 
different countries have developed independent movements capable of enjoining 
more-moderate principles.24 
The Muslim Brotherhood, far from being an elite band of radicals, represents a 
large portion of society in Egypt and, to a lesser extent, the Arab world, whether 
religiously, theologically, or just socially. Some Brotherhood leaders elsewhere in 
the region are looking at Egypt and learning to tone down their rhetoric, and to 
favor the more moderate popular sentiment above hardline political Islamism. 
The United States, for its part, prefers 
stability above all, and has refused 
to come down in favor of any side. 
This careful position has led parts of 
moderate Egyptian Muslim society 
to discredit the United States for 
attempting to mediate between all 
religious parties in Egypt, including 
the Brotherhood.
Jihadis
The term jihad is often linked to 
the other “bad” Muslim titles to 
make them even more “bad.”25 In 
most media contexts, jihad refers 
to Muslims who resort to violence 
to promote their beliefs. Moderate 
Muslim scholars and academics 
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continue to correct the improper view of jihad by explaining that the most 
important jihad is the struggle to live a good life, eschew temptation, and sup-
port one’s family. However, in this sense, jihad needs more than just these two 
contextual definitions; it requires a third, a middle way. The first kind of jihad is 
the internal fight to be a good Muslim. The second kind is the takfiri jihad taken 
on by terrorists with the intent to wipe out all apostate Muslims, and the people 
and governments who support them. The first definition is related to moderate 
Islam, and the second to Salafi or Wahhabi extremist teachings. The third kind 
of jihad sits somewhere between these two.
To support the inner jihad as the only legitimate jihad and condemn the takfiri 
jihad as un-Islamic is only partially correct. The conflict in Syria, continuing 
rhetoric against Israel, and the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq remind us 
that even moderate Muslims will find clerical and Qur’anic support to defend 
their brethren, and Islam itself, from slaughter, invasion, and slander.26 One does 
not need jihadi teaching to be inspired to defend one’s own country or neigh-
bors; any patriotic citizen of any creed would do the same. Thus, those who are 
not actively joining takfiri groups in Syria but continue to support the defense 
of helpless Muslims feel they are fulfilling proper jihad. The many Muslims who 
support this middle jihad mix with the takfiri jihadists in blogs, comments, and 
reactions to current events. They often comment on the same news article or 
event to support their own ideas.
Using one simple example among many: The Maghreb countries (Morocco to 
Tunisia) have reported on their attempts to deter and prevent Muslims from 
fighting in Syria. The online news source Magharebia, which typically receives 
barely a dozen comments on its articles, released a news article on this policy in 
February 2014 and was flooded with hundreds of diverse reactions. In between 
the pacifist and takfiri reasoning was the middle jihadist, who believed he 
should fight simply to protect Muslims from dying. As one commenter railed, 
“Cracking down on jihad! By God this is unfortunate. [Is it] not enough that 
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men are extinct! Still you ban jihad! No, you want us to stay idle and watch our 
brothers tortured and women raped so that your conscience would rest.”27 Call 
it self-defense or simply nationalism, as a great deal of the West would, but many 
Muslims still call it jihad.  
Secular, Liberal, Pro-Western, and Shari’a
Every Muslim believes in shari’a law.28 When shari’a is placed on the “bad” list 
by Muslims and non-Muslims, neither is offering a true definition of shari’a. 
The non-Muslim often imagines only the sensational aspects of shari’a, without 
realizing that shari’a is part of everyday Muslim life. The Muslim who calls shari’a 
bad is either catering to the sensationalism or has in mind an unvoiced, more 
liberal image of shari’a. Shari’a is what explains how to pray, how much alms to 
give, family law, inheritance, and how to determine what is prohibited, neutral, 
or obligatory and the associated punishment or reward. What the majority of 
Muslims do not prefer is the extreme interpretation of shari’a that forgets mercy 
and abuses the death penalty.29
At the same time, non-Muslims support the idea of secular Islam, comparing it 
to their own idea of “secular.” Many Westerners have shed their religious identi-
ties in practice and claim to be religious primarily as a nominal heritage. When 
a Muslim calls himself (or herself ) secular, however, it doesn’t mean that he does 
not observe religious practice. A secular Muslim supports shari’a but does not 
believe that a government or institution should force its observance. A secular 
Muslim would rather that each individual Muslim be motivated to observe Islam, 
and shari’a, as he or she sees fit. When reporters lean too far and condemn shari’a 
in practice, a flood of Muslim commentators will correct them. For example, in 
the comments section of a recent article reporting on events in Libya, one com-
mentator represented the moderate voice: “Implementing the shari’a of God in 
all affairs of life is necessary for the adjustment of this life and its stability.”30 
In between the pacifist and 
takfiri reasoning was the 
middle jihadist, who believed 
he should fight simply to 
protect Muslims from dying. 
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The miscommunication between Muslims and Westerners runs much deeper. 
Most Muslims fear what Westerners think of as “secular.” As Muslims look at 
Europe and North America, they hope that more-moderate Islam does not 
degenerate into liberal morals, the rejection of religion, and the increase of 
atheism. The individualistic and secular Western culture doesn’t quite grasp the 
concept that a secular Muslim can still be religious. The famed African scholar 
Ali Mazrui described the dichotomy of “Christian legacy and liberal secularism” 
as one of the most confusing dualisms of the colonial heritage for Africans to 
grasp.31 Most of the Muslim world lives in collectivistic societies where family 
takes precedence over the individual. A Muslim society will not stand by as its 
values erode into immorality.
The shari’a debate is central to North African politics. In Egypt, the competing 
parties argue about the extent and implementation of shari’a. Tunisia is again an 
example of diversity within the “good” and “bad” Muslim categories. Tunisia’s 
Ennahda party, associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, not only refused to 
put shari’a to a referendum vote but also, through its main leader, Rashid Ghan-
nouchi, may even advocate for freedom of conscience in religion—“to leave or 
embrace any faith.”32
As many Muslim countries debate the extent to which shari’a and Islamic culture 
should be codified in their constitutions in order to preserve the faith, many 
sub-Saharan African countries are proud of their secular constitutions.33 If asked, 
a Muslim from Senegal, Mali, or Niger will recount his proud Islamic heritage 
and observe that these countries remain 90 percent or more Muslim without 
their citizens being forced into observance by law. Having a secular government 
but a very religious population is a source of pride for African Muslims, two 
characteristics that many Arab countries have yet to balance.  
Fundamentalism and Modernism
Many of the terms on the “bad” list are related, such as Wahhabi, Salafi, or 
Islamist. Fundamentalism is another term often associated with extremism, but 
again, it is an example of cross-terminology and, in this case, a little hypocritical. 
A fundamentalist Christian is someone who believes that the Bible is literally 
true: that Jesus was God and said and did the exact things found in the scrip-
ture. How one acts on these beliefs may place a Christian in a more extremist or 
pacifist camp, but the definition remains the same.34
While a growing number of Christians believes that the Bible should not be 
taken literally, and that it may contain numerous historical mistakes and myth-
ical influences, you will be hard-pressed to find the same degree of secularizing 
ideas among Muslims. The vast majority of Muslims believe that Muhammad 
was the final prophet and that through him, the perfect Qur’an was relayed 
without error. The Muslim world is fundamentalist in this sense.35 It is how the 
words are interpreted and how shari’a is then applied, however, that divides 
the moderates from the extremists. The term fundamentalist can be equally as 
unhelpful on the “good” and “bad” list as the terms secular and shari’a unless we 
reevaluate our ethnocentric viewpoint.  
Islamic modernism is also varied in its definition and application. Islamic mod-
ernism emphasizes the need to transform Muslim thought and Qur’anic exegesis 
with changes in society, technology, and “Westernization.” Modernism implies 
reconciling scientific advancements and cultural shifts with religious imperatives. 
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In Islam, it can refer to a liberal interpretation of the Qur’an where many shari’a 
requirements evolve to fit a modern reality, or it can relate to acquiring and 
utilizing modern conveniences to advance Islam, thus allowing Islamic teachings 
to meet a wider audience’s legalistic needs. 
Examples of the latter case are Iran’s Ruhollah Khomeini and the Brotherhood’s 
Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. They did not reject modernization but 
sought to mold it and apply it to their Islamist, “fundamentalist” cause. To these 
modernist Islamists, “Islam was the answer to the social, political, economic and 
cultural decline of the ummah.”36 Another modernist who was more accom-
modating and moderate in his dialectic approach to reasoning was Muhammad 
‘Abduh of nineteenth-century Egypt. An Al-Azhar University notable and mufti 
(scholar of Islamic law) of Egypt, ‘Abduh issued a fatwa (a formal legal opinion) 
favoring unity between the Muslim and Christian sects of diverse South Africa, 
rather than have them abide by strict shari’a legalism.37 The fatwa may have 
been controversial, but it recognized the multifarious nature of Africa’s Islamic 
environment. 
Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa
The overgeneralization of Islamism, Islamists, and political Islamic influence 
often results from the fact that the Middle East has dominated most analyses 
of global Islam for decades. Western news media are tempted to apply 10 
years of Middle East analysis to the entire region south of the Sahara, based 
on the assumption that one Muslim culture is like the other. Political Islam in 
sub-Saharan Africa, however, is just as weak as the region’s governmental institu-
tions and political culture. For a dozen historical, cultural, and religious 
reasons, political Islam is not the force in the Sahel (the Muslim-majority region 
just south of the Sahara proper) that it is in the Middle East.
There is no one picture of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa, no unified leadership or 
go-to mufti. In modern Morocco, for example, Sufism is all but institutionalized, 
with regular government-sponsored festivals and well-cared-for shrines, while 
across the continent in Kenya, Sufism is barely visible.38 Sub-Saharan Muslim 
communities rely on local marabouts, imams, lamidous, and scholars who 
are loosely tied to a legal school—or more often, who rely on personal study, 
flexibility, and independent reasoning.39 
Africa as a whole is said by most scholars to contain an Islam highly influenced 
by Sufi thought. Sufism is on the “good” list. Since many Sufi teachings are 
abhorred by Salafists and takfiris, this may be a decent indication that it belongs 
on the “good” side. Generally speaking, Sufism is a mystical, esoteric branch 
of Islam in which religious texts and poetry have a metaphorical meaning that 
serves to bring one’s being closer to goodness and God’s love. Overgeneraliza-
tion, however, again cripples the analysis. Sufi Islam is a very broad term.
Sufi Islam and its various mystical practices, which vary widely between regions, 
molded well with the spiritual foundations of Africa’s traditional cultures.40 Salafi 
purists are unsettled with the way that pre-Islamic African traditions are woven 
into Sufi ritual. Sufi leaders and tariqas (“orders”) can be political or apolitical.41 
Some of the most powerful reform movements, such as the uprising of 1881–85 
under the famous Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad, were led by Sufis. Uthman dan 
Fodio, who founded the Sokoto Caliphate in Nigeria in the early nineteenth 
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century, was also a Sufi scholar and reformer. In present-day Senegal, the most 
powerful Mouridiyya Sufi order has at least four million followers, while 
Senegal’s presidents and politicians hail directly from either the Mouridiyya or 
Tijaniyya order.42  
Many present-day Sufi leaders boldly voice their opposition to takfiri teachings. 
Other Sufi orders have moved to cleanse and reform what they consider syn-
cretistic practices in African customs, similar to a Salafi quietist approach. 
Depending on the country and village, Sufism can be political or quietist, 
reformist or traditional, competitive or sublime.43  
Generally speaking, sub-Saharan African Muslims are more moderate, more 
secular, perhaps more “Western” than their North African counterparts, prob-
ably because Middle East politics is not reflected as strongly in sub-Saharan 
societies. This is not to assume, however, that they are any less “Muslim.” It will 
serve Special Forces well to interact often with their African counterparts to 
keep a finger on the religious pulse. For better or worse, the cultures are changing 
with the times, and Islamist teachings are influencing many sub-Saharan Muslim 
communities.44 Hasty government or community backlashes made in response 
only threaten to add fuel to the fire of radicalism.  
Democracy
If Western democratic values are what Western policy makers prefer for 
Muslim-majority countries, they will have to first consider all the misconcep-
tions discussed here. Freedom of religion does not necessarily mean freedom of 
conversion.45 Secular does not mean “godless.”46 What a “majority” of Muslims 
prefer in terms of democracy does not imply that the minority will rest easy if 
their values and beliefs are in jeopardy. Tunisia appears to be treading in the “cor-
rect” direction politically, but its secular president, Moncef Marzouki, admits 
that every court opinion and constitutional paragraph is a tightrope walk of 
verbal gymnastics, balancing de jure and de facto compromises and legal intent.47
Irony of Analysis
The irony behind the misleading “two column” education and understanding of 
Muslims is that it achieves the opposite effect of its aim. Instead of encouraging 
mutual respect, it results in confusing confrontation. Instead of dissecting and 
explaining Islam, it waters down the reality while espousing tolerance and com-
promise. In the end, all these blunders have angered and will continue to anger 
the very populations that this information approach seeks to engage. Those at 
the top levels of political discourse are avid supporters of tolerance and religious 
dialogues. Leading Middle Eastern and Western scholars have signed multiple 
petitions promising to support mutual understanding.48 These efforts are bold 
and necessary and should continue, but their failure arises from assuming that 
the political consensus of top-level scholars’ definitions of Islam can capture the 
practice of every Muslim in every cultural context. Defining “proper Islam” does 
not necessarily describe everyday Muslim practice, and non-Muslims should 
avoid taking for granted that the elites and pundits who appear in international 
media speak for the Muslim masses.
Many Muslim scholars and “moderates” have also succumbed to the “two 
column” style of teaching Islam, which is counterproductive to education, 
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counterterrorism, and their own political strategy. In some cases, the fumble is 
caused by difficult Arabic-to-English translations of religious terms. It is also the 
result of variations in Islamic practice, the political diversity of Islam, and the 
pressures placed on Muslim representatives to “explain” their faith to a skeptical 
and demanding Muslim and non-Muslim population.49 The Qur’an and Hadith 
are clear on the fact that Muslims are to be united. There is one ummah, and 
indeed, the broad analysis at the scholarly and political levels ultimately attempts 
to effect this concept.50  
Don’t Stop Learning and Talking
For Special Forces personnel and policy makers alike, the answer to this problem 
of in-depth understanding involves some of the same steps: Seek out dialogue, 
personal and communal, with faith systems that are unlike one’s own. Approach 
every engagement with patience and tolerance, even if one does not accept the 
others’ beliefs. Engage and research each Muslim community as its own entity. 
Do not allow political and emotional baggage from past experiences to deter-
mine one’s picture of the counterpart. 
This educational approach is politically and reli-
giously sensitive. In many ways, it contradicts the 
image of a global Islam.51 This method does not 
intend to incite, create, or even highlight division. 
The differences are already present, and implying 
an orthodox or singular Muslim identity not 
only is counterproductive but also makes military 
partnerships and long-term relationships at every 
level impossible. The ummah of believers prays 
toward Mecca, but how they govern their faith and 
how they act on the ethical imperative to promote 
and preserve Islam varies greatly, particularly in 
Africa. Cooperation must occur in the reality of 
ethnic, cultural, and ritual diversity.  
The military needs continued education on Islam 
that supports tolerance, dialogue, and compas-
sion. Mutual respect occurs at the lowest level of 
interpersonal reaction; the more generalized that 
analysis becomes, the less useful it is. What exactly 
is a “moderate” Muslim? It all depends on whom 
you ask. And you can ask, after building a sincere 
relationship, without depending on a cheat sheet 
of catchphrases and misleading titles. v
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“The most rebellious territory in the Qing Empire” is how 
historian Joseph Fletcher once described the land known today as Xinjiang 
Province, in northwestern China.1 While China’s Qing Empire lasted until only 
1911, the rebelliousness has continued unceasingly into the twenty-first century. 
Today, we are seeing an unprecedented increase in violent rebellion among 
the discontented Uyghur population from whom Xinjiang’s historical unrest 
originates. So far in 2014, there have been violent attacks perpetrated by Uyghur 
ethno-nationalists every single month, with two attacks occurring in May alone.
On 22 May 2014, two SUVs exploded in a crowded market area of Ürümqi in 
northern Xinjiang after explosives were thrown out of the two vehicles and 
into the crowd: at least 31 people died and more than 90 were wounded. Two 
weeks earlier, a knife attack in the metropolis of Guangzhou—a southern city 
near Hong Kong previously known as Canton and home to over 14 million 
people—killed six people and terrified thousands at one of the world’s busiest 
train stations. In April, Ürümqi saw a combination knife-and-bomb attack that 
was less fatal but left nearly 80 people injured. In March, an attack at a train sta-
tion in China’s southwestern Yunnan Province, bordering Myanmar, left 33 dead, 
including the attackers after they rampaged through the train station stabbing 
and slashing bystanders. Less than a month prior, another explosives-and-vehicle 
attack in Xinjiang Province left all 11 attackers dead.  
Over the past 100 years, Uyghur ethno-nationalists have executed bombings 
both inside and outside of Xinjiang Province, and even outside of China, 
attacking police convoys, shopping centers, government buildings, public 
transportation, factories, private residences, and other targets. These attacks have 
caused injuries and casualties among civilians, military personnel, and govern-
ment employees. Uyghur militants have targeted both Han (the majority Chi-
nese ethnicity in China) and Uyghur police officers, and have launched attacks 
on other People’s Republic of China (PRC) security forces as well. They have even 
assassinated their own Muslim clerics for being too accepting of government 
restrictions. While incisive attacks and assassinations were more commonplace 
during the 1990s, ethno-nationalist Uyghur extremists have shifted their tactics 
to include more bombings and wider-scale, more-public attacks. Suicide bomb-
ings also began to increase markedly in 2008 and have continued, including the 
most recent suicide attacks at Tiananmen in 2013 and nearly every attack so far 
in 2014. Knife attacks abound, and knives are frequently used in one-off attacks 
by disgruntled peasants, factory workers, and average laobaixing2 involved in civil 
disputes throughout the country, in addition to extremist Uyghurs. Data clearly 
indicate a steady rise in Xinjiang-based and -focused violence since the late 1980s 
generally, and in the past few years particularly.  
China’s constantly transforming and ever-repressive tactics and strategies for 
dealing with this dissatisfied group appear only to be enraging and, in effect, 
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radicalizing the very population authorities fear empowering. But before we 
uncover the excessive, clever, and sometimes hidden policies of Beijing, we must 
first provide a caveat concerning two important terms: terrorism and Uyghur. 
This Article Is Terrorism, Says China
The PRC’s definition of terrorism is problematic, and at best, transparently 
self-serving; at worst, it falls critically short of the international norms of human 
rights.3 For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the 
regional security organization whose member states include China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, defines a terrorist act as
any act connected with intimidating the population, endangering 
human life and well-being, and intended to cause significant prop-
erty damage, ecological disaster or other grave consequences in order 
to achieve political, religious, ideological or other ends by exerting 
influence on the decision-making of governments or international 
organizations, or the threat of committing such acts.4
In sum, as American journalist Joshua Kurlantzick has put it, “Beijing’s defini-
tion of terrorism includes any group or individual it perceives to be a threat to 
the regime.”5 Period. Beijing’s open-ended phrases leave dangerous room for the 
regime to apply the label wherever it deems useful and convenient. As govern-
ments test the limits of their countries’ new anti-terror laws, pressure from the 
international community to very carefully define terrorism should not let up. 
Indeed, under China’s definition, purely peaceful activism can easily be described 
as terrorism, an absurdity that no self-respecting democracy or republic should 
tolerate.  
Consequently, in this paper, I avoid the labels of terrorist and terrorism in 
discussing the violence perpetrated by the troubled, and troublesome, Uyghur 
ethnic group, mostly so as not to legitimize the loose manner with which China 
and its counterterrorism partners define and apply these terms. Additionally, 
some instances of ethnic violence over the past two decades show signs of simple 
opportunism, and weak or one-off affiliation and coordination between the 
individuals involved. While undoubtedly some of the violence suffered by China 
at the hands of angry Uyghurs may accurately be labeled as terrorism—particu-
larly incidents within the past 10 years—it is not the aim here to make those 
determinations, nor, might I argue, is it even necessarily helpful to do so. 
“We Now Face Our Deepest Winter”6
The Uyghurs have much to be angry about. Their grievances can be identified 
as economic inequality, perceived foreign occupation of their lands, lack of 
religious and political freedom, and lack of political autonomy. The greater, 
macro-level context informing their struggle is one of historical injustice and 
spoiled nationhood. 
The term Uyghur in this paper refers to an ethno-linguistic Turkic people who 
have been residing for millennia in and around the Tarim and Dzungarian Ba-
sins, the oases of the Taklamakan Desert, and the surrounding and intervening 
mountain ranges of present-day northwestern China.7 Today’s definition of 
Uyghur is actually rather nebulous, owing to the complex historical background 
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of those peoples it attempts to label.8 Uyghur may actually refer to a variety of 
overlapping and intermixing ethnic groups who have undergone several mass 
religious conversions, the most recent being to Islam in the fifteenth century. The 
term is used here with a conscious awareness of the modernity of this identity 
formulation.9 
Economic inequality is pervasive and severe between Uyghurs and Han Chi-
nese. Although Czech researcher Jitka Malečková and American economist 
Alan B. Krueger both argue against the correlation between disparities in 
living standards and violent crime such as terrorism, economic hardship and 
inequality are nonetheless grievances of Xinjiang’s violent perpetrators that are 
repeatedly cited by both Eastern and Western scholars and journalists who cover 
China.10 The numbers speak for themselves. In a mini-census in 2005, just over 
twenty-two thousand Uyghurs and Han were surveyed in Xinjiang, and from this 
sample population, it was found that Uyghurs earn, on average, less than half of 
what Han Chinese earn. The data also directly revealed that around 50 percent 
of all Uyghurs surveyed had only attained primary (elementary) education or 
lower, inhibiting them from even being eligible for many higher-paying jobs. 
These findings are supported by a more recent Al Jazeera report by Raymond 
Lee covering the socioeconomic hardships that are affecting Xinjiang Uyghurs as 
well.11 According to Lee’s analysis, the population is dealing with ongoing land 
expropriation, government corruption, and social exclusion, which cause “accrued 
anger [to be] translated into enormous social grievance against the government.”12 
Uyghurs earn, on average, 
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Xinjiang’s natural resources are being tapped at great profit to the Chinese gov-
ernment, while little or none of this profit flows to the local people.13 Uyghurs 
in Xinjiang know these resources are valuable and that their community is being 
helplessly exploited by the Han Chinese: during his lengthy field studies in 
the region, anthropologist Justin Rudelson heard the locals joke that the train 
from eastern China comes into Xinjiang “making the sound ‘ach, ach, ach’ (I’m 
hungry),” and leaves “making the sound ‘toq, toq, toq’ (I’m full).”14 Uyghurs also 
know that the Lop Nor nuclear test site in southern Xinjiang has polluted their 
soil and groundwater with heavy metals to the point that locals are experiencing 
birth defects and other health problems. 
Uyghur ethno-nationalists may also resent what is perceived by some to be 
outright occupation of their lands by the Chinese. American political scientist 
Gregory Gause asserts that “terrorists are driven … by their opposition to what 
they see as foreign domination.”15 They also desire more political representation. 
As Sophie Richardson, the Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch, tes-
tified before Congress, “Uyghurs are still excluded from the decisions about the 
future of their homeland,” and one reason is because Han continue to dominate 
party and local government positions.16 The few Uyghurs who do make it into 
government positions are generally understood to have been handpicked and 
carefully appointed by Beijing.
As is often the case with religion throughout the PRC, despite Beijing’s promises, 
Uyghurs are also restricted from practicing their religion as they choose. As just 
a handful of myriad examples: They may attend only legally sanctioned and 
certified mosques; preached material must be approved beforehand; they must 
apply for permission to leave the country years in advance for hajj but may still 
be arbitrarily denied; and their Han neighbors are employed by the government 
to watch their activities and report anything suspicious.17 Mosques may be shut 
down and imams removed or defrocked without notice. Community organiza-
tions receive similar treatment: in 1997, the shutdown of at-risk youth shelters 
and removal of their leaders in Yining led to peaceful demonstrations that 
deteriorated into violent riots. James Millward speculates that mosque grounds 
were even turned into pig pens during the Cultural Revolution.18  
Fueling Uyghurs’ anger further, the 
government treats Han and Han-
dominant areas of Xinjiang differently 
from Uyghurs and their neighborhoods. 
For example, Han neighborhoods are 
developed and receive government 
investments, and according to Hong 
Kong–based political scientist Chien-
Peng Chung, Han typically live in the 
newer neighborhoods, likely as compen-
sation for their willingness to migrate to 
the region at the government’s request.19 
This is in contrast to Uyghur neighbor-
hoods, which may be completely razed 
even when they are inhabited, such as 
has been done in Kashgar.20 The more 
tractable northern areas encounter 
relatively lax enforcement of religious 
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restrictions, whereas in the south, policies are enforced to—and beyond—the 
precise letter of the law. There is also the direct, daily humiliation of racism and 
discrimination, through comment and action, in public and in the workplace, 
especially where more Han Chinese are present.21
These factors combine to form an “emotional thrust,”22 which leads Uyghurs to 
use violence as a way to communicate their plight and resist the Chinese state 
and its policies. While the examples of grievances outlined here are by no means 
the full story, they serve to outline why Uyghurs are discontented to the point of 
becoming susceptible to radicalization. The next section describes how and why 
radicalism is increasing in direct response to Beijing’s policies and actions against 
Uyghurs and their identity.
History, History, History Repeats
It was just before Communism’s victorious rise in the mid-twentieth century 
that the two East Turkestan uprisings came about. These two movements and 
their short-lived republics—the Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkestan and 
the Second East Turkestan Republic—have been written about extensively in 
historical briefs of the region; however, a critical detail is often left undiscussed, 
despite its effects on today’s tense reality. This detail is one of geography: the 
first republic was established in the southwestern oasis regions of Kashgar in 
1933, at the same time that a separate anti-Chinese khanate was also established 
in the southern city of Khotan; the second republic was established in 1944 in 
the northwestern areas of Ili, following a series of rebellions against the Chinese 
state. Modern anti-Han sentiments in Xinjiang are historically rooted in the 
geographic areas of the province that correspond to these historical uprisings. 
Even before the more familiar twentieth-century incidents, about one hundred 
years after the Qing dynasty attempted in 1759 to annex what is now Xinjiang, 
a military commander of Tajik ancestry named Yaqub Beg led a successful mass 
rebellion against Qing rule, and established an emirate in the southern Xinjiang 
city of Kashgar.23 Like the later East Turkestan movements, this uprising was also 
ethnically motivated, pitting the Uyghur and 
Hui (a separate and distinct ethnic group of 
Muslim Chinese) populations of the region 
against the Han Chinese. In contrast, the 
Uyghur dwellers of the Turpan region to the 
north have a track record of amiable cross-
cultural relations with the Han Chinese 
dating back centuries. Not coincidentally, it 
is in the north that the Chinese government 
set up the new regional capital of Ürümqi.
Friendly Neighborhood 
Insurgents
The southwestern rebel strongholds of 
Kashgar and Khotan are the closest cities 
to a little-known section of the Chinese 
border that abuts Afghanistan and leads 
into the Wakhan Corridor: a nearly 
Yaqub Beg
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two-hundred-mile-long stretch of Afghan territory sandwiched between 
Tajikistan and Pakistan that directly connects Afghanistan to China. The ap-
proximately 50 miles of border is so unheard of that even seasoned experts and 
academics in the field are unaware of it. Historically, the Wakhan Corridor was 
used to travel between the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang and the historic region of Ba-
dakhshan—today’s northeastern Afghanistan and southern Tajikistan—and was 
a critical feature of the ancient Silk Road. This is a perfectly, and frighteningly, 
ungoverned channel through which to funnel goods and ideas to an increas-
ingly beleaguered and desperate Uyghur populace. Rounding off this volatile 
frontier just as it connects with China is the disputed Indian state of Jammu and 
Kashmir, where uprisings against the government in New 
Delhi have been boiling over for decades. The provinces 
that converge on this border area thus are home to 
generations of veterans of armed conflict against states. 
As effectively as the Cultural Revolution erased local 
histories throughout China, the independent streak 
running through the non-Turpan Uyghur areas across 
Xinjiang did not fade. While China has purposefully 
used these local geographic histories to its advantage, 
such as investing resources primarily in northern Ürümqi, 
the Uyghurs may themselves begin to harness geography 
in their struggle by reaching across the border. Their not-
so-distant insurgent neighbors may be more than happy 
to help out, and are certainly already equipped to do so.
Call and Response: Fighting Violence with Violence?
China’s responses to dissident attacks, and to the threat of East Turkestan 
separatism, are causing an unnecessarily dire situation in Xinjiang. The state uses 
an impressively comprehensive mixture of suppressive policies that combine 
soft, information-centric tactics and campaigns with violent kinetic, often lethal 
operations. Chinese counterterrorist campaigns usually receive coverage in the 
West for their physically brutal character; because there is a plethora of informa-
tion and analysis available on this angle of China’s repression, however, I touch 
on it only briefly here. My focus in the subsequent section is on China’s much 
larger and relatively unknown information-oriented operations, which all but 
cripple their dissenters. 
The most famous of China’s anti-terrorist campaigns against its East Turke-
stan dissidents is the ruthless “Strike Hard” campaign, which is initiated and 
rescinded as needed, usually in the run-up to or aftermath of major protests, 
incidents of unrest, or violent attacks. The campaign has allowed for a range of 
repressive measures, including: legal proceedings against suspected terrorists 
to be expedited or circumvented altogether, the torture of suspects, executions, 
police sweeps through neighborhoods without warning or justification, intru-
sive surveillance, targeted assassinations, and a general massive increase in the 
presence of security forces. Joshua Kurlantzick reported in 2003 that the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) had turned Xinjiang into “a garrison,” noting that the 
Army ran a drill “conspicuously” near a mosque.24 This is in contrast to an earlier 
trip report from the mid-1990s by Paul Henze, who characterized the PLA bases 
as being in “inconspicuous locations,” giving the impression that the increase in 
security forces is no temporary measure but part of a long-term kinetic strategy 
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against violent extremists in the region.25 Indeed, later on, in 2010, the Com-
munist Party of China recruited five thousand more special police from within 
Xinjiang, while the People’s Armed Police added a new rapid-reaction unit 
in Ürümqi. In 2010, there were sixty thousand security cameras in the city of 
Ürümqi alone.26
The campaign has also mobilized individuals, both directly and indirectly, into 
informant networks, whereby they sell one another out to the security services to 
avoid having suspicion fall on their own families. The legitimacy of such accusa-
tions is often questionable. The second-order effects of the informant network, 
however—sowing distrust and discontent between locals and among the 
minority populations—play neatly into some of China’s information operations 
against the East Turkestan movement.
Information Warfare with Chinese Characteristics
Overall, China executes a brilliantly comprehensive propaganda and informa-
tion campaign that has, in ways, achieved degrees of success with assimilating 
and erasing Uyghur culture and reframing Uyghurs’ self-perception firmly 
within a Chinese-identity narrative. In this section, we peer into the shadowy 
and layered world of China’s subversive and methodical propaganda to find out 
just what the Uyghurs have been up against in their fight for survival—let alone 
for their own autonomous province or nation.
The Pen Is Mightier
One of the most effective moves the PRC has used to undermine Uyghur identity 
is to grind away the people’s literature and oral history traditions. It has done this 
primarily through a series of language overhauls, beginning with the first rewrite 
in 1956. At the behest of Mao, written Chinese itself was undergoing its own lan-
guage overhaul at this time: traditional Chinese characters were abandoned for 
simplified characters, a first blow for modernization that was felt countrywide. 
The Uyghurs, for their part, were forced to convert to the Cyrillic alphabet, in a 
purposeful effort to undermine the influence of Uyghur intellectuals.27 In 1960, 
the script was changed again, this time from Cyrillic to Latin, further impeding 
the transmission and comprehension of any cultural records that may have 
survived to that point. Eighteen years later, in 1978—or in other words, as the 
next generation came into adulthood—Beijing imposed a modified version of 
Arabic writing on the Uyghur people. Thus, successive cadres of schoolchildren 
have lost the ability to read their own history, even recent history, except as 
promulgated from the central authority. 
In addition to having their written history cut off from them, the Uyghur popu-
lation had three different languages imposed on them within a span of 28 years, 
four languages if Mandarin Chinese is included, and many more when including 
dialects from adjacent provinces and Soviet influences during the same era.28 
Anthropologists consider the effects of language loss on a culture to be devas-
tating because languages are “like a key that can unlock local knowledge” and are 
certainly a key to transmitting history and maintaining national identity.29 The 
generational timing of the language impositions also ensured that not only the 
culture as a whole but also the microcosm of Uyghur families would be weak-
ened, making Uyghur youth more vulnerable to the influence of the dominant 
Chinese culture during their formative years. The Uyghur schools have also been 
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disrupted by these mandates regarding which language to use for instruction in 
minority areas. 
Every 10 years or less, the Chinese government switches its policy to either 
allow and encourage, or disallow and discourage, Uyghur language instruc-
tion. Because of this, alternating generations of Uyghurs may speak, read, and 
write some version of their own language, or exclusively Mandarin, inhibiting 
intragroup communication. According to Rudelson, who spent a number of 
years in Xinjiang doing field research, Uyghur intellectuals “feel that the younger 
generation may grow up not only uninterested in reading about Uyghur history, 
but also unable to simply read.”30 These policies and language shifts have created 
an important communication gap that helps China in its efforts to assimilate or 
erase Uyghur culture and identity.
There have also been more direct attacks on the historiography and cultural 
records of the region and its localities, including the establishment of a regional 
museum that portrayed only a Han Chinese presence in Xinjiang. Despite 
purporting to cover thousands of years of the area’s history, the museum report-
edly excluded any mention of the actual peoples native to Xinjiang.31 (This 
museum apparently has been shut down.) Beijing also has a long track record 
of imprisoning any authors, academics, and artists, including those from the 
Uyghur minority, whom it considers dissident. As a recent example, econo-
mist and historian Ilham Tohti was arrested on 15 January 2014 for “inciting 
separatism,” only a few weeks after he sat for an interview with the Australian 
Broadcast Corporation.32 Books and music are publicly burned for their suppos-
edly separatist content in sudden and powerful waves of repression. Mass public 
rallies are held “at which Uyghurs [are] sentenced to jail [or death] without 
trial,” in an eerie harkening back to the worst years of the Cultural Revolution.33 
Beijing also co-opts up-and-coming Uyghur intellectuals by handpicking them 
to be educated in the country’s capital based on their compliance with Beijing’s 
views and policies.34 These assimilated scholars are more widely published and 
thus become more influential than Uyghurs who are more true to their original 
culture and sentiments. 
There Goes the Neighborhood
With the completion of the transnational railroad in 1962 into Urumqi, the 
Chinese government shifted the capital of Xinjiang away from the traditional 
Kashgar and Ili regions—the cultural centers of Uyghur identity—north to the 
historically more Han-friendly city of Ürümqi. Since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, Han Chinese have been persuaded by the 
Communist central government to migrate en masse to historically Uyghur 
lands throughout Xinjiang in exchange for land, money, government or Party 
positions, or other compensation; ostensibly to develop the region, the central 
government also built a railway line that connects developed eastern China to 
Ürümqi. In 1949, Han Chinese made up a mere 5 percent of the population in 
Xinjiang; by 2010, they comprised 41 percent. In the regional capital of Ürümqi, 
Han account for nearly 80 percent of the population.35 When the United States 
encouraged American settlement of the newly independent Mexican state of 
Coahuila y Tejas in the early nineteenth century, the Spanish-speaking Tejanos 
were outnumbered by Americans within the span of about 30 years, and the 
Mexican-American War of 1846 was the result. The Uyghurs are similarly 
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becoming strangers in their own lands and, likewise, have so far been unable to 
win back the territory they believe belongs to them. 
Islam in a Chinese Choke Hold
The practice of Islam, which underpins modern Uyghur culture even for secular 
Uyghurs, is also subject to unjust scrutiny and clampdowns. Uyghur religious 
leaders are sometimes forced to go to re-education camps, where they are taught 
how to be “more patriotic,” and hundreds of thousands of clergy members have 
been “examined” by authorities; an estimated 10 percent of these were defrocked 
in the crackdown that came immediately after the April 1990 Baren Township 
Riot.36 The initial protests were not even related to Islam but were instead in 
response to the forced abortions that were being carried out to implement the 
government’s one-child “family planning policies,” as they are often euphemisti-
cally called. Uyghurs who work in state institutions (there is no such thing 
as a truly “private” enterprise in China) are sometimes not allowed to attend 
mosque services, particularly during Ramadan, and are not allowed to observe 
the Ramadan fast. Islamic teachers and scholars are also regularly imprisoned 
and sometimes summarily executed without explanation. Mosques are shut 
down and destroyed without warning or media coverage, and imams are charged 
with “spreading material promoting ‘religious extremism’ on the internet” under 
ambiguous circumstances.37 Uyghur women who wear headscarves, especially 
in the rebellious Kashgar region, are pulled off the street to have their scarves 
forcibly removed; Uyghur men are encouraged to shave their beards. According 
to Kurlantzick, “Government documents smuggled out of the country reveal … 
government officials, including [former president Hu Jintao] proposing to use 
secret agents to infiltrate and ‘quietly smash’ religious groups … supposedly 
threatening public order.”38 In schools, the Buddhist origins of certain Uyghur 
Turkic texts are emphasized over their Islamic roots.39 
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Chinese Identity or No Identity
Nicholas Dynon, an expert on Chinese 
public diplomacy, writes, “Education 
reinforcing state sanctioned views of 
cultural identity … equips youth with 
the ability to say, ‘I am Chinese, I am 
Uyghur, I am not an Arab.’”40 Other 
surreptitious efforts to shape ethnic 
identity include the revision of history 
textbooks used in Xinjiang schools 
to portray Uyghurs not only as being 
ethnically Chinese but also as having no 
history separate from that of the Han 
Chinese people. One such textbook used 
in Uyghur schools and created by the 
Beijing-controlled Xinjiang Youth Press 
is called I Am a Pan-PRC Chinese, as translated from Uyghur by Rudelson. The 
short-term effects of this kind of education reform and revisionist history, which 
were implemented in the late 1990s and early 2000s, are difficult to mea-
sure, but there are some signs that the PRC has been successful at least in 
causing confusion among younger Muslim and Turkic Chinese about their non-
Chinese cultural heritage. These tactics may even be beginning to disconnect 
them from their heritage entirely. For example, in a survey cited by Millward in 
Eurasian Crossroads, 43 percent of Uyghurs sampled in the mid-2000s believe 
that their culture and ethnicity are historically a part of China; 80 percent of 
Han believe the same of the Uyghur people.41
The central government has also attempted to divide ethnic minority groups 
in a bid to prevent cross-minority sympathy, a perception of likeness, or a 
sense of shared grievances, which could strengthen the minorities in solidarity 
against the Chinese state. For instance, when the Chinese Communists were 
first consolidating their control of Xinjiang, they forced the nomadic Kazakh 
minority into fixed and smaller pastures, while simultaneously increasing the 
Kazakhs’ political leadership of then-Uyghur-dominant Xinjiang; Beijing still 
uses this historically oppositional minority relationship to its own advantage.42 
The central government has even turned the historic Ili area of 
Xinjiang into an official “Kazakh Autonomous Region,” which, 
despite also being historically Uyghur territory, is now governed by 
Kazakhs and Han.
In conjunction with the information campaigns launched within 
the Uyghur and other Xinjiang communities, Beijing has also 
been steadily increasing its nationalist rhetoric and nationwide 
propaganda campaigns directed toward the Han population and 
jingoists, “[fostering] intense nationalism through fascist-like 
mass rallies and xenophobic school curricula.”43 The Xinhua News 
Agency recently released a series of paintings and slogans from 
the early days of communism’s rise in China, pulling the patriotic 
heartstrings of its citizens and appealing to Han Chinese youth, 
who seem to have a growing penchant for overly zealous portrayals 
of “mother China.”44
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China Seals a Deadly Bomb 
At the same time that it engages in these active strategic propaganda and infor-
mation campaigns, the government blocks off any routes for redressing griev-
ances—either historical ones or those arising strictly from these policies. Any 
protests, for instance, “must be officially approved beforehand and … the applica-
tion must specify the protest’s ‘purpose, methods, slogans, or catchphrases.’”45 
Aside from giving the government the obvious upper hand in physical security 
for such protests, including the ability to shut them down before they even 
begin, this pre-approval documentation also presumably gives Beijing advance 
time to preload all of its media outlets with precisely drafted rhetoric that is 
relevant and damaging to the movement, as it did in the 2013 Nanfang Zhoumo 
scandal.46 
Uyghurs and any other dissenters in China cannot safely seek legal representa-
tion either, because lawyers are discouraged, with consequential threats, from 
representing anyone even remotely related to a protest or “any other”47 activity 
that could be deemed “separatist” or “terrorist.”48 Even if one does find a brave-
enough lawyer, the Chinese government openly describes the judges presiding 
over such cases as “selected politically qualified personnel drawn from the entire 
region,”49 thus preventing citizens from having any truly just, legal route of appeal 
to the government.  
Blockades without Borders
Blocking any international avenue of recourse, China prevents Uyghurs from 
either gaining sympathy from or finding refuge with neighbors by painting the 
Uyghurs as threats not only to China but to the other countries in the region as 
well.50 Through the SCO, China has secured the return of Uyghurs it deems to 
be criminals from other member states, which unquestioningly fulfill China’s 
requests for extradition. SCO members also deny Uyghurs’ applications for 
asylum without review, thus shutting them out of the region’s legal arenas. 
China’s media and communications blockades so severely limit the availability 
of information that the Uyghurs’ plight simply cannot be fully or accurately 
portrayed by international media, and thus fails to win the sympathy or interces-
sion of the rest of the world. China has also become so powerful on the world 
stage that those who might otherwise intervene under similar circumstances 
are discouraged from doing so out of fear of economic or other repercussions. 
The difficulty of clearly defining the Uyghur people as an ethnic group probably 
exacerbates the difficulty that would-be sympathizers have in trying to identify 
with the people’s plight. The easiest way to solve that problem may be through 
increased Islamicization of Uyghur identity, something that seems to be 
happening naturally in response to the intense and complete stifling of 
Uyghur nationhood. In other words, the common thread of Islam may be the 
most direct means the Uyghurs have to connect with and gain the sympathy of 
outsiders, whether they be mainstream Muslims or violent extremists. 
Uyghurs are effectively blocked off from every major means to redress griev-
ances: legal, direct appeals to the domestic government, peaceful activism, 
community organization, and regional or international aid from private 
citizens, organizations, or governments—every angle is occluded by China’s 
truly comprehensive collection of strategies. This combination of soft and hard 
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policies, however, can lead to a particular explosiveness. If there is no other way 
to express their frustration but to detonate, that may just be where the Uyghurs 
are headed. As Gregory Gause put it, “When a dictatorship controls the political 
life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven 
underground and toward the extreme.”51
China Gets Hit by Its Own Shrapnel
The information and kinetic dimensions of China’s war on terrorism have proven 
so harsh that these policies are backfiring by further alienating the Uyghur 
population. For instance, the information bureau’s success at painting Uy-
ghur violence as “evil,” and thus instilling a sense of otherness and eroding 
sympathy among the non-Uyghur populations, has antagonized Han Chinese 
into forming serious prejudices against Uyghurs.52 Many Han, especially those 
who have limited or no direct personal contact with Uyghurs, fear, dislike, and 
discriminate against them as a result of official propaganda. At the same time, 
paradoxically, as China has implemented a strategy of re-education in Uyghur 
schools to make students feel more like an integral part of China, Uyghurs’ daily 
experiences on the ground are giving them a different picture. Racial discrimina-
tion against Uyghurs seems to be as cruel as ever. One Han urbanite in Guang-
zhou recoiled in fear during a conversation when I explained that some Uyghurs 
have sought new lives in the United States. “Aren’t you afraid of what they will 
do to your country?” he asked in bewilderment. When I asked why anyone 
would be afraid of them, he explained to me that “Uyghurs are psychotic people” 
and “criminals” to be feared and contained. Several years earlier, in 2007, during 
the time I spent doing ethnographic research on ethnic discrimination in China, 
sentiments among Han were similarly harsh and unjust. 
The harsh physical security measures used by the Chinese government against 
the Uyghur population are propelling otherwise moderately minded people to 
begin identifying with the more extreme subgroup. Norwegian Police University 
College professor Tore Bjørgo writes, “The experience of being beaten up or 
arrested by the police along with other group members … tends to redefine their 
entire relationship to the society.”53 Nick Holdstock, British journalist and au-
thor of the Xinjiang exposé The Tree That Bleeds, reported that “many Uyghurs 
claimed [to him] that the adoption of a more conservative approach to Islam … 
[only] came after the crackdown” on the Yining protests in 1997.54 He went on 
to write, “The growth in religiosity among Uyghurs in Xinjiang can be seen as 
a response” to China’s repression and restriction of Muslim identity. Abdullah 
Mansour, widely considered to be the leader of the Turkestan Islamic Party55—a 
terrorist organization advocating for an independent East Turkestan—claimed 
in a Uyghur-language video that the 23 April 2013 attack in Tiananmen Square 
was in direct response to Chinese state actions taken against Uyghur culture.56 A 
report for Al Jazeera on Uyghur unrest also points to China’s repressive policies 
as a significant motivating cause for the “adversarial orientation” of Uyghurs 
against Han rule.57  
Conclusion: Reclaiming Identity, Reclaiming Rebellion
As China’s counterterror policies backfire, the Xinjiang region is undergoing ad-
ditional social and political changes that are feeding overall instability and, most 
likely, further violence. The relatively recent reopening of Xinjiang’s borders with 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and India, as well as the little-known Wakhan 
Corridor into Afghanistan, is bringing a slew of transformations. First, there is 
 “When a dictatorship controls 
the political life of a country, 
responsible opposition 
cannot develop, and dissent 
is driven underground and 
toward the extreme.”
“Aren’t you afraid of 
what [Uyghurs] will do 
to your country?”
“The growth in religiosity 
among Uyghurs in Xinjiang 
can be seen as a response” 
to China’s repression and 
restriction of Muslim identity.
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the reuniting of Uyghur families who were separated during the Cultural Revo-
lution and throughout the early Communist era. Estimates vary, but Rudelson 
notes that between sixty thousand and one hundred twenty thousand minority 
nationals fled from Xinjiang into what is now Kazakhstan. Although we don’t 
know precisely what percentage of that number were Uyghurs, we do know that 
Uyghurs made up at least 80–90 percent of the population in Xinjiang Province 
at that time, so their percentage of that exodus was likely quite significant. 
Rudelson also mentions that many Uyghurs “fled to India and settled in the 
Rawalpindi area of today’s Pakistan” in the 1930s.58 It is not difficult to imagine 
what those Uyghurs have been exposed to during their lengthy exile in such a 
conflicted area. There are also significant Uyghur populations in Kyrgyzstan and 
more-distant Turkey.  
Second, the various oases of Xinjiang historically were more closely tied to their 
most proximate neighbors in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Kazakhstan than to the Han populations to the east. This is one of the 
reasons that the oases developed such distinct cultures—bilateral relations with 
neighboring countries varied sharply from oasis to oasis, exposing each to a 
unique cultural influence. When China’s borders were closed in 1962, not 
When China’s borders were 
closed in 1962, thousands of 
Uyghur families were split apart.
Taklaman Desert
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only were thousands of Uyghur families split apart, but the identity-reinforcing 
relations that each oasis had with Central Asians were all but obliterated. Since 
the 1980s-era reopening of the borders under Chinese politician and reformist 
leader Deng Xiaoping, Xinjiang’s oases are experiencing a revival of their more 
traditional non-Chinese and non-PRC identities. Both the deeply personal 
connections that are being reformed by families, and the significant political and 
economic relationships that are being dusted off and rebuilt, may have a substan-
tial influence on the overall milieu of Uyghurs’ relations with the Chinese state 
in the coming years.
The reopening of these borders may have other effects as well, due to the overall 
regional environment. In particular, the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces 
from Afghanistan leaves a well-recognized vacuum of authority in a region that 
is already notoriously under-governed. Central Asian borders, particularly where 
they run into northwestern China, are dangerously unpoliced and, even when 
they are guarded, are easy to pass through with an extra pack of cigarettes or 
what amounts to a few U.S. dollars. The dearth of authoritative presence and 
security, particularly in the nearly hidden Wakhan Corridor, presents a welcome 
mat for the kind of destabilizing influences that an angry ethno-nationalist 
group like the Uyghurs would gladly welcome.
China’s notoriously inhumane and repressive policies are pushing its Uyghur 
minority to the only other extreme that seems to be left open to them: the 
violent means of communication we call terrorism. The revival of Uyghurs’ 
Muslim identity due to the rejuvenation of their cross-border relations with 
Central Asia may be leading to a new solidarity that mirrors Xinjiang’s not-so-
distant rebellious past. The regional community in Central and South Asia will 
undoubtedly feel the effects of a rise in Uyghur ethno-nationalist terrorism. We 
already see the expansion of attacks going well beyond Xinjiang’s borders into 
the rest of mainland China, despite a tremendously restrictive security environ-
ment. It would almost be easier for Uyghur radicals to target Han in neighboring 
countries, and as the Vietnamese violently kick out Chinese workers from their 
country over territorial disputes in the South China Sea, it is not a far cry to 
imagine further attacks on Han Chinese citizens abroad, carried out by members 
of an insurgent-empowered Uyghur “nation.”
Increased security measures will almost certainly be called for by regional 
partners in the near future, particularly China’s fellow SCO members who have 
at least some relative influence with Beijing, in a bid to prevent cross-pollination 
with neighboring takfiri radicals and an explosion of new and more violent 
attacks from radicalized Uyghurs. What China’s leadership still does not seem to 
recognize, however, is that harsher crackdowns only serve to ignite these explo-
sions in the first place. They need to understand that the Uyghur ethnic identity 
they’ve been pounding down on so hard is effectively becoming a detonator, 
before it’s too late to cut the fuse of the bomb they themselves have packed. v
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Inherent in the United States’ counterinsurgency strategy in 
Afghanistan is a tension between the individual warfighter’s natural desire 
to wage conventional war and the strategic leader’s attempt to overcome this 
“institutional inclination.”1 Over the years of fighting this nebulous conflict, 
that tension has led to a conceptual disconnect between strategic-level policy 
makers and tactical-level decision makers, which has tended to exacerbate 
the ground force operator’s perception of disenfranchisement. This perceived 
disenfranchisement is most evident in the arena of battlefield regulation—the 
rules of engagement (ROE), tactical directives, standard operating procedures, 
and general orders issued by strategic leaders. Tactical oversight has increased as 
the years have passed, resulting in progressively cumbersome mission-approval 
processes. The actions of individual troops in combat are occasionally second-
guessed, resulting in formal reprimands and, in rare cases, courts-martial.2 
Although this regulation and increased oversight is always implemented with 
a particular policy aim in mind, American troops engaged in direct combat are 
understandably rarely concerned with the policy origins of a particular rule.  
An internet search for “restrictive ROE” will render thousands of scathing news 
articles, blogs, and other internet criticisms against the perceived handcuffing of 
ground forces in Afghanistan. Commentators blame the ROE for a variety of ills, 
most disturbingly an increase in American casualties. Indeed, several commenta-
tors directly attribute American deaths to the restrictiveness of the rules under 
which U.S. forces operate.3
If a ground force operator perceives battlefield regulation to be reducing op-
erational effectiveness, or endangering 
the lives of his comrades, or restricting 
the “right to self-defense,” strategic 
arguments in support of the regulation 
will hold little sway in the mind of that 
operator. Thus, as relevant as the subject 
might be, the purpose of this article is 
not to enter the long-standing argument 
over counterinsurgency strategy and the 
ROE required to effectively implement 
it. That debate will continue as long as 
we pursue ill-defined goals in conflicts 
against vague enemies. Instead, the aim 
of this article is to provide practical 
guidance to commanders, leaders, and 
operators currently attempting to ex-
ecute the ROE, regardless of any view on 
the strategy or policy behind the rules.  
Several commentators directly 
attribute American deaths to 
the restrictiveness of the rules 
under which U.S. forces operate. 
Stressing Self-defense in the Force: Five Methods to  
Empower Commanders
CPT David Hammond, U.S. Army
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In Afghanistan, self-defense 
is everything for the 
individual servicemember.
The frustration over perceived hyper-regulation of the battlefield discussed in 
this article does not seem to be a uniquely American problem. Tactical-level 
operators from the armed forces of other nations deployed in Afghanistan have 
apparently also struggled with the effects of the national and strategic imple-
mentation of rules designed to minimize civilian casualties in combat.4 This 
highlights the problem as one that is potentially universal for modern militaries 
engaged in counterinsurgency. Although this article addresses the issue through 
the prism of a U.S. lawyer’s experience in Afghanistan, our coalition partners in 
this and future conflicts may also benefit from the methods outlined here. The 
concept of unit self-defense, embodied in the ROE of nations and multinational 
organizations, is after all grounded in international law. The unique problems 
that arise in applying the concept to an asymmetric conflict are therefore 
international in nature.
Self-defense in the ROE
Strategic leaders create ROE for three purposes: (1) to achieve their military 
objectives, (2) to remain consistent with national policy, and (3) to meet their 
legal obligations.5 Every battlefield “rule” can be traced to one of these purposes, 
and often a single rule can serve more than one of these purposes.6 A rule prohib-
iting the destruction of compounds except as a last resort might serve a military 
counter-propaganda goal, while also serving a U.S. policy goal to minimize 
civilian casualties and avoid the compromise of sensitive political negotiations. 
Perhaps no issue is more delicate in the drafting and implementation of ROE than 
the right to unit self-defense and perceptions that strategic leaders have infringed 
on it, thereby disenfranchising the ground force operator. As demonstrated by 
the volume of internet punditry on the topic, these perceptions certainly exist 
in some sectors of the media, and as a result, among casual American readers. 
More dangerously, these perceptions exist within the force, and in Afghanistan, 
self-defense is everything for the individual servicemember. The platoon leader 
on patrol in a counterinsurgency theater has little use for offensive ROE when 
the enemy is not easily distinguished from the civilian population. Gone are 
the days of declaring an entire force hostile and engaging the hostile force based 
on the type of uniform he wears or the type of vehicle he is in. There are no 
Soviet-era T-72 tanks roaming the battlefield. Instead, by necessity, the ROE must 
be conduct-based: they must be reactionary. Ground forces must constantly 
evaluate enemy behavior and make split-second decisions about whether to 
employ lethal force based on this behavior.
This is not an easy exercise. There are four inherent difficulties in the application 
of conduct-based ROE: (1) determining what conduct to attack, (2) determining 
when to attack it, (3) the subjective nature of these determinations, and (4) the 
enemy’s ability to adapt to the ROE through modified behavior. These difficulties 
are confronted on a daily basis in Afghanistan, and if not appropriately consid-
ered and addressed, they contribute to a sense of disenfranchisement in the force. 
When the perception that the wrong answer could end a career grows pervasive 
in a unit, frustration quickly follows and morale suffers.7 Leaders must make 
dedicated efforts to avoid this unraveling, not just because it affects morale, but 
more importantly, because it breeds hesitation. The methods I describe in the 
following sections will assist commanders and leaders in the effort to empower 
subordinate decision making, lessen the conceptual disconnect between strategic 
policies and tactical decisions, and remove the perception of disenfranchisement 
from the force.
When the perception that 
the wrong answer could end 
a career grows pervasive, 




1. Understand Self-defense Doctrine and Make It a 
Pervasive Organizational Theme  
All deploying soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are told that they have the 
right, and obligation, to defend themselves and their units against hostile acts 
and hostile intent. But too often, this is all they are told. Moreover, when they 
are told, it is during a single legal brief provided by a judge advocate, with no 
command or leadership emphasis on the concept. Unless leaders incorporate 
self-defense as a pervasive theme, the concept risks transformation into a vague 
legal formula written on an ROE card, ill-suited for battlefield application.8 Prin-
ciples guide the combat decision making of an effective force, not “adherence to 
hard and fast rules.”9 The failure of leaders and servicemembers to fully grasp the 
principle of self-defense is a key factor in the perceived disenfranchisement of 
tactical decision makers.
As an illustration, consider the September 2009 events in Ganjgal, Kunar 
Province, Afghanistan. During the course of the now well-known six-hour battle, 
several requests for fire and air support were denied or simply not fulfilled. Five 
American servicemembers lost their lives. Members of the ground force involved 
in the firefight, including Captain William Swenson, who received the Medal of 
Honor for his actions that day, publicly blamed politically-driven ROE and tac-
tical directives seeking to minimize civilian casualties.10 The Army’s investigation 
into the incident largely blamed absent and negligent battalion-level leadership 
for the failure. Indeed, a few battalion officers in the operations center that day 
saw the end of their careers.11 The true causes of the incident may be forever lost 
to reasonable disagreement, but one truth is readily apparent: the importance of 
employing assets in self-defense was lost to somebody, somewhere, that day. As a 
theme, self-defense was not pervasive.
To prevent the disenfranchisement of the force, leaders must ensure that all mem-
bers understand the nature of self-defense. By “understand,” I mean fully grasp, 
which requires a deeper understanding of the origins and limits of the concept.
There are essentially two types of self-defense engaged in by U.S. servicemem-
bers: in extremis self-defense and U.S. self-defense.12 In extremis self-defense, 
which involves life-or-death situations, leaves no room for discretion, and 
individual servicemembers maintain the greatest freedom of action. In the in ex-
tremis realm, concerns over collateral damage are appropriately minimized, and 
the only true limitations are the Law of Armed Conflict’s broad requirements 
of necessity, discrimination, proportionality, and the prevention of unneces-
sary suffering. Simply put, servicemembers have a right to use all necessary and 
available means for defense in such a situation, and no strategic concern or rule 
can defeat this right. Although “in extremis self-defense” is not a doctrinal term 
or a concept expressly recognized in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)13 or other legal scholarship on the subject, 
the term’s usage has risen to prominence among American commanders, staff 
officers, and judge advocates in counterinsurgency combat theaters. The term 
is important in counterinsurgency operations because it distinguishes between 
the common, everyday defensive use of force on the battlefield under the broad 
SROE, in which discretion is possible, and the “at the point of death” scenarios in 
which the ground force commander or individual servicemember must immedi-
ately use lethal force to survive or preserve the lives of his comrades.    
“U.S. self-defense” is broad 
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Despite universal acceptance of 
the basic principle, the source 
and scope of the right to unit 
self-defense is unsettled. 
To the contrary, “U.S. self-defense” is broad, can be subjective and discretionary, 
and may invite limitations by higher headquarters on the manner and method of 
execution. For example, strategic leaders may require ground forces to de-escalate 
a situation through maneuver or withdrawal prior to deploying air strikes on 
structures. The type of self-defense to be invoked in a particular situation 
has important implications, and confusing the two concepts invites perceptions 
of disenfranchisement and the incorrect belief that the ROE, by their very nature, 
risk lives through restrictiveness. Thus, leaders must examine and understand 
each of these distinct self-defense concepts.
In Extremis Self-defense
Since their inception, the SROE have directed that “unit commanders always 
retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response 
to a hostile act or hostile intent.”14 This notion is not unique to the United 
States: self-defense is a basic tenet of the rules of engagement for military 
forces around the world.15 Despite universal acceptance of the basic principle, 
the source and scope of the right to unit self-defense is unsettled.16 The right is 
not codified in any international convention or treaty and can be attributed to 
various sources.17 Several commentators who have discussed the concept have 
argued that the right is grounded in natural law and has evolved through state 
practice to constitute customary international law.18  
Writing in the thirteenth century, Saint Thomas Aquinas built on the work of 
the Romans and recognized self-preservation among man’s “natural inclina-
tions.”19 From these natural inclinations flow natural laws, or “true directives 
that every person can easily formulate for himself.”20 Aquinas believed that no 
authority, or set of positive laws, can circumvent or take away rights grounded 
in this natural law.21 These rights exist by virtue of reason alone.22 Indeed, the 
founding document of the United States invoked this very principle when it 
declared certain truths “self-evident,” among them the right to life.23 Aquinas also 
recognized that the right to self-preservation is not absolute and must operate 
with due consideration for the equally desirable goal of a peaceful society.24 In 
this vein, Aquinas first articulated the principles of necessity and proportionality 
in the execution of the right to self-defense, declaring unlawful the use of “more 
than necessary force,” “out of proportion to its end.”25
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius expanded on Aqui-
nas’s view of the natural-law right to self-defense.26 Grotius also recognized the 
principles of necessity and proportionality but first articulated the requirement 
of immediacy as a component of necessity.27 In Grotius’s view, if alternatives 
exist, then danger is not immediate, and thus force is not necessary.28
Grotius’s views on immediacy became a key principle in the natural-law ap-
proach to self-defense,29 and informed the eventual international-law concept 
embodied in the ROE of Western military forces.30 Under this customary 
international-law concept of self-defense, troops in immediate danger, without 
alternatives to avoid it, may use lethal force to protect their lives.31 It is their right 






U.S. policy as codified in the SROE diverges significantly from the international 
legal understanding of self-defense as informed by natural law.32 The SROE’s 
notion of self-defense is broad and encompasses a variety of scenarios that do 
not amount to an in extremis self-defense situation. Indeed, the preponderance 
of lethal force used by American troops in Afghanistan falls under the broad 
concept of “U.S. self-defense.”
Under the SROE, hostile intent is defined as “the threat of imminent use of 
force.”33 The decision as to whether a threat is imminent is “based on an assess-
ment of all facts and circumstances known to U.S. forces at the time and may 
be made at any level.”34 Most importantly, “imminent does not necessarily mean 
immediate or instantaneous.”35 Contributing further to the broad nature of U.S. 
self-defense, the SROE expressly include the ability to “pursue and engage forces 
that have committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, if those forces 
continue to commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent.”36   
Hostile intent may be manifested in a variety of ways not amounting to an actual 
attack. For example, U.S. forces might positively identify individuals with heavy 
weapons two kilometers away, tra-
versing toward a known fighting posi-
tion historically used to attack friendly 
elements. U.S. policy does not require 
the ground force commander to wait to 
strike until the ambush is underway, or 
to seek higher approval to strike under 
an offensive framework. Although 
lethal force in this situation would, 
without question, be authorized under 
current U.S. self-defense principles, it is 
not an in extremis self-defense situa-
tion, and there is technically no right 
to self-defense under international law. 
If deemed appropriate, a higher-level 
commander could certainly restrict 
his ground force commander’s use of 
a particular weapon system in such a 
scenario, or altogether deny the use of 
lethal force.
This broadness in the SROE is not without detractors. Despite the common com-
plaint in the media and throughout the force that the American ROE are overly 
restrictive, several commentators call for a narrower definition of imminence 
in order to bring the concept of U.S. self-defense in line with the customary 
international-law concept.37 
The force must understand these concepts, because in a web of complicated 
policies and restrictions, one simple truth remains at the forefront: a ground 
force commander has the inherent right to defend his unit in an in extremis 
situation. In combat, this concept trumps all others. No commander may ask his 
men to die when means of survival remain, regardless of the strategic fallout that 
might result. This right to self-preservation is as old as time, derived from reason 
U.S. policy as codified in the 
SROE diverges significantly 
from the international legal 
understanding of self-defense 
as informed by natural law.
No commander may ask his 
men to die when means of 
survival remain, regardless of the 
strategic fallout that might result. 
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and centuries of philosophy and jurisprudence. Every discussion of operational 
restrictions must lead with this concept, without exception.38 
In sensitive political environments, the broadness of U.S. self-defense invites 
attempts by U.S. strategic leaders to reign in the subjective nature of the SROE. 
Modern counterinsurgency campaigns come with a host of limitations on the 
use of combat power, most visibly restrictions on the use of air-to-ground muni-
tions in certain situations. However, if the enemy is using a civilian dwelling to 
attack American troops, or a hospital or mosque for that matter, and the only 
method for maneuvering to safety involves the use of indirect fire, there should 
be no hesitation. American troops are authorized to use all necessary and pro-
portionate means in self-defense. This concept must be indoctrinated, pervasive, 
and understood at the lowest level of any American military organization. This 
is not to claim that strategic leaders have ever openly restricted the right to in 
extremis self-defense. No leader would endorse such an approach. Leaders must 
nevertheless transcend mere token reference to the right to self-defense. 
2. Empower Ground Force Commanders in the Use of 
Munitions in Self-defense
Increasingly, higher commanders limit the ground force commander’s use of 
certain munitions, even in self-defense. Matrices of approval authorities for the 
release of bombs, missiles, field artillery, mortars, and even direct-fire weapons 
are common in Afghanistan. Such documents may span several pages, with 
contingencies based on contingencies. The Counterinsurgency field manual 
implores commanders to use caution in the use of particular munitions during a 
counterinsurgency campaign, specifically warning against an “inappropriate” use 
of air strikes.39
Commanders understandably seek to maintain the ability to control the lethal 
effects used within their battlespace, as they are the ones our military and society 
ultimately hold accountable for those effects.40 Requiring the ground force com-
mander to seek approval to use a particular munition in self-defense, however, 
without expressly drawing the critical distinction between in extremis and U.S. 
self-defense, may not only contribute to perceptions of disenfranchisement but 
could actually disenfranchise by violating the ground force commander’s legal 
right to protect his unit.
A higher commander may decide on the one hand that, given a certain politico-
strategic environment, the risk of using a destructive munition in a discretionary 
self-defense situation outweighs any potential benefit. On the other hand, as a 
matter of law and policy, if a unit is pinned down receiving effective fire from 
massing enemy forces spread over a large target area and using the cover of 
compounds and natural barriers, a ground force commander does not have to 
wait for approval from a higher headquarters before lawfully using whatever 
munitions are at his disposal. The ability of a commander’s guidance for fires 
to distinguish between the discretionary and non-discretionary uses of force is 
crucial. To the extent that any failure in the Ganjgal incident is actually at-
tributable to a higher headquarters’ rules-based disapproval of the ground force 
commander’s choice of munition, this important distinction was not made at the 
time, and the disenfranchisement was not merely perceived but very real.  
The ability of a commander’s 
guidance for fires to distinguish 
between the discretionary 
and non-discretionary 
uses of force is crucial.
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A properly drafted fires approval matrix can easily account for the in extremis 
self-defense scenario by expressly allowing the ground force commander to 
determine for himself whether approval is necessary based on the facts on the 
ground. Fires guidance should state at the outset, “This guidance does not apply 
in any situation in which the ground force commander determines that seeking 
the required approval is not possible without risk to life.” This exception to 
the commander’s guidance for fires should be clearly stated on the controlling 
document, whether it is a fires appendix to an operations order or a stand-alone 
policy. Judge advocates and fire support personnel will play crucial roles in 
ensuring that the entire force understands the concept. But more importantly, 
the concept will not work without a thorough understanding of self-defense 
throughout the force. By stressing these principles early in a pre-deployment 
cycle, and at every available opportunity thereafter, the concept can be ingrained 
throughout the formation.
The incorporation of this framework provides two important advantages. First, 
and foremost, it increases the confidence of ground forces that the ROE and 
operational guidance will never put them in a situation that might endanger the 
lives of their personnel. The ROE themselves cannot endanger lives, but a misap-
plication or misunderstanding of the ROE certainly will. It is vitally important 
for commanders to prevent the emergence of the toxic perception among troops 
on the ground that strategic leaders are overly restricting their ability to defend 
themselves. 
Second, this framework provides the higher commander with the ability to 
shape the large majority of lethal effects on the battlefield through the issuance 
of lawful restrictions on the use of certain munitions in non-immediate self-
defense situations. When operators fully understand and appreciate the first 
advantage, they more readily accept the second.  
From an operational perspective, a cautious commander may express concern 
that the exception might be unnecessarily invoked by a ground force commander 
who abuses the rule in order to maintain control over the particular munition 
employed. These concerns should be easily dissuaded. When the ground force 
commander operates outside of the commander’s fires guidance and invokes the 
in extremis exception, he “buys the rounds,” taking full responsibility for any 
resulting negative effects. If strategic consequences result from the ground force 
commander’s invocation of the exception under reported in extremis circum-
stances, a thorough administrative investigation of the matter will provide the 
command with the information necessary to validate the decision. When the 
facts show that ground forces were under direct attack and unable to respond ef-
fectively with organic weapons or to de-escalate the situation through maneuver 
or withdrawal, the engagement is a success, and strategic-level considerations are 
secondary to the legal right to unit self-defense against the immediate threat.  
3. Underwrite Mistakes, Don’t Punish Them  
Empowering ground force commanders alone is not enough. For the preceding 
framework to be effective, strategic leaders must fully endorse the approach. Per-
ceived disenfranchisement in the force is partially attributable to the common 
belief that harsh consequences may follow a violation of the ROE.41 When 
strategic leaders endorse the empowerment of the ground force commander, and 
self-defense has truly become a pervasive theme in an organization, misapplica-
tions of the ROE are going to occur. As the culture of empowerment proliferates, 
The ROE themselves 
cannot endanger lives, 
but a misapplication or 
misunderstanding of the 
ROE certainly will.
When the ground force 
commander operates outside of 
the commander’s fires guidance 
and invokes the in extremis 
exception, he “buys the rounds,” 
taking full responsibility for 
any resulting negative effects.
Fires guidance should state 
at the outset, “This guidance 
does not apply in any situation 
in which the ground force 
commander determines that 
seeking the required approval is 
not possible without risk to life.”
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servicemembers will grow increasingly prone to broad interpretations of the U.S. 
self-defense doctrine and might, as a result, misidentify a hostile act, or errantly 
stretch the definition of imminence in hostile intent.  
Individual consequences must not follow these good-faith ROE mistakes.42 If a 
servicemember misapplies the ROE in an attempt to destroy the enemy, a careful 
analysis must follow. Too often, commanders shy away from finding that an 
ROE violation occurred, believing that the violation must result in some sort of 
adverse action.43 This belief is fed by the failure of strategic leadership to fully in-
stitutionalize the culture of self-defense. Instead, commanders and leaders should 
not hesitate to call a violation of the ROE what it is. At the same time, they must 
underwrite the mistake and disseminate the vignette to the force in the form of 
a lesson to be learned.44 By reserving adverse action or criminal liability for the 
rare, extreme scenario in which a servicemember deliberately and wrongfully 
disregards the ROE, thus causing harmful effects, leaders will discourage hesita-
tion and reduce perceived disenfranchisement.
4. Don’t Make the Judge Advocate the “ROE Guy” 
Judge advocates play an important role in advising commanders as they apply in-
creasingly complex battlefield regulation to difficult circumstances. Complicated 
scenarios requiring careful analysis do arise. But these are the exceptions. More 
common are relatively straightforward decisions to use lethal force. Avoiding 
perceptions of disenfranchisement in the force does not come easy when the 
lawyer is at the center of every targeting decision.  
This viewpoint is not to detract from the role of judge advocates. The ROE with 
regard to offensive targeting can be fluid and difficult to execute, requiring 
knowledgeable legal advisors who are ready to assist in the decision-making pro-
cess. Additionally, due to its broadness, difficult issues might arise in the applica-
tion of U.S. self-defense in a given scenario. Legal consultation should absolutely 
occur in the gray areas that naturally arise with such a subjective policy. But 
when the force fully understands the concept of self-defense, the lawyer should 
rarely find himself consulted prior to a true defensive situation. Just as a well-run 
corporation does not run every decision by its general counsel, neither does a 
well-run military unit ask for a judge advocate’s opinion every time it seeks to 
use lethal force. Some commanders fall into the trap of running routine targeting 
decisions by the judge advocate:  
A well-run military unit 
does not ask for a judge 
advocate’s opinion every time 
it seeks to use lethal force.
Commander: “This guy is digging in the ground 
in a historic IED location. Can I kill him?”
Judge Advocate: “Are you reasonably certain 
that he is emplacing an IED?”
Commander: “Yes.”




While the judge advocate should be present or easily accessible during opera-
tions, overreliance on legal advice creates an environment of hesitation and 
bureaucracy, which can trickle down to the ground force operator.
To reinforce the commander’s role in the execution of the ROE, commanders should 
consider briefing the ROE to subordinate commanders, with instructions for sub-
ordinate commanders to do the same. An effective top-down, command-driven 
approach to ROE training would ultimately result in the absorption of the com-
mander’s emphasis on self-defense by those responsible for the day-to-day training 
of troops—the small-unit leaders.45 The ROE are the commander’s rules, and there is 
no requirement that the judge advocate solely occupy the domain of ROE dissemina-
tion. The ROE lose their true purpose and authority when the lawyer is the “ROE guy.”
5. Take a Practical Approach and Consider the Freedom-
of-Action Spectrum
There exists a cold reality in the ROE arena, readily apparent yet infrequently 
openly espoused. When the enemy is killed, rarely does anyone mourn the loss 
or allege an ROE violation. When civilians are killed, quite to the contrary, the 
question “Was the ground force commander following the ROE and tactical 
directives?” will inevitably arise.
Simply put, a ground force commander’s freedom of action within the ROE is 
directly proportionate to the risk of civilian casualties in any given situation 
(see figure 1). As the likelihood of civilian casualties increases, the ability of the 
ground force commander to take a broad approach to the ROE decreases. A 
practical approach to the ROE will not shy away from this truth. Servicemembers 
must understand that, prior to taking a broad approach to the definition of 
imminence under U.S. self-defense policy, the risk of causing civilian casualties 
and thus triggering heightened scrutiny must be considered. Civilian casualties 
trigger investigations, and investigators ask questions. Appreciating this reality is 
crucial to the effective implementation of U.S. self-defense doctrine.
Consider the following hypothetical as an illustration. Utilizing an armed 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), a ground force observes via full-motion video five 
insurgents engaging friendly foreign forces with small-arms fire. The ROE would 
unquestionably authorize the use of lethal force against these positively identified 
hostile acts. Before the ground force commander is able to strike from the UAV 
platform, however, the enemy forces disengage and begin to travel away from the 
engagement area, carrying their weapons. Even so, the pursuit provisions of U.S. 
self-defense doctrine would authorize a strike, although the international legal 
standard might consider this an offensive use of force. As the insurgents depart 
the engagement area, three additional individuals with weapons join the hostile 
group. Suddenly, a previously straightforward situation is murky. The additional 
three individuals are clearly “bad,” but they have not been observed engaging 
in hostile acts. Can they be said to have demonstrated hostile intent, simply by 
As the likelihood of civilian 
casualties increases, the ability 
of the ground force commander 
to take a broad approach 
to the ROE decreases.
Figure 1: The Ground Force 
Commander’s Freedom  
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in the American military.
association with the previously hostile group? Many observers would answer no. 
The ground force commander may believe otherwise.
In such a scenario, not uncommon in Afghanistan, the ground force commander 
must consider the freedom-of-action spectrum before using force against the entire 
group. If he engages and kills all eight insurgents, few on his side will mourn the 
loss, and few will feel a compulsion to question the decision. If a young child enters 
the fray at the wrong moment and is injured in the strike, questions will follow. 
An armchair quarterback might question this use of force, even under broad U.S. 
self-defense principles, because the three additional individuals were not observed 
engaging in hostile acts, and were moving away from friendly forces.  
Through an understanding of the freedom-of-action spectrum, the ground force 
commander has the ability to take calculated risks in these difficult scenarios. He 
must ask, “What is the risk that I might cause a civilian casualty and invite scrutiny? 
Are buildings nearby? What is the pattern of life in this area?” If, on the one hand, 
he assesses that the risk of unintended damage is low, he might comfortably decide to 
disregard the academic legal concerns on the limits of self-defense. On the other hand, 
if the risk of civilian casualties outweighs the advantage of taking eight insurgents off 
the battlefield, he might decide on tactical patience. Through this practical freedom-
of-action analysis, a difficult ROE question becomes easier to address.
Conclusion
Modern counterinsurgency campaigns are subject to increased international 
scrutiny unrivaled in conflicts of previous eras, both in the media and in political 
realms. This scrutiny has the tendency to result in significant battlefield regulation, 
much to the chagrin of ground force operators. Perceived disenfranchisement in 
the force at the hands of this regulation is at best a detriment to morale, and at 
worst an invitation for hesitation and the degradation of combat effectiveness. 
When understood, emphasized, and correctly applied, the concept of self-defense 
is a key mitigation tool against this perception. It is unlikely that ground force 
operators will ever fully embrace the limitations on their capabilities in a politically 
ultra-sensitive theater like Afghanistan. But as the five points described in this essay 
demonstrate, these limitations are easier to swallow when (1) they exist within a 
culture of self-defense, (2) the lawyer’s role is appropriately minimized, (3) ground 
force commanders are free to make tactical decisions on the weapons they employ, 
(4) servicemembers are permitted to make mistakes in the application of the ROE 
without the threat that their careers will be damaged, and (5) commanders are 
encouraged to adopt a practical approach to the broad notion of U.S. self-defense. 
Finally, our coalition partners in Afghanistan, and in future conflicts, might 
similarly benefit from stressing self-defense in the force. The customary 
international-law concept of self-defense, grounded in natural law, is indeed an 
international concept, while the broader notion of imminence in the SROE is 
an American concept. Because of the more stringent international standard for 
invoking self-defense, the threat of disenfranchisement in a foreign military force 
is potentially greater than it is in the American military. The concepts discussed 
here may, with some refinement, be equally applicable to foreign forces operating 
under a strict international-law concept of unit self-defense. v
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Combat Development Command.
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resources, increase effectiveness, and reduce risk to U.S. forces. 
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with a demonstrated low failure rate, appropriate yield, and 
proper fuse can achieve desired effects while mitigating 
adverse effects. However, inappropriate or indiscriminate use 
of air strikes can erode popular support and fuel insurgent 
propaganda. For these reasons, commanders should consider 
the use of air strikes carefully during COIN operations, neither 
disregarding them outright nor employing them excessively.” 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, 
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Dept. of the 
Army, 15 December 2006), App. E-6: https://rdl.train.army.
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E4276B6F0481-1274576841878/3-24/appe.htm
40 International sensitivity to air strikes and the accountability of 
senior leaders for their effects is illustrated by the November 2009 
relief of Wolfgang Schneiderhan, chief of staff of the German 
Army, in the aftermath of an air strike in Kunduz Province, 
Afghanistan. The strike, carried out by the U.S. Air Force at 
German request, resulted in about 100 deaths, both civilians and 
insurgents. See Marcus Walker, “German Military Chief Resigns 
over Afghan Strike,” Wall Street Journal, 27 November 2009: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125922787790365143
41 This common belief is not without justification. For example, 
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platoon leader claimed he believed the men were Taliban 
suicide bombers. See David Adams, “U.S. Soldier Convicted 
of Murdering Two Afghans Is ‘Scapegoat’: Lawyer,” Reuters, 2 
August 2013: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/
us-usa-military-murder-idUSBRE97115V20130802
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NATO Special Operations Forces consists of personnel from 27 
contributing countries. These countries vary not only in size, manpower, and 
military and financial strength, but also in their attitudes and level of national 
political will to support NATO SOF. The 27 contributing nations do, for the most 
part, share one thing: a lack of discretionary resources. Despite their limited 
resources, however, many of the NATO SOF countries claim to have three main 
roles, or mission sets, for their SOF forces: direct action (DA), special reconnais-
sance (SR), and military assistance (MA). 
From my point of view, NATO SOF is probably dealing with collective self-decep-
tion here. From a military perspective, deception is good, but self-deception can 
be precarious; in the NATO SOF community, such self-deception shows us two 
things. First, we are being too politically accommodating in failing to identify 
our shortfalls. Second, the larger NATO SOF countries still have the will to sub-
sidize the smaller ones to perpetuate the illusion of fulfilling all three NATO SOF 
mission sets. Maybe it must be so, but I do not know. In a nutshell, we all know 
that those three mission sets have various secondary missions—waterborne 
special operations, for example—and too often those additional missions have 
costly price tags.
In my opinion, the reality may be that the United States is paying the bill and 
pumping money into NATO SOF capabilities that will never be fully operational 
because other member nations cannot afford to develop or sustain them. The 
problem is not about the equipment. It is about the people and logistical or 
combat service support. I hardly ever hear people talk about secondary missions 
and readiness to fulfill those missions at the national level. The lack of secondary-
mission capabilities seems to be some kind of national secret, so it is easier 
within the Alliance to talk about how each NATO SOF country has three main 
NATO SOF mission sets. The cruel reality is that it is impossible for every NATO 
SOF contributing country to fulfill all three main mission sets at the strategic 
level if needed, especially now, after over a decade of unconventional warfare in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Therefore, I ask myself whether NATO SOF should be more specific and start 
mapping the real capabilities among countries in the NATO SOF community, 
and thus determine which state needs specific aid. Should NATO SOF be more 
specific about requirements while talking about the three mission sets? Maybe 
the thinking is that it is a good thing to avoid being specific until someone else 
is willing to pay the overall bill (as the United States, for example, is currently 
doing through various funds). 
As it is, many NATO SOF countries probably have hollow SOF capabilities, and 
the United States and other powerful countries will probably keep spending 
money to keep this SR/DA/MA illusion alive. Sometimes it seems that the United 
Sometimes it seems that 
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At the end of the day, NATO 
SOF lacks plug-and-play 
partners on a tactical level.
States’ only aim is to make NATO SOF countries happy by providing them with 
military aid, with the result that the United States, as a main player in NATO, 
teaches learned helplessness to the other NATO SOF countries. 
The outcome is simple, in the case of real-world conflict. Where NATO SOF must 
be involved, the United States ends up with SOF partners who request more 
financial assistance and equipment to fulfill their missions. In my opinion, the 
United States has spent a lot of money building up different NATO SOF coun-
tries’ secondary-mission capabilities, which many of them, regardless of need, 
could never afford in the first place and cannot maintain on their own. In short, 
at the end of the day, NATO SOF lacks plug-and-play partners on a tactical level.
In conclusion, I raise a question: Should all NATO SOF countries be required 
to fulfill three mission sets? If the answer is yes, then what kind of secondary 
missions must be developed, and why? It seems to me that it is just politically 
comfortable to insist on three main mission sets even when countries cannot 
begin to fulfill the minimum requirements for one mission set or for secondary 
missions. Three mission sets seems to be the standard for NATO SOF, and yet this 
plan never works in practice. v
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A less discussed benefit 
of this cool war is the 
unprecedented transformation 
and constant adaptation that 
are being demanded of the 
military forces involved.
Some people argue that a new cold war is going on, but the 
characteristics of this war—which Frederik Pohl has called a cool war—have 
totally changed.1 This cool war, which is also referred to as a shadow war, is being 
waged against often unseen and networked insurgents and terrorist organiza-
tions. Nations that engage in this kind of conflict are drawn to the apparent 
promise of operating in secret, and also to the mass disruption and irregular 
warfare that seem likely to be the prevailing form of conflict in the future.2 There 
is no shortage of targets in this war, and it is likely to be a protracted one. A less 
discussed benefit of this cool war, however, is the unprecedented transformation 
and constant adaptation that are being demanded of the military forces involved, 
which is quite an interesting subject if we want to get a sense of the skills 
required and patterns for future organizational and leadership development. 
Building capabilities that are fit for fighting this new kind of war and that will 
provide lasting value requires deep strategic foresight, research, and an under-
standing of the future operating environment. As Richard Slaughter writes in 
the book Thinking about the Future, “Strategic foresight is the ability to create 
and sustain a variety of high quality forward[-looking] views and to apply the 
emerging insights in organisationally useful ways; for example, to detect adverse 
conditions, guide policy, [and] shape strategy.”3 But I believe that the safest 
option we can choose today is not to prepare for specific events but rather to 
prepare Special Operations Forces and our leaders for the inevitable complex 
challenges that lie ahead and then make this transformation sustainable.
Although the challenges of irregular warfare have been with us for at least the 
past two hundred years, we are still looking for answers to the main questions: 
who will be the masters in future conflict, and what leadership skills will help us 
prevail as we face future security threats? In the Western world, we have some 
restrictions as well. We would like these masters to belong to our bureaucratic 
organizations, so maybe the more specific question to ask is: How can we build 
integrated leaders, who can successfully counter challenges in unconventional 
and highly complex situations, yet are able to operate as part of a larger bureau-
cracy? How can we build a network within the Ivory Tower?4
In this article, my main goal is to explore the leadership aspects of future warfare 
and show why integrating unconventional leadership is a key aspect for all 
organizations that deal with massive disruptions and complex problems. I also 
contend that embracing the concept of integrated leadership is a must for all 
future leaders. My case study, which focuses on the cultural shift within one 
particular organization of the U.S. Special Operations Forces, Joint Special Op-
erations Command (JSOC), seeks to understand how a networked organizational 
culture operating within a bureaucracy can be a model both for operations and 
for developing future leaders. In the course of analyzing this case study, I have 
come to understand three points, in particular:
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1. An unconventional leader must have a completely different mindset from 
a conventional one, a mindset that focuses on the constant and relentless 
development of the self and the organization. An unconventional leader 
understands that the individuals within the organization need to be 
ready to decide, move, and act faster than the opposing force, or even the 
circumstances.
2. Unconventional leaders also have to have a different focus. The ability 
to comprehend multiple inputs enables them to integrate seemingly 
disparate and diverse organizational cultures and fuse them into one 
integrated unit to be able to operate within larger bureaucracies. 
3. We need to develop a different understanding of sustainability. Staying in 
the comfort zone of what is familiar is the most dangerous option these 
days. It is vital to prepare the organization to be not so much robust and 
resilient as transformative, or “antifragile,” meaning they actually improve 
when shocked.5 If an organization is willing to change its ways and adapt 
to the new demands of the shifting context, it will thrive, not just survive. 
Thriving is the new survival strategy. 
The defining characteristic of irregular warfare is the small size of its fighting 
units and tactics that use these units in innovative new ways. John Arquilla 
describes three forms of irregular warfare: special operations, guerrilla warfare, 
and terrorism.6 I have chosen the first form as my case study, and through an 
analysis of the organizational culture and leadership aspects of transformation 
within JSOC, will identify some essential leadership skills for the future.7 I chose 
to study JSOC because the organization replaced its cumbersome, conventional 
linear bureaucracy with a shared informational and operational environment 
that has encouraged both a mindset and cultural shift within the organization, 
and has enabled its branches to streamline and work more efficiently toward a 
common purpose. 
Transforming the Organizational Culture for Sustainability
The recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have transformed JSOC into the 
most truly joint command within the U.S. military.8 The operational tempo at 
present is unprecedented and provides notable results, but inevitably brings up 
two often overlooked questions: is it sustainable and is it adaptive? 
A recent book by General Stanley McChrystal, who commanded JSOC from 
2003 to 2008, and two articles about him published in open-source journals 
shed some light on the organizational and leadership skills used by the force to 
track down and eliminate a highly elusive and networked enemy. These works 
enable us to identify lessons learned from the transformation of JSOC into a 
global counterterrorism force.9 
Leaders believe that they need to know how to build resilient organizational 
cultures. But to succeed in the shaping of an organizational culture, first they 
have to recognize that their own values play an important role in transforming 
the culture of the organization they lead. Furthermore, if these leaders are to 
build truly enduring organizations that will stand the test of time, they have to 
be aware that organizations are living entities: a collective of human beings who 
form group structures and operate in complex, adaptive systems like any other 
living entity. Sustainability is therefore much more than survival or even resil-
ience; it is about thriving.
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If an organization is to become a sustainable living entity, it has to be able to 
adapt. In fact, adaptability is perhaps the most essential component for any 
entity to thrive. To understand how leadership promotes adaptability, I have 
chosen two specific qualities—mindset and focus—that a leader should be 
aware of when dealing with adaptation and cultural shifts within his or her 
organization.
Develop a Growth Mindset to Skyrocket the Organization out of the 
Comfort Zone
If we want to build an integrated, sustainable, and adaptive organizational 
culture, we need a specific mindset, which then acts as a spark and ignites the 
leadership transformation process.  Focus is best understood as the direction, or 
channel, that guides the leader during this process. It is not enough, however, to 
initiate the changes and carry them through; the new culture must survive (even 
in the absence of the original leader), and sustainable paradigms can fuel the 
process of change even after the leader is long gone. 
The best thing about our mindset is that we have the power to shape it. Studies 
show that most people (leaders of large organizations among them) are terrible 
at estimating their abilities. If they have a growth mindset, however, and they are 
oriented toward leaving their comfort zone for unknown territory (where they 
face obstacles and where learning can take place), they need accurate informa-
tion about their current abilities in order to learn effectively.10 People with this 
unconventional growth mindset believe that even geniuses have to work hard for 
their achievements. Such people may appreciate endowment, but they admire 
effort, since they believe that effort is absolutely necessary to develop ability and 
turn it into accomplishment. According to this mindset, the hand dealt is just a 
starting point for development.
This growth mindset was a precondition in JSOC’s organizational adaptation to 
becoming a network, and developing such a mindset has presented JSOC with not 
only technological and organizational challenges but leadership challenges as well. 
McChrystal realized the necessity of this precondition and pointed out in an inter-
view that “if organizations aren’t ready to move faster, their decision-making pro-
cesses become overwhelmed by the information flow around them.”11 McChrystal 
understood instinctively that for JSOC to be successful it needed not just to survive, 
but to thrive through the development of unconventional leadership. 
Unconventional leadership is not a new phenomenon. It has been with us 
throughout the ages, and leaders of irregular warfare have long understood the 
importance of these skills. Unconventional leadership, however, is quite different 
from the mere exercise of authority. A compelling vision is necessary to convince 
key stakeholders to endorse the plan, but even this vision is not enough to make 
someone a leader. True leaders will attract followers and collaborators who 
support their vision and buy into it with their own energy and ideas. This is a 
key to success in the new strategic environment, where we very often have to find 
solutions under the pressure of time. Unconventional military leaders realize that 
when they are facing complex situations, operating with decentralized decision 
making is difficult. The conventional hierarchical military decision-making pro-
cess implies that the leader at every level of the pyramid is the person in charge of 
deciding and directing everything below him. By implication, the highest-
ranking individual is the one who always has the deepest understanding of 
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a problem and the best solutions. This perception is entrenched in the military, 
but it is unsuitable for highly complex asymmetric situations, especially when 
we are facing adaptive challenges, because it compels people to stay inside their 
mental comfort zone. 
Staying in the comfort zone provides a false sense of security.12 As our modern 
and complex environment changes rapidly, organizations are constantly bom-
barded with complex problems, and they need to adapt and learn if they are to 
overcome these problems. Success in a highly complex and difficult environment 
is about changing qualities, stretching to learn something new, developing 
oneself and the organization, and staying in the zone of learning. People with an 
unconventional mindset do not just seek challenge; they thrive on it. The bigger 
the problem, the more they stretch, and sometimes they stretch so far that they 
do the impossible. 
The opposite end of the spectrum is the conventional (fixed) mindset. Success 
for such thinkers comes from proving themselves within a limited environment. 
They thrive on safety and familiarity. Because they believe that intelligence 
and skills are fixed traits, the thought of developing such qualities further does 
not even occur to them. People with a conventional mindset react to failure 
by seeking to repair their self-esteem (by blaming others or the circumstances) 
instead of trying to grow and learn. 
Conventional wisdom says that military units are most likely to succeed in the 
field when they follow strict command-and-control procedures. Militaries are 
organized and trained to operate in a hierarchical, rigid top-down structure for 
a reason, and they tend to stick to this system, which suggests that most military 
personnel are likely to be closer to the conventional end of the mindset spec-
trum. But in an asymmetric conflict, when facing an irregular enemy, a leader 
with a conventional mindset who encourages his troops to settle in the comfort 
zone, sticks to doctrine, and does not want to experiment with new ideas will 
eventually lead those troops toward failure. 
Focus to Achieve the Multiplier Effect
Most people would think that focusing on one thing is easy, but it is actually 
pretty difficult. Learning to focus on one thing is possibly one of the best things 
a leader can do, and is one of the most overlooked areas of leadership. Apple 
Inc. founder Steve Jobs wonderfully encapsulated this idea when he pointed 
out that people think focus means saying yes to the one thing that requires your 
attention, but in fact it means saying no to a hundred other good ideas that are 
clamoring for attention. From this perspective, focus has two important compo-
nents: the first one is setting limits (through eliminating what is unimportant), 
and the second is concentrating on the priority. 
To make JSOC more effective, McChrystal first prioritized the development 
of partnerships with agencies to fuse intelligence and synchronize operations. 
Working together, the agencies redesigned the bureaucratic ways in which 
information traveled up the decision-making pipeline and developed a real-
time information-sharing environment.13 In the next phase of organizational 
transformation, JSOC combined all elements of intelligence (to find the enemy), 
drone operators and signals intelligence specialists (to fix the target), various 
teams of Special Forces operators (to carry out the operations), and analysts and 
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experts in exploitation and crime-scene investigation (to pull together and exploit 
real-time information and feed it back into the cycle for further analysis). This 
constituted the full cycle of the operations called F3EA (find, fix, finish, exploit, 
analyze, and disseminate). Such a process was a game changer in modern warfare. 
The network was operating at speeds that have never been seen before, as the direct 
result of a new leadership approach that encouraged decentralization, intelligence 
sharing, and decision making at each respective level of planning and operations.14 
The latest studies reveal that maintaining focus is what distinguishes experts 
from amateurs and stars from average performers.15 Psychologist Daniel 
Goleman also explores this phenomenon and suggests that attention and focus 
are key to high achievement in many professions.16 We tend to think of attention 
as a switch that’s either on or off (i.e., we’re either focused or we’re distracted), 
but that is a misperception. Focus comes in three varieties: The first variety is 
“inner focus,” which is mainly self-awareness and self-management. The second 
is “outer focus,” which is the ability to recognize broad patterns and complex 
systems. The third is “other focus,” which is the ability to feel empathy for others.
While outer focus is strong in people with the conventional mindset (military 
leaders who are depicted as great strategists, for example, often do not worry too 
much about the consequences of their decisions), other focus is more likely an 
unconventional trait. Unconventional leaders are very sensitive to people, and are 
motivated to develop the people for whom they are responsible. This empathetic 
concern is the main reason why an unconventional leader is considered to be a 
“multiplier.” Leadership expert Liz Wiseman points out that the ability to extract 
and multiply the intelligence that already exists within them is the holy grail of 
efficiency for organizations that need to make the most of their limited resources.17 
This multiplier ability, along with their natural empathy, can make Special Opera-
tions leaders ideal candidates to fully embrace unconventional leadership and 
cooperate jointly, not only with other military personnel but also in a broader 
context with all kinds of stakeholders, to successfully carry out the mission.
Decentralizing command and control in JSOC was just the first step on a long 
road toward adaptation. To become a learning organization (one that is able 
to constantly adapt to new circumstances and information), JSOC leadership 
needed not only to synchronize and fuse different service cultures but also to 
provide a unifying vision for the entire endeavor. The techniques used at JSOC 
had a spectacular effect on SOF, and the United States appears willing to deploy 
these warriors throughout the world wherever they are needed against an 
irregular threat. These changes support the idea that smaller networked units 
can (1) have a decisive strategic effect, (2) be especially effective against irregular 
opponents (the disruptive, complex, adaptive challenges that lie ahead), and  
(3) be developed, maintained, and deployed for a fraction of the cost of a large-
footprint solution because they provide a multiplier effect. 
The multiplier effect gives them the ability to fight alongside or through the 
local population, and to integrate and develop personnel from other organiza-
tions in support of the mission. Skillful leaders use psychological appeals, and 
bring genuine compassion and understanding of the opposing forces and all key 
stakeholders to this force development process. Through the multiplier effect of 
using everyone to the peak of his or her ability, unconventional leaders are able 
to increase the group’s output without actually increasing the number of people 
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working on the project. In today’s resource-constrained environment, this is an 
effective approach to increasing operational tempo and mission effectiveness. 
Foster Sustainability to Thrive
Something that is fragile, like a glass, can survive small shocks but not big ones. 
Something that is robust, like a rock, can survive both. But robustness is only the 
other end of the survivability spectrum, and can be as much of a dead-end goal 
for Special Forces as fragility. There are systems, however, that are antifragile: 
they feed on volatility. Some systems, like the ones explained by Joseph Schum-
peter’s theory of creative destruction, innovate, progress, and become resilient 
after a disruptive event.18 The implications are clear: if we want to build organi-
zations that are sustainable over the long term, we need to make them antifragile.
Statistician Nassim Nicholas Taleb revived the old theory of hormesis, which 
suggests that a small dose of a harmful substance can actually be beneficial to 
an organism.19 Rather than merely restoring system equilibrium, the organism 
under stress overcompensates by building resistance beyond the immediate 
need in anticipation of future stress; the hormesis response in effect predicts or 
anticipates the organism’s future.20 Such an adaptation is not simply robust; it is 
adaptive and thus antifragile.
Leaders can build up their skills to be antifragile themselves, and can develop 
this quality in their organizations as well. Just as our muscles get stronger when 
subjected to the stresses of walking long distances and lifting heavy things, our 
minds become sharper and more flexible when we deal with mental difficul-
ties. Our hearts are strengthened and our self-confidence grows when we face 
problems in life and find a way to succeed.
The prototypical model of antifragility, according to Taleb, is not simply hor-
mesis, but evolution. Evolutionary antifragility operates at the group informa-
tional level. Unlike with hormesis, those units that undergo disruption develop 
attributes that improve the collective of units, and so the entire collective—in 
our case, JSOC—evolves to withstand such disruption in the future. Thus the 
antifragility of concern here is the organizational culture, which must be able to 
survive any given leader. From an organizational perspective, it is imperative to 
understand that while individual organisms such as group leaders are relatively 
fragile, the gene pool—the organizational culture they have created—takes 
advantage of shocks. Just as for a species, stress and harm are necessary for an 
organization because they trigger evolutionary adaptation in the surviving lead-
ership and guarantee that the future form of the organization will be stronger.21
Sustainability is necessary to win the protracted cool war, and not just the battles 
in this war. Thus JSOC—and all forces operating in this environment—needs to 
adapt constantly, to transform itself into an effective organization that is capable 
of supporting tactics such as sustained swarming attacks, as well as integrating 
and institutionalizing its networked organizational culture within the larger 
bureaucratic military system.22  
Final Thoughts
Successful leadership through turbulent times and complex challenges not 
only results in organizational and procedural changes but also changes people’s 
To build organizations 
that are sustainable over 
the long term, we need to 
make them antifragile.
Just as for a species, stress 




mindsets and the organizational culture as a whole. Leaders like General 
McChrystal typically operate in such a way that their subordinates do not 
experience anything remotely similar to the conventional model of “following.”23 
These leaders recognize that all people in the organization can be unconven-
tional leaders if (1) they are trusted, (2) they have a level of independence to 
make decisions, and (3) they play an integral part in the transformation process. 
Unconventional leaders are also constantly reaching outside of their organiza-
tions to find new ways to adapt to a changing environment, and they work to fit 
the new organizational culture into the larger bureaucratic system of which they 
are already a part. 
Most of us would assume that to adapt, a leader needs to choose from two dis-
tinctly different options: conventional thinking and unconventional thinking. 
The conventional way to do business is based on refining and streamlining 
operational processes, which improves the system’s capacity and encourages 
people to use the existing business model. The unconventional option requires 
experimenting with innovative alternatives to what people are already doing, 
going beyond the traditional boundaries and moving out of the comfort zone to 
search for new possibilities and explore new options. 
Shifting an organization’s culture is a mental balancing act, and effective leaders 
will continually explore new, innovative avenues while retaining and stream-
lining what is already working.24 This balancing act does not come naturally. 
Good leaders constantly move between the two approaches and test which 
option brings better results. Leaders therefore need to master both approaches, 
especially the less well-understood methods of unconventional leadership.
Complex problems and culture shifts present not only stress, but possibilities 
as well. By the time conventional leaders understand that the world has actually 
changed, they have often squandered most of the time and energy they had to 
adapt. Unconventional leaders who have a growth mindset and the ability 
to focus on multiple factors know that off-the-shelf strategies, although they can 
streamline the organization’s operations, will not change the game! These leaders 
want to make their organizations antifragile, and they are the best asset organiza-
tions have to achieve what is necessary for the organizational culture shifts that 
lie ahead in the age of the cool war. v
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The sophisticated use of online media platforms by individuals 
and organizations that promote violent Islam augments a blend of audiovisual 
media interspersed with writings that help to sanction and explain specific 
ideological dimensions of jihadist activity. This online presence is intended to 
attract fighters and fundraisers to the cause, and has rapidly evolved into an 
open subculture that uses audiovisual elements to cultivate and strengthen group 
cohesion within the mujahid vanguard.1 It further seeks to propagate awareness 
among the general public in the hope of mobilizing elements among it as well. 
Jihadists have aggressively expanded their use of Twitter, in addition to Facebook 
and YouTube, especially since the outbreak of violence in Syria. This propagation 
effort by the so-called “media mujahideen” has been approved and sanctioned by 
movement leaders, and now contributes to the interconnected jihadist zeitgeist.2 
For example, as a previous study by the authors has shown, jihadist groups are 
now using Twitter to disseminate links to video content shot on the battlefield 
in Syria and posted for mass consumption on YouTube.3 Since 2011, members of 
jihadist forums have issued media strategies that encourage the development of 
a media mujahideen. This encouragement has been accompanied by the release 
of guides to using social media platforms, which often include lists of recom-
mended accounts to follow.4 
This article focuses on one such guide. The first section briefly examines the 
rationale for considering Twitter as part of the “electronic ribat,” or activist front, 
and the types of accounts that are important to jihadist activity. The next section 
analyzes the accounts listed within the guide and the interactions between 
these users, who apparently are regarded by the author of the guide to be at the 
vanguard of jihadist activity on Twitter.5 The final two sections examine the fol-
lower–following relationships between these “important jihadist” accounts, and 
the way information flows through this network of Twitter users. This analysis 
demonstrates that jihadist groups have used the opportunity created by the pro-
liferation of social media platforms to create a persistent, as well as ideologically 
cohesive, presence for jihadist propaganda online. This informal network is likely 
to have reached a level of interconnection that gives it a high degree of resilience 
against disruption from individual account suspensions.  
The Role of Twitter and the Most Important Jihadist 
Accounts to Follow 
A “Twitter guide” (dalil Twitter) posted on the Shumukh al-Islam (SSI) forum 
outlined the reasons for using Twitter as an important arena of the electronic 
front (or ribat) and identified the different types of accounts that users should 
follow. The guide, entitled “The Twitter Guide: The Most Important Jihadi 
Sites and Support for Jihad and the Mujahideen on Twitter” and created by 
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SSI member Ahmad ‘Abdallah, included 66 Arabic-language Twitter accounts, 
which fellow forum members were encouraged to follow.6 
‘Abdallah describes Twitter as “one of the arenas of the electronic ribat, and not 
less important than Facebook. Rather, it will be of much greater importance, as 
accounts are rarely deleted and it’s easier to get signed up” without providing a 
phone number. Furthermore, Twitter users can follow anyone without having to 
be accepted as a friend, as on Facebook, but “you will see all of their postings just 
as on Facebook.” 
The Arabic term ribat can be very hard to translate and conceptualize in other 
languages. The term is frequently referred to both in jihadist videos and in 
print and online literature in the context of religiously permissible warfare; 
in a modern meaning, it could loosely be translated as “front.” The concept of 
ribat is prominent due to its mention in the 60th verse of the eighth chapter of 
the Qur’an, the Surat al-Anfal (The Spoils of War).7 It is often used to legitimize 
acts of war, and is found in bomb-making handbooks or as part of purported 
theological justifications in relation to suicide operations. Extremist Islamists 
consider the clause to be a divine command that stipulates military preparation 
to wage jihad as part of a broader understanding of “religious service” (‘ibada) on 
the “path of God” (fi sabil Allah).
As the value of the media jihad is understood and used on a tactical and strategic 
level by militants to further their cause, the physical “frontier” of holy war is 
shifting to encompass the “arm-chair jihadists” on the virtual front—the profes-
sional media teams embedded with fighting units as well as the global network 
of media supporters. ‘Abdallah assesses the strategic and tactical value of media 
jihad in his posting and recommends that his readers start using Twitter by 
following the 66 accounts he lists.
Types of Accounts Important for Jihad and the Mujahideen 
on Twitter
As ‘Abdallah’s Twitter guide states, “Today I have summarized for you all of the 
renowned accounts in support of jihad and the Mujahideen that convey their 
news or are in their favour; some are official accounts [by jihadist groups or 
brigades], some of which are accounts by scholars, ideologues, and supporters. 
We ask you for your support, even if just by following them.”8
‘Abdallah lists five different general account types and recommends individual 
accounts that could fall within each category (we note here only a few examples 
of the many that ‘Abdallah cites). The range of accounts demonstrates that the 
strategy consciously embraces the different roles that users can play within social 
media networks: 
1. Accounts by Media and News Foundations refers to all Twitter ac-
counts maintained by the official jihadist media outlets, such as Fursan 
al-Balagh li-l i’lam (@fursanalbalaagh) or the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum 
(@as_ansar).
2. Accounts by Scholars and Writers includes stars such as the 
London-based Hani al-Siba’i9 (@hansibu), Muhammad al-Zawahiri10 
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(@Mzmmd_Alzwahiri), or the notorious and industrious Abu Sa’d 
al-‘Amili11 (@al3aamili).
3. Accounts by Members of Jihadist Forums and Brothers and Sisters 
Supporting the Mujahideen provides good examples of “hybrid” users 
active inside the jihadist forums and social media. This group comprises 
users who are not necessarily engaged in violent conflicts but who can 
be regarded as a support network. Members of this support network are 
media activists in terms of disseminating violent-militant material online 
while also propagating jihadist ideology in general. 
4. Accounts Supporting the Mujahideen in Greater Syria (al-Sham 
al-‘izz wa-l-jihad) includes media activists in support of prisoners (e.g., 
@alassra201212 ) and campaigns by Ansar al-Sham (e.g., @7_m_l_t), a 
charity that regularly requests money and support (financial, logistical, 
personnel) in general. Twitter users with handles (usernames) containing 
jihadist slang and iconography periodically send out tweets thanking 
groups such as Ansar al-Sham for the money or goods that were 
received.13
5. Various Accounts includes activists such as the “unofficial account of Minbar 
al-Tawhed wa-l-Jihad” (@MinbarTawhed), Israeli Affairs (@IsraeliAffairs), 
or the high-profile account Mujhtahid (@mujtahidd), which advertises 
“the divulging of secrets of the Al Salul,” an insulting reference to the 
ruling Saudi family.
‘Abdallah’s posting concludes with the signature Abu ‘Abdallah al-Baghdadi and 
his personal Twitter account, @Ahmed_Abidullah, which has only 375 followers; 
‘Abdallah had posted a little over 1,000 tweets to the account as of 10 February 
2014. This indicates that the account makes its greatest contribution to the cause 
on Twitter by producing the guide rather than by directly disseminating infor-
mation to a mass audience. 
“The Most Important Jihadi Sites and Support for Jihad 
and the Mujahideen on Twitter”14 
To analyze in greater detail the nature of the 66 important jihadist accounts 
listed by Ahmad ‘Abdallah, we extracted the profile data for each account 
through the Twitter API (see figure 1).15 Two elements that indicate the nature of 
these accounts are the common languages and the locations of users. This data 
shows that the majority of accounts were set up in Arabic (56 percent), although 
a significant number were set up in English (41 percent), with French making up 
the remainder (3 percent).16 This is despite the list’s being composed specifically 
of Arabic-language accounts, which suggests that some of the 66 accounts may 
be bilingual. 
A second step in understanding this group is to have a sense of where they are. 
This task is made slightly harder by the fact that few of these users enter mean-
ingful locations in the “location” field on their Twitter profile, and fewer still 
enable geotagging of Twitter content.17 Fortunately for our study, however, a 
surprisingly high number of people set their phone’s clock to their current time 
zone, probably because this allows the time stamps on the tweets they view to 
make sense. The phone system is set up to define most time zones by a location, 
such as a major city, which gives an approximate indication of the longitudinal 
zone in which a user is located (see figure 2).
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Humans are creatures of habit. We like the clock to show the correct time, 
whether it’s where we actually are or based on a location with which we mentally 
associate ourselves. For example, following the 2009 presidential election in Iran, 
there was a brief campaign for Twitter users to show support for the protesters 
by changing their phones’ location to Tehran, perhaps only to confuse Iranian 
authorities. This strategy had more than a few problems, however, as writer/
researcher Evgeny Morozov pointed out at the time.18 One of the more notable 
problems was the failure of the less-savvy Twitter users to change the time zone 
as well as the location. Another problem was the tendency of slacktivists19 to use 
different tags, such as #helpiranelection, from those used by the protesters or 
“digital insiders” (e.g., #GR88, #Neda, #Sohrab). As a result, particularly engaged 
users could be identified by authorities because their interactions on Twitter 
were predominantly characterized by a series of locally resonant hashtags.20
Casablanca, Morocco, was the most common location that account holders 
on ‘Abdallah’s list used to signify their time zone. While it does not mean they 
were physically in that or any other specific city, it does indicate the area of the 
world they were likely to be in, particularly given that over 40 percent of the 
account holders used just three of the more than 250 possible locations available 
on Twitter profiles (see figure 2).21 This suggests that users are most likely to be 
in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, which is consistent with much of 
the content of the accounts. 
When Twitter users look up the 66 accounts, one of the first elements they tend 
to examine is the number of followers an account has. While this is not a direct 
measure of influence, it does indicate that users have heard of the account, and 
that they may be interested in seeing more of its specific content.
Of the 66 important jihadist accounts identified by ‘Abdallah, @mujtahidd is 
exceptional, with over one million followers as of 20 August 2013 (see figure 3). 
The next most followed were @IsraeliAffairs, with around 180,000 followers, 
and @1400year, with around 30,000 followers at that time. Six months later, in 
February 2014, @mujtahidd had over 1.3 million followers and @IsraeliAffairs 
had over 200,000, while the number of followers for @1400year jumped to 
over 100,000. This data shows that some of these accounts are able to reach and 
engage a relatively large Twitter community. These three most significant users 
are discussed in greater detail in the following section.
The Three Most-Followed of the Recommended 66 Users of 
Influence
1. @Mujtahidd
Mujtahid is an Islamic term of jurisprudence, a “legist formulating independent 
decisions in legal or theological matters, based on the interpretation and applica-
tion of the four usul,” as defined in Hans Wehr’s Arabic-English Dictionary.22 
According to Wehr, mujtahid can also simply mean “industrious, diligent.” The 
@Mujtahidd account holder’s bio on Twitter consists merely of two Arabic 
names, Harith and Hummam (“Lion” and “Cultivator,” respectively), and his 
e-mail address, mujtahidmail@gmail.com. These two names also serve as a code 
related to a saying of the Prophet Muhammad, who declared that these two 
names were the most dear ones to God and to himself, second only to the names 
‘Abdallah (“Servant of God”) and ‘Abd al-Rahman (“Servant of the Merciful”). 

















Figure 2: Time Zone Location
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Twitter users claim that the account holder behind @mujtahidd is a “known 
whistleblower inside the #Saudi government,” according to Al Battar Media, 
a media outlet that merged with the SSI media front and became the forum’s 
official media arm on 8 January 2014.23 The “whistleblower” designation serves 
to enhance the account holder’s cachet as an insider working against an apostate 
regime on behalf of God and the jihadists’ cause.
2. @IsraeliAffairs 
@IsraeliAffairs had about 180,000 followers as of 20 August 2013. The account 
holder writes in his online bio, “I am Muslim, my citizenship is Arab, I work 
on behalf of my country which is every span of hand on earth; raising on it the 
adhan [the call to prayer]! [I am a] diplomat, translator, researcher in Israeli 
affairs.”
3. @1400year 
@1400year, the third most-influential account, has about 85,000 followers. The 
Arabic name of this account is gharib fi wadanihi—“the stranger in his own 
country.” The sentiment of gharib is a reference to a frame of mind: the “true 
believer” considers himself to be something of a foreigner in this world and asso-
ciates himself with the earliest Muslims, who had also been perceived as strangers 
in their own historical time and milieu. The eagle next to the ISIS flag on the 
account’s Twitter page is a clear allusion to this idea of jihadists as “strangers” 
(ghuraba’ ). “Stranger” or “estranged” is used here in the context of the Israeli 
occupation of Palestine, which is considered to be the “first catastrophe” (nakba) 
in a series of dramatic events that have affected Islamic countries or territories 
since the mid-twentieth century. Jihadists are convinced that there is a global 
“conspiracy against Islam,” hence the British grab of Palestinian land followed 
by the declaration of the state of Israel (1948), and subsequent epochal conflicts 
including the occupations of Afghanistan (1979/2001), the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
(2003), and the Arab Spring conflicts after 2011, have entrenched this notion in 
jihadist communities both on- and offline.
When the data for @1400year was captured in August 2013, the bio for the 
account holder stated, “The man in the picture is Rachid Nekkaz, a French 
millionaire of Algerian origin, who opposes France’s ban of the niqab. He said to 
the Muslimat of France to wear the niqab and I will pay the fine, I am honored 
by placing his picture [on my account].”24 The account holder’s updated bio, 
however, states, “The demise of Israel may be preceded by the demise of [Arab] 
regimes that made a living on the expense of their own people, laughing at them, 
destroying the societies.”25
@1400year also has a YouTube account linked to it with 1,830 subscribers and 
437,243 views. Having such links across platforms allows users to more effectively 
create their zeitgeist. This is similar to the way jihadist groups such as Jabhat 
al-Nusra are using Twitter to disseminate links to Syrian battlefield videos posted 
on YouTube.26
Of the remaining accounts, 31 of the 66 accounts listed have between 5,000 and 
100,000 followers, as shown in figure 4.
Links across platforms allow 




The mean number of followers for this group of accounts is 28,220, but 
this is heavily influenced by the three accounts with the greatest number 
of followers. The median number of followers is much lower, at 5,377. 
This gives an indication that important jihadist accounts, or at least 
those thought important in ‘Abdallah’s Twitter guide, have the potential 
to reach a relatively large number of users, especially when compared, 
for example, to the U.S. State Department’s Digital Outreach Team and 
its Arabic Twitter account, @DSDOTAR, which had a little under 900 
followers as of early 2014. 
Do These Accounts All Speak to the Same Followers?
This overview of the 66 “important jihadist accounts” can give the 
appearance that collectively, the accounts are reaching over 1.8 million 
users. However, as noted earlier, @mujtahidd alone is followed by over 
1.1 million users, and is such an outlier that we have excluded it from 
the subsequent analysis. Even so, the real number following all of the 
remaining 65 accounts is much less than 700,000, because a number of 
users follow more than one account. By building a network representa-
tion of the users who follow the important jihadist accounts, we found 
that the network following one or more of these accounts (excluding 
@mujtahidd) was a little over 370,000 users, which gives a more accurate 
picture of the reach these groups collectively achieve.  
To break it down further, many users follow one or two accounts, as we 
might expect from an online social environment, while a very few follow 
several of the listed accounts. Figure 5 illustrates a close approximation of 
a statistical power law curve.27  
Of those users who follow only one of the 65 (minus @mujtahidd) 
important jihadist accounts, 34 percent follow more than one. Of the 
users who follow more than one of these accounts, however, 45 percent 
follow only two accounts. These can be thought of as casual followers. At 
the other end of the scale, there are 504 users who follow 40 or more of 
the listed accounts and 109 users who follow 50 or more. These followers 
clearly are more engaged than most.
The fact that a user is particularly engaged in following the accounts 
deemed important in ‘Abdallah’s Twitter guide does not necessarily 
indicate any political affiliation—not least because of the number of 
CT scholars and professionals who actively follow such accounts. It is, 
however, instructive to consider the aggregated traits of this “highly 
engaged” group of 504 users who follow 40 or more important jihadist 
accounts.
Unsurprisingly, given the dominant languages used by the 66 listed ac-
counts, Arabic, English, and French are the languages that appear most 
frequently in the Twitter profiles of these highly engaged followers (as 
shown in figure 6). In addition, there is a small number of users who post 
to Twitter in other languages, such as Indonesian, Spanish, Dutch, and 
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they disseminate is in Arabic, and they may act as bridges by connecting the core 
content in Arabic to wider communities that do not speak Arabic. 
From the aggregated profile data, a similar question can be asked about where in 
the world these highly engaged users appear to be.
The findings from the location data (see figure 7) highlight the cultural im-
portance of appearing (at least) to be located in or near the Arabian Peninsula: 
almost 20 percent of highly engaged followers use Baghdad to set their time 
zone. Collectively, the followers’ data shows a focus on the Middle East and 
Europe similar to the 66 important jihadist accounts.  
This section has shown that the 66 accounts listed by ‘Abdallah, as we might 
expect, tend to tweet in Arabic. They are collectively followed by a network of 
around 370,000 people (if @mujtahidd is excluded), but most of these are casual 
observers who follow only one or two of the accounts. There are, however, 500 
to 1,000 more-engaged followers. These active followers tend 
to be Arabic speaking, have relatively few followers themselves, 
and appear to have a greater tendency than less-engaged users 
to identify with the Arabian Peninsula region, and Baghdad in 
particular.   
Relational Dynamics between the 66 Important 
Jihadist Accounts
An analysis of the relational dynamics between the 66 accounts 
on Ahmad ‘Abdallah’s list provides insight into the way these 
accounts relate to each other, and the relative importance of 
each account to the others on the list. These relationships are 
important because they influence the way individuals search for 
information, what they find, and the behaviors they adopt.28  
When we reconstructed the network of follower–following 
relationships, we found that @JbhatALnusra, @WaleedGaj2002, 
and @AsadAljehad2 are most frequently followed by the other 
accounts on the list. Conversely, @SaveArakan4, @Mhaajrr, 



















Figure 6: Languages Used by Highly 
Engaged Followers
Screen name



















































the other accounts 
follow them. The 
ranking for each ac-
count (see table 1) 
is based on how 
frequently each 
account is followed 
by the others. This 
ranking is also 
comparable to the 
ranking produced 
by the eigenvector 
calculations for 




The network as a whole represents 958 relationships among the 66 important 
accounts, with a network diameter of 5 (the distance between the furthest two 
nodes calculated on the directed graph). The network density is 0.2 on the 
directed graph, meaning around 20 percent of the connections that could exist 
actually do exist. (A score of 1 would represent a complete graph, where all con-
nections would exist.)  
Key Nodes in the Network
We found, perhaps not surprisingly, that the majority of the connected accounts 
are hardcore jihadist media activists, of which the most frequently followed is 
Jabhat al-Nusra. In this section, we look at some of the high-profile accounts 
whose owners are clearly advocating the full extent of violent jihadist ideology 
on a global level.
@WaleedGaj2002
This account has over 45,000 followers, while following 387. It apparently 
belongs to Walid (Muhammad) al-Hajj, a “former Guantanamo detainee and 
eyewitness of the Qila-e-Jangji massacre in Afghanistan,”29 who is from Sudan. 
According to the WikiLeaks Gitmo Project, as reported by the New York Times, 
he was released from the Guantánamo Bay prison in 2008.30 Al-Hajj’s tweets 
indicate that he still supports the mainstream al Qaeda jihadists: he praises 
Osama bin Laden while being cherished by other Twitter users for having known 
the shaykh personally, and he is also active within the mainstream media.31 
Figure 8: Eigenvector Calculations
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@Strategyaffairs 
The account holder behind @Strategyaffairs is a prolific and quite industrious 
jihadist media activist, with over 100,000 followers and just over 4,000 tweets 
as of August 2013. He is also active in most classical jihadist forums as ‘Abdallah 
bin Muhammad. Occasionally he has tweeted statements by the Yemeni group al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) prior to the “official” broadcast within 
the forums, and provided context for as well as posted AQAP’s statements, both 
within the forums and on Twitter. Other SSI members, for instance, used his 
Twitter input to further the AQAP statements within the forum, thus raising the 
status of @Strategyaffairs in general.
@EYADQUNAIBI 
Dr. Iyad Qunaybi is something of a rising star within the radical on- and offline 
scenes. He is active on all social media outlets, and his videotaped speeches are 
also transcribed and published within the jihadist forums by media outlets such 
as the previously mentioned @fursanbalagh. His sermons are presented in Arabic 
and sometimes subtitled in English. Qunaybi rose to fame within this subculture 
in 2011–2012, during the uprisings in Egypt, but his focus has been on Syria since 
the outbreak and spread of violence there. His standing was boosted when his 
posts began to be included on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s database, under the 
name Iyad al-Qunaybi.32 His input is valued, retweeted, and disseminated within 
the jihadist forums and on Facebook, and is further published on sites such as 
JustPaste.it, where content is easily shared and almost impossible to track.
@as_ansar 
This is the official Twitter account of the bilingual Shabakat al-Ansar al-
Mujahideen, a tier-one jihadist online forum. The main forum is in Arabic, with 
a sister forum in English. Both forums are sometimes taken down, but they 
usually resume working after some time. The instability of the main forum is a 
good example of why Twitter has become a tangible alternative for the media-
driven jihadists—the Twitter accounts remain alive and very active with their 
over 26,000 followers, untouched by any disruptions to the online forums. 
The YouTube link shown in the @as_ansar screenshot at left is an “invitation to 
Muslims to visit the forum” and instructs visitors on the use of the Tor Project 
privacy app to conceal their identity online.33
@Al_nukhba
This is one of the pioneer jihadist Twitter accounts, advertising its founders’ 
passion for social media from as early as 2009. The name nukhbat al-I’lami al-
jihadi, the “Jihadist Media Elite,” may stem from Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s July 2005 
“Message to the British and European Peoples and Governments regarding the 
Explosions in London,” in which he described the internet as the most impor-
tant medium through which to propagate and spread the jihadists’ demands, 
and ideology in general.34 He called on “the jihadist elite” residing in Europe to 
partake in this venture. 
The @Al_nukhba account could be described as a jihadist media hub. Its mem-
bers, active on the forums for years, are highly committed and regularly provide 
transcriptions of jihadist media productions. This is naturally very helpful for 
any analyst, but it is also quite a service for the jihadist audience. The speeches of 
main leaders and ideologues, as well as major video productions of such outlets 
as Sahab and al-Malahem, are transcribed and can be conveniently downloaded 
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as a PDF or Microsoft Word document. On the group’s main website, Nokbah.com, 
data collections and videos can be downloaded and also searched. It is a well-
built and -maintained data warehouse for extremist content, which is uploaded 
and disseminated primarily via the classical forums. @Al_nukhba has about 6,000 
followers, had tweeted over 500 times by early 2014, and was following no one.
The “betweenness” calculation (see table 2) highlights those users through which 
the shortest paths across the network most frequently pass. These users are often 
found near the center of the network image. From the perspective of between-
ness, in addition to some of the users mentioned previously, these accounts also 
appear to play an important role as bridges between different elements of the 
network. To have a high betweenness score, users have to both follow and be 
followed by other users.  
@Caucasusaffairs
@Caucasusaffairs has a significantly higher betweenness ranking compared to 
some of the more-followed accounts: @Caucacusaffairs is both widely followed 
and an active follower. As the name of this account implies, @Caucasusaffairs 
covers everything related to the Caucasus region and the organization called 
the Caucasus Emirate, with a focus on Chechnya. The tweets published on the 
account are mainly in Arabic, but some are also in Russian. @Caucasusaffairs 
has over 44,000 followers while following over 400 users itself, and has posted 
about 8,000 tweets. Such volume makes this account a valuable asset in addi-
tion to the main forums and their relevant subsections. It mainly retweets the 
Arabic-language media outlet Echo of Caucasus (through @RevOfIslam), which 
has been one of the main media hubs in Arabic for many years. The image of a 
four-fingered black hand on a yellow background (see figure 9), which is widely 
used on Muslim Brotherhood sites, is a symbol of the massacre that took place 
at Egypt’s Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque on 14 August 2013, when Egyptian security 
forces destroyed an encampment of supporters of ousted President Mohammed 
Morsi. This symbol “has emerged in the Middle East, online and offline, to 
remember the crackdown of the Rabaa al-Adawiya protest camp whereby many 
pro-Mursi citizens were killed.”35
The use of the Rabaa al-Adawiya icon in the Chechen context is yet another 
attempt by the media-savvy jihadists to globalize their agenda, and serves among 
them as proof for the repeated claim that there is a “war against Islam.” This icon 
has been further “jihadized” by adding the movement’s black banner, as shown in 
figure 9.36
This analysis of the relational dynamics between Ahmad ‘Abdallah’s 66 “impor-
tant jihadist” accounts through their following–follower relationships shows 
that the accounts form a relatively dense network, which has two results. First, it 
creates mutually reinforcing clusters of information, which can crowd out other 
perspectives,37 and thus contributes to the development of a zeitgeist, or a new 
electronic propaganda frontier, as was discussed in relation to the activity of 
Jabhat al-Nusra.38  
Second, the density of the network tends to protect it against basic disruption 
strategies such as the removal or suspension of individual accounts. As Paul 
Baran’s work On Distributed Communications demonstrated, only a small level 











Table 2: “Betweenness” centrality
Figure 9: Rabaa al-Adawiya Protest 
Symbol
84
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 3
heavy enemy attacks.39 Although Baran’s work was done in the pre-internet con-
text of the 1960s, and focused particularly on media problems faced in the 1970s, 
the insight provided by the study also relates to online activity and the need for 
more complex strategies to disrupt dense communication networks. 
Information Flow
This final section assesses the flow of information in a network that includes the 
66 important jihadist accounts. Tracking the spread of this information provides 
a useful insight into the way relationships can both influence the spread of 
information and allow the identification of key actors or influential users within 
the jihadist Twitter phenomenon. For example, a previous article by the authors 
on the Syrian jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra demonstrated how jihadist groups 
are using Twitter to post links to video content shot in Syria.40 
Some of the data from the first sections of this article was posted on the blog 
Jihadica in August 2013, along with a brief analysis of 
the 66 important jihadist accounts.41 In this article, 
we are making use of data about how Twitter users 
communicating in Arabic responded to the informa-
tion we posted on the blog. Following the post, 
which is in English, requests appeared on Twitter 
for a translation to be posted in Arabic. This transla-
tion subsequently appeared on JustPaste.it,42 and 
news spread rapidly on Twitter using the hashtag 
#دراسة_أمريكية_أخطر_66_حساب_جهادي. 
The majority of the tweets containing #دراسة_
أمريكية_أخطر_66_حساب_جهادي appeared between 8 
and 10 September 2013, after which there was little further activity. At its 
peak, the hashtag was used over 800 times in 15 minutes, equivalent to 53 
tweets a minute (see figure 10). 
The graph in figure 10 shows the volume of tweets containing the hashtag 
for each 15-minute period. This indicates that the news traveled fast, 
reaching most of the users it would ever reach within the first day, and 
highlights the speed of information dissemination within this network. 
A few users were particularly important in spreading the news. Figure 11 
shows the users most frequently retweeted within our data.
In addition to the volume of retweets, time is also a factor, because users 
were retweeted or mentioned at different times. Known as an engage-
ment profile, the graph in figure 12 shows the time period in which users 
were particularly important.
Figure 12 also highlights that prominent users are retweeted rapidly; if 
this observation held up in numerous other contexts, this would indicate 
that information is traveling across such networks faster than current 
case-by-case counterstrategies can respond. Among the 66 jihadist 
accounts in this study, @Tuohed and @almohajermuslm had the greatest 
levels of retweets and mentions early on 9 September 2013. Twelve 
hours later, @xxggxx2 became prominent, and nearly 12 hours after that, 
retweets of @albttarm peaked. This hints at the features of the network 
 Figure 10: Arabic Speakers’ Response to Jihadica  
































Figure 11: Most Retweeted Users
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that give it greater resilience. Information can be shared rapidly, as shown by 
the initial spike in retweets. The engagement profiles also show, however, that 
different users are able to continue the conversation, which highlights the fact 
that prominent users fulfill different roles in the network. 
To gain greater insight into the way information travels and the role of promi-
nent users in the network, key actor analysis (see figure 
13) can differentiate those users who are important for 
reaching specific communities from those users who 
are at the core of the network. If there are a number 
of users who operate within the core, or vanguard, 
and others who act as conduits for content to a wider 
audience, this further enhances the network’s resilience 
by allowing it to withstand disruptions caused by the 
occasional suspension of accounts that apparently 
breach Twitter’s terms of service. 
The position of key actors on the scatter plot in figure 
13 is based on two network metrics: betweenness 
centrality and PageRank. Betweenness centrality refers to how often a node lies 
on the shortest path between any two nodes in the network.43 A node with high 
betweenness centrality has the potential to influence the spread of information, 
by facilitating, hindering, or even altering the communication between others. 
PageRank is an objective measure of the importance of a node in a network—a 
specific citation graph. As Google cofounders Sergey Brin and Larry Page 
describe this method, the result “corresponds well with people’s subjective idea 
of importance”:44 
 ¡ Users in the bottom left of the graph 
tend to have no particular role and can be 
thought of as general users, although they 
may have high value to a very specific, often 
very small, group.
 ¡ Those in the top left of the graph tend to be 
in the core (or one of the cores) of the net-
work. This indicates they are often the ones 
most invested in the network and have 
access to privileged information, but they 
rely on others to disseminate the original 
content they tweet to a wider audience.
 ¡ Those in the bottom right of the graph 
fulfill the role of bridging between the core 
content producers and a specific com-
munity. The value of this role often comes 
from tailoring information to a specific 
audience, which makes these users more 
valuable to that group but less important to 
everyone else.
 ¡ Users in the top right are rare. They serve a dual function: they have the 
same trusted status as those in the top left of the graph, and they also 
fulfill the same “bridge” role as users in the bottom right of the graph, 
reaching areas of the network that others do not serve.
Figure 12: Response to the 66
Figure 13: Key Actor Analysis
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The network map (see figure 14) can show 
which users communicated with each 
other, which reached the same communi-
ties, and which were a bridge to specific 
communities.45 
The colors indicate the different intercon-
nected communities; note, in particular, the 
green cluster of interconnected users in the 
middle of the network. This highlights the 
likely resilience of the core of the commu-
nity on Twitter, in addition to the resilience 
created by the multiplatform zeitgeist 
identified in our earlier study of Jabhat 
al-Nusra.46 There are significant levels of 
redundancy in the connections at the core 
of the network, which allow communica-
tion to continue even when some accounts 
are suspended.
Conclusion
This analysis demonstrates that jihadist 
groups have used the opportunity created by 
the proliferation of social media platforms 
to develop a network of Twitter accounts 
that gives them a persistent as well as 
ideologically cohesive presence for jihadist propaganda online. The case studies 
presented here indicate that the level of interconnection between core members 
of the network has achieved a high degree of resilience against disruption from 
the suspension of individual accounts. If this finding can be repeated across a 
number of other examples, it will have wide-ranging consequences for counter-
strategies, which will need to shift from countering individuals to disrupting 
cohesion across a network if they are to be effective. v 
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 2 April 2014, Global ECCO director 
Michael Freeman and CTAP coordinator Amina Kator-Mubarez sat down with 
former U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency official Kirk Meyer to talk about his 
work to identify and dismantle terrorist financing networks in Afghanistan be-
tween 2006 and 2011. During that time, Meyer founded the first Afghan Threat 
Finance Cell and served as its director until his departure from Afghanistan in 
2011.2 
MICHAEL FREEMAN: Thank you, Kirk, for doing this interview. You were the 
director of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) for three years, from 2008 
through 2011, but you are a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) special 
agent by training and by trade. How did you come to be in Afghanistan in 
charge of threat finance?
KIRK MEYER: It was kind of a fluke, actually. From 2006 to 2008, I was in Af-
ghanistan as the assistant attaché for the DEA. I came back to the United States 
and reported to my headquarters on 4 August 2008. When I arrived to check in, 
the chief of operations told me to come with him downstairs, where we got into 
a van. Then he told me we were going to the White House. At the White House, 
there was a meeting led by Juan Zarate, who I believe was, at the time, the deputy 
national security advisor and an advisor to President George W. Bush.3 The 
discussion was about establishing an ATFC similar to the Iraq Threat Finance 
Cell (ITFC), and who was going to lead it. In Iraq, they had co-directors: one 
from the Treasury Department and the other from the Department of Defense 
(DoD). At our meeting, the Defense representative said DoD didn’t want any 
more leadership roles but would be happy to provide a deputy. At the end of the 
meeting, Zarate said, “Well, we will have DEA run it,” with the understanding 
that if DEA didn’t perform well, they would revisit the leadership issue. I believe 
that they chose DEA on the assumption that the majority of the funding to the 
insurgency was drug-related. 
FREEMAN: How did you set up this cell? How did you organize it? What was 
your mission when you established this ATFC?
MEYER: The next thing was to work with my two deputies, one from Treasury 
and one from CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), to create a plan and identify 
resources. Six or eight weeks after the 4 August meeting, I was called back to 
the White House, where I met with John D. Duncan Jr., who was also affiliated 
with the Bush administration. The Barack Obama administration was about 
to come into office, and the Bush people wanted us on the ground prior to the 
transition. At the meeting were myself and two other DEA personnel, two people 
from Treasury, and a person from the Pentagon’s Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD). The 
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Pentagon person told us that they had already talked to someone at Bagram Air 
Base and that everything we required was in place. All we had to do was show 
up. So Duncan said, “Well, why don’t you guys get there in the next few weeks?” 
It was agreed that we would go, starting with the leadership, with the under-
standing that it would be a developing project. No one expected the ATFC to be 
up and running right away. There was some fear, expressed by Duncan, that the 
Obama administration might stop the idea, so they wanted to get us started. I 
tried to contact the woman who was at the meeting to get the contact number 
for the person in Bagram who was going to help us. After about a week, she 
e-mailed me and told me that there was a mistake and that there was nothing 
available for us at Bagram. I decided to go forward anyway because I had already 
been to Afghanistan, and I figured I would get a better understanding of what 
was happening if I was on the ground. Plus, this was a big deal for DEA. 
DEA has a lot of experience working internationally. It has the largest presence 
overseas of any U.S. federal law enforcement agency, with over 90 offices. We 
have a tremendous amount of experience working interagency, but this new 
ATFC was different for DEA. We had never led anything like this. I was a little 
concerned that if we didn’t show up as John Duncan had requested, the blame 
would be on DEA and not necessarily on the fact that the resources weren’t 
available. So I arrived back in Afghanistan in late October 2008. When I arrived, 
I found that the embassy and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan really didn’t know why I 
was there and what we were going to do, and neither was in a position to assist 
us with resources. I knew that there was an old, dilapidated trailer at Bagram Air 
Base that the military had given DEA several years before, and DEA wasn’t really 
using it anymore. Consequently, I convinced the DEA regional director to transfer 
it to the ATFC. So the first facility for the ATFC was a trailer that had several leaks 
in the roof, plumbing that backed up, and the entire electrical system strung out 
in back of the trailer on a broken tree branch. That was our start. 
FREEMAN: What was your mission? Who gave you your marching orders? 
MEYER: Well, a white paper was supposed to be the initial marching orders to 
establish the ATFC, but all the agencies hadn’t signed off on it yet. So we actu-
ally arrived in Afghanistan prior to the white paper being concurred to by the 
different federal agencies and the military. Our goal, though, was to identify and 
help disrupt the material and financial funding streams that were supporting the 
Taliban and other terrorist organizations.
FREEMAN: And the presumption was that that was mostly coming from drugs?
MEYER: The presumption was that a lot of it was coming from drugs, right. 
FREEMAN: So you got there, and there were the three of you. How did you grow 
that organization?
MEYER: Initially, I borrowed two laptops and a stand-alone computer from 
DEA, which we had configured for military use. My Treasury deputy had served 
in the ITFC, so he had an idea of how we needed to progress. He started working 
on producing the requirements that we would need on the intel (intelligence) 
side, while the military deputy and I basically became salesmen or marketers. 
We produced a PowerPoint presentation, and we met with any military officer 
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who would talk to us, from McKiernan (General David McKiernan, then-
commander of the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]) on down, 
to see whom we could solicit help from. One problem was that because the 
white paper hadn’t been produced, there had never been a FRAGO (fragmentary 
order—a form of military notification) produced either. From the military’s 
perspective, we didn’t exist, so we couldn’t have access to any services or any type 
of resources, even things like toilet paper or bottled water. Through networking 
with other organizations on Bagram, though, we managed to obtain necessi-
ties—those guys helped hold us together, actually. 
The first person to really help us was Brigadier Robert Carr, who was the 
senior intel officer in the country. I briefed him, and then that night at about 
11:00 p.m., I got a call from his aide, who said, “Okay, General Carr has ordered 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to clear out their conference room in 
Bagram. How many computers do you need? We are going to drop them.” In 
about 24 to 48 hours, he had built us our first SCIF (sensitive compartmented 
information facility). It was a temporary SCIF that was based inside of a DIA 
compound. So there were a lot of people willing to help us, but there were a lot 
of struggles going on at the same time. 
FREEMAN: You mentioned that you had to sort of “sell” your organization 
and your mission to other people. How much of a priority did people place on 
counter-threat or counterterrorist financing? How did other people—from 
DoD, from other organizations in Afghanistan—see this threat finance issue?
MEYER: It really varied a lot. For example, we were almost immediately given a 
seat at the table with Regional Command East at Bagram. We started attending 
the daily stand-up (briefing) for the military commander at the time and his 
commanders who followed after him. Other people didn’t really want to talk to 
us. There were some people on the military intelligence side who were, I think, 
a little threatened by us. There was some hesitancy because we were bringing in 
civilian agencies, we had different authorities, and the military didn’t understand 
a lot of those authorities. For example, the HUMINT (human intelligence) 
collection teams didn’t understand the fact that I, as a DEA special agent, could 
recruit and run informant networks, which we did at the ATFC and for DEA. 
Even though we were not military interrogators, we could go into the detention 
facility and interview detainees because there was an exemption in the system 
that allowed special agents, 1811s, to act as interrogators. So we were doing 
interrogations of detainees in the Bagram facility. We were creating informant 
networks. And we were starting pretty quickly to produce IIRs: intelligence in-
formation reports; we produced the first ones within a couple of months. In my 
understanding, the Iraq Threat Finance Cell, which was much better resourced 
than we were, didn’t produce its first IIR until almost a year after it opened. We 
were doing it within a few months.
FREEMAN: What was your level of resourcing? 
MEYER: I convinced DEA that if they were going to lead this, then we needed 
resources and DEA was going to have to use money to do it. There had been an 
assumption that the military was going to pay for everything. The military had 
a group at CENTCOM in Tampa at that time called, I think, the Interagency 
Action Group, and then it became the Interagency Task Force.4 A little bit of 
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a struggle went on between them and me because everyone assumed they were 
going to provide resources, but they were unable to provide anything. After the 
Pentagon said that the resources were available and they weren’t, the civilians 
felt that the military was balking at the fact that civilians were going to lead the 
organization. But in retrospect, I am not sure that was really the case. I think a 
lot of the problem was that everybody, including the agencies that were involved 
in producing the white paper, were reviewing everything through the lens of 
Iraq, and Iraq was very different. For one thing, the United States had a lot 
more control in Iraq. In Afghanistan, we rushed to give control to the Afghan 
government. In Iraq, everything was highly resourced. Alumni of the Iraq Threat 
Finance Cell talked about how they were inside a palace. When they arrived 
at the ITFC headquarters, they had all these new computers—anything they 
required was on the ground and available. 
Well, I had spent two years in Afghanistan before the surge, and nobody had 
anything extra. Everybody was sharing things, everybody was doing favors for 
each other, but it took networking to do even the minor things. There was no 
surplus anywhere, whether it be computers or vehicles or space. When we moved 
into the dilapidated trailer before my deputies arrived, for example, I woke up 
one morning and there was a major with a clipboard and three guys following 
him, because they thought this was an abandoned building and they were 
making bunk assignments. They were actually assigning people to where they 
were going to sleep in a building that the military didn’t even own—they were 
going to take it over. That was the kind of environment that was there. 
Another problem was that the various civilian agencies assumed they were 
going to use money out of the DASD office to fund the ATFC and that there 
wouldn’t be individual agency costs associated with the ATFC. I guess the best 
way to describe it is that prior to this period, the definition of what constituted 
a counternarcotics project was pretty broadly interpreted. I think there was 
an inspector general’s report or some kind of evaluation of how the military 
had spent counternarcotics funds, and suddenly, at the time that the ATFC was 
standing up, there was a clampdown on how they could use that money. So when 
the civilian agencies were assuming that the DASD was going to fund things like 
the ATFC, they were making assumptions based on how things had previously 
operated, not realizing that the military was under this new, more-restrictive 
environment. It created a tremendous amount of friction between the Tampa-
based military interagency group that was designated to support the ATFC and 
me in Afghanistan. In addition, because the same group had difficulty getting 
the U.S. Forces–Afghanistan and the embassy to approve their initial attempts 
at writing a FRAGO, they were even more restricted in what support they could 
provide. 
FREEMAN: Let me move from the organizational dynamics to the substance of 
what you were doing. I want to talk about a few issues that we can address one 
at a time. How did you see and evaluate and work against the drug issue? I have 
the same kind of question for corruption, for the banking sector, and for the U.S. 
money coming in, and trying to control that money from going to the Taliban. 
So maybe you can go through each of those: drugs, corruption, contracting, 
money.
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MEYER: The first way to look at it is to talk about a couple of things we did. 
First, besides slowly building out the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, we immedi-
ately engaged with some Afghan units. In 2007–2008, I helped create what we 
called the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), which was a vetted Afghan police 
unit. By “vetted,” I mean that we got the best background checks we could do 
in Afghanistan, which realistically wasn’t much, but we routinely polygraphed 
the participants in this unit. In addition, during the same time period, I helped 
initiate the process to establish a legal wire intercept system managed by a 
second vetted Afghan unit called the Technical Investigative Unit, or TIU. The 
TIU was developed to support the SIU. The ATFC was allowed access to that 
system through our engagement with the SIU. The SIU provided the ATFC with 
an Afghan action arm that would work with us, and partnered with the ATFC on 
investigations that included operations like the execution of search warrants on 
criminal hawalas.5 We worked with FinTRACA, the Financial Transactions and 
Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan. FinTRACA was Afghanistan’s financial 
intelligence unit and part of Da Afghanistan Bank, Afghanistan’s central bank. 
We were pulling bank data; we were pulling hawala information and building 
a network of contacts within the hawala system. I spent hundreds of hours 
interviewing hawala agents, visiting their shops, and eating in their homes. So we 
were starting to gather a lot of unclassified information, which we fed into the 
ATFC. The ATFC intelligence analysts took the information developed through 
unclassified law enforcement means and linked it to develop a more holistic 
intelligence view.
What we learned pretty quickly was that this view led us to a specific paradigm: 
in Afghanistan, you couldn’t just look at the Taliban, you couldn’t just look at 
corrupt officials, you couldn’t just look at the drug traffickers. Even though on 
the surface, these groups were at odds, in reality, everybody was in the money 
game to some degree. You had corrupt Afghan officials; you had bad actors in 
the Afghan business and financial sector, the Taliban and drug traffickers, all 
of whom were frequently acting in tandem. So you could look at one thing, 
say a hawala, or a bank, or a drug trafficker, and the connections would spider 
out and connect to other illicit areas in operations in Afghanistan. We started 
collecting this information and getting a very holistic view of what was going on, 
and we saw that it dealt with issues broader than just threat finance. We then got 
customers—people actually requested this type of holistic information. 
FREEMAN: So how bad was the drug trade?
MEYER: The drug trade was really bad, but I personally never believed it was 
as big a funding source for the insurgency as a lot of people thought. It was a 
funding source, I am not denying that, but you used to hear these numbers all 
the time—a billion dollars and the like. Unfortunately, I have to say that one of 
the things we discovered was that we were one of the biggest funding sources for 
the insurgency. “We” being the U.S. government and ISAF, through development 
projects. This was mostly because of a particular dynamic: in the beginning, 
the only metric anybody was using to measure development was how fast they 
could spend money, not what impact that spending had on the insurgency. 
So there were a lot of projects being done in areas where we didn’t control the 
terrain. Either the Taliban controlled it or these were areas where the terrain was 
contested and the Taliban played a major role. In those cases, about 25 percent 
of every development project’s funding was going to the insurgency. So we were 
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frequently funding the insurgency through this lack of oversight and lack of 
thoughtfulness about where we were doing development projects. 
The problem was abetted by other things, too. For example, an ancillary issue of 
that first one was that a lot of these projects never occurred. We paid for things 
that weren’t built, or they were built shoddily, and a big part of the reason for 
that was that the contracts were often given to big American or European firms, 
and those firms would subcontract the work while keeping a slice of the money. 
That subcontractor would be an Afghan company, which would subcontract the 
work again, and it would be subcontracted again and again, until some guy at the 
very end got a little pot of money to build the project—say a piece of road. But 
now he didn’t have enough money to build the road, plus pay the Taliban, plus 
pay the corrupt officials who usually took about 20 percent of every develop-
ment project. So basically, the contractors didn’t build the projects or they built 
them shoddily, and because the projects were in contested areas, nobody verified 
whether they were built. In Afghanistan, you frequently heard this saying: “The 
Russians built roads that lasted 30 years, and the Americans build roads that last 
30 days.” It was a very common refrain. We had one instance where there was an 
article in the newspaper about a school—I want to say it was built in Helmand 
province—and the article identified the school’s principal. We actually called 
the principal to talk to him, and it turned out he was based at a school outside 
of Kabul. He didn’t even know he was assigned as the principal in Helmand. 
It was a total charade: the school had never been built, and then individuals in 
the government were stealing—basically using ghost employees and stealing the 
teachers’ salaries. 
FREEMAN: Did the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, then, help reveal this 
environment?
MEYER: We did. Although we didn’t go to look for corruption, we started 
reporting on it because nobody else was really doing in-depth reporting on the 
problem. We started getting requests for the reporting, some of which came 
from high-level officials in Washington, some from the U.S. embassy, and some 
from ISAF. There were a lot of military people who were interested in the cor-
ruption problem, so we did an assessment from the information we had and the 
information we could gather. People were shocked by how bad this situation was 
and who was involved in it. At one point, we were asked to work with the Af-
ghan police to identify a high-level Afghan government official whom we could 
target, so that the Afghans could bring him into their court system for arrest and 
prosecution. The U.S. government was then going to press this issue with Afghan 
president Hamid Karzai. We were involved in a couple of those operations, and 
in each instance, it caused significant tension between the White House, the U.S. 
embassy, and President Karzai.
FREEMAN: So it got swamped by the political… ?
MEYER: These efforts were repeatedly derailed because of political concerns. 
Probably the biggest thing that happened was learning about Kabul Bank. While 
we were looking at a hawala based in Dubai, we gained the cooperation of the 
founder of Kabul Bank. Kabul Bank was the largest private bank in the country, 
and it was being used by the United States and ISAF to transfer money for all the 
military and police salaries. The bank was actually a giant Ponzi scheme,6 and we 
found out about it when we went to interview Sherkhan Farnood, the person 
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who founded the bank, about his hawala and its dealings with somebody in the 
Karzai family. Suddenly, Farnood just started confessing that the bank was a 
Ponzi scheme. We interviewed him for hours and looked at thousands of pages 
of records, and we realized that about 80 percent of the bank’s deposits were 
gone and that the money we sent through the bank for the security forces was 
often being used as a “float” to hide the Ponzi scheme. 
For example, one scheme in particular involved the Afghan vice president’s 
brother, Haji Haseen Fahim, who was a Kabul Bank shareholder and a British 
citizen, and the Afghan president’s brother, Mahmud Karzai, who was also a 
Kabul Bank shareholder, and an American citizen. Fahim would take one of the 
bank security guards to an Afghan bureau called AISA, the Afghanistan Invest-
ment Support Agency, which was one of the places that issued business licenses. 
Fahim would purport that the security guard was the CEO of a new company, 
and AISA would issue the security guard a business license in his company’s 
name. Of course, these companies were fictitious. Fahim would then take the 
genuine business license issued for the fictitious company to the bank and meet 
with bank employees who were co-conspirators in the Ponzi scheme to take out 
a loan in the name of the non-existent company. He, Karzai, and other Kabul 
Bank shareholders created numerous fictitious companies using various indi-
viduals like the security guards as proxies to obtain the genuine business licenses 
from AISA. Every loan was supposedly paid off, but no money was ever paid; 
it was an accounting trick. They would just open other fictitious companies to 
make it look as though the money were loaned out again. 
Eventually, Sherkhan Farnood, who illegally removed money from the bank in 
a similar manner, ran into financial difficulties because he was heavily invested 
in Dubai real estate when the real estate market in Dubai crashed around 
2008–2009. This caused friction between the different partners within the bank 
because Farnood expected the other shareholders to share in his losses, claiming 
he had made the investments on behalf of the group and not for his sole benefit. 
Basically, Farnood, along with a few minor shareholders, was in one camp, while 
the opposing faction, including Fahim and Karzai, was led by the bank’s CEO, 
Khalil Fruzi.
FREEMAN: And it imploded?
MEYER: It imploded as they fought about the bank. It was a strange situation 
because we were regularly meeting with both factions and reviewing numerous 
records from Kabul Bank and Shaheen Exchange, Sherkhan’s Dubai-based 
hawala. Each faction was feeding us information to discredit the other, and we 
were verifying the truth through financial records, legal wire intercepts con-
ducted by the SIU, and other means. 
FREEMAN: Who was giving the money to the Kabul Bank for them to then loan 
out? Was that the United States?
MEYER: No, it was small depositors. 
FREEMAN: Afghans?
MEYER: Afghan depositors, NGOs, and just about anybody who was using a 
bank in the country had an account at Kabul Bank. It was the largest private 
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bank with the largest number of branches, and about $1.2 or $1.3 billion in 
deposits. The amount stolen has been estimated to be between $800 and $950 
million. Basically, the majority of the money was gone. There was an instance, 
for example, at the U.S. embassy in which an Afghan employee and her husband 
wanted to buy a house. It took them an entire day to get their $1,200, and the 
bank vice president met with them and tried to talk them out of withdrawing 
their savings. Since much of the money was gone, it was difficult for the bank to 
meet the expectations of customers who wanted to withdraw funds. 
The situation was so dire that the bank executives used the U.S. and ISAF funds 
intended for the salaries of the military and the police whenever the bank had 
inadequate reserves and somebody, like the embassy employee, wanted their 
money. So the bank was using the salary payments as a float. Say you were an Af-
ghan policeman or an Afghan soldier, and you lived in a province and expected 
to get paid on Monday. Instead, you might not get paid until a week or 10 or 15 
days later. Sometimes the money would be as much as 30 days late because the 
bank was holding that money until it could get enough new deposits to release 
the U.S./ISAF funds for those salaries. It was a common complaint among the 
soldiers and police that their pay wasn’t routine but would come in randomly. 
FREEMAN: What happened to these guys? Bernie Madoff is in jail.7
MEYER: The authorities eventually put 21 people on trial and convicted all of 
them. Unfortunately, some of the people they convicted were people like the 
head of FinTRACA, who, in my opinion, was charged because he had assisted us 
in our investigations into this case and others. Luckily, he only had to pay a fine, 
the equivalent of about $450, but other people got jail time. The Afghan vice 
president’s brother and the Afghan president’s brother were excluded from the 
prosecution even though they had significant involvement in the fraud.  
FREEMAN: Can you describe what your best success was, and then on the flip 
side, what your most frustrating experience was?
MEYER: I would say our best success was two hawalas that we managed to 
dismantle. The first was the New Ansari Money Exchange. New Ansari was the 
largest hawala in Afghanistan, and the most powerful. It set the daily exchange 
rate for the U.S. dollar in Afghanistan. Not the central bank, not the govern-
ment, not the market—New Ansari set the exchange rate. New Ansari was a 
global hawala that transformed itself into a corporation that was the sole dis-
tributor of Thuraya satellite telephones; it also controlled Afghan United Bank, 
an internet company, cellular telephone shops, construction companies, a fuel 
importation company, and a trading company located in Dubai. It was a global 
hawala with two branches in Dubai and locations in several Asian and European 
countries, as well as in California. The organization was born from the narcotics 
trade, was heavily involved in the laundering of drug proceeds, had links to the 
Taliban, and supported numerous corrupt government officials.
The New Ansari hawala really grew after 2001. That year, the Taliban stopped 
opium cultivation, and everybody—the United Nations, everybody—cheered 
the Taliban for taking action. But the backstory to that decision was that Mullah 
Omar met with his friend Haji Abdullah Barakzai Ansari, an opium broker with 
a small hawala business, in 2000 or 2001. According to several sources, Mullah 
Omar told Ansari to stockpile as much opium as he could because the Taliban 
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government was going to stop cultivation to increase the price of opium. So 
Ansari did that, and when the Taliban stopped opium cultivation and the opium 
price went up five times, they sold the stockpile and split the proceeds. Ansari 
then used that money to build the New Ansari Money Exchange. He had some 
younger guys—and by “younger guys,” I mean guys in their 30s and 40s—whom 
he then basically trained to manage and grow the business. They were the ones 
who took the profits from the hawala and invested in numerous businesses. This 
group had a long-term goal of relocating to the United States and even sent their 
families to Dubai and enrolled their kids in English-language schools. They 
planned to purchase U.S. businesses as a means to emigrate to the United States. 
In addition, they had started to infiltrate the U.S. financial system by having Af-
ghan United Bank establish correspondent banking relationships with Deutsche 
Bank and Habib Bank of New York.
The younger managers expanded the business through political connections and 
corruption. They were major contributors to President Karzai’s election cam-
paign and raised money for cabinet members to purchase their positions. They 
kept numerous government officials on retainer, too.
The way I often explained New Ansari’s operations to people was to use The 
Godfather movies as an analogy.8 The first generation was Vito Corleone, and the 
Afghan Vito Corleone was Abdullah Ansari. He created the empire and started 
making payments—bribes—to government officials. Then the story moved to 
Vito’s son Michael Corleone, who acted much like the younger New Ansari 
managers. They expanded the business and the system of bribes, purchasing 
the services of the National Directorate of Security, police, Ministry of Interior 
Affairs personnel, and numerous other government employees. Many officials 
were on retainer, while others were paid for episodic events. In one instance, the 
Ansari group even paid a large sum of money to a family after they convinced the 
patriarch to confess to a crime he did not commit in order to protect a valued 
New Ansari member—who did commit the crime—from incarceration. 
These younger New Ansari managers were involved in everything. They were 
involved in extortion, in major drug trafficking, in money laundering. In addi-
tion, they were annually transporting the equivalent of $2.5 billion in different 
currencies to Dubai through Kabul International Airport. Because of New 
Ansari’s political connections, it was impossible to take any real action against 
the organization in Afghanistan, so we focused on getting them designated 
as a criminal enterprise through the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC). This really hurt them because they had invested so heavily in 
all these other businesses that relied on U.S. contracts, and it kept them out of 
the U.S. financial system because Habib Bank of New York terminated their 
correspondent banking system, and many others ended any financial relationship 
with them. For example, they had a fuel importation business and were selling 
fuel to the U.S. military. Once New Ansari was on the sanctions list, all those 
businesses dried up. We disrupted their businesses, which eliminated their ability 
to launder drug money and support the Taliban. 
Another Taliban financier we managed to get on the OFAC list was a hawala 
business based in the south called Haji Khairullah Haji Sattar, after its owners. 
This was a major mover of money for the Taliban around Afghanistan. 
FREEMAN: What was your worst frustration?
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to stockpile as much opium 
as he could because the 
Taliban government was 
going to stop cultivation to 
increase the price of opium.
The younger managers expanded 
the business through political 
connections and corruption. 
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MEYER: Because I was there with DEA previously, I think it probably was the 
drug issue. Like the corruption issue, we frequently debated how we should deal 
with it. One thing that I loved about the Afghan Threat Finance Cell was that 
we had a lot of really smart young people, a lot of whom were military analysts 
who never really got to think outside the box. We unleashed them. Frank 
Calestino, my Treasury deputy, was really good at unleashing people’s thinking. 
So these young analysts came up with innovative ideas that had not previously 
been considered. For example—I don’t know that the military ever acted on 
this, but I think it was the right way to go—the Taliban were collecting taxes on 
opium in the south. They were going to mirabs, who were the local officials who 
managed the water supplies in the villages. The mirabs knew which farmers were 
growing opium, and could estimate the size of their operations by the amount of 
water they used. The Taliban would have the mirabs calculate the amount of tax 
owed to the Taliban by individual opium farmers, and then also use the mirabs 
to collect the tax, which was paid in opium.  
I went to a lot of meetings about crop substitution and eradication, but the 
problem with that approach is in the way the opium system works in Afghani-
stan. The opium farmers are given credit by opium brokers at the beginning 
of the growing season. This debt can be repaid only with opium. These opium 
brokers act like the company stores in the old coal-mining towns in the United 
States, where miners always had debt so they could never get out. Until they got 
their wages, they were always being paid in goods, and they could never leave 
because they owed rent on the house and money for groceries. Well, that was 
what would happen with the opium farmers. The opium brokers would loan the 
farmers money at the beginning of the season, and the only way the farmers were 
permitted to pay it back was in opium. Let’s say a farmer won the lottery or had 
some other financial windfall; he couldn’t go and give the opium broker money 
for his debt. The debt had to be paid in opium. So when the Karzai government 
eradicated opium or tried to substitute crops, it often worked against the indi-
vidual farmers who owed debt in opium, and possibly made them into Taliban 
supporters. 
I remember one farmer I interviewed who told me that when the government 
came and eradicated his crop, he couldn’t pay the opium broker, and so his father 
gave the farmer’s four-year-old daughter to the opium broker, who was some 
72-year-old man, to try and settle the claim. Anyway, these young ATFC analysts 
came up with the idea that the military should focus on the mirabs and their 
relationship with the Taliban. We should wait until the mirabs gathered the 
opium owed to the Taliban for taxes, and at that point, conduct military and/
or law enforcement operations, because then the farmers would be out of the 
equation. I believe that was the innovative thinking we should have been using 
to deal with Taliban funding through the drug trade. 
FREEMAN: What would you have needed to be able to do that? What resources 
or what authorities or… ?
MEYER: You would have to monitor, either through legal wiretaps or other 
means, the phones of the mirabs, or recruit the mirabs as informants. By doing 
that, you should also be able to identify the Taliban members involved in the tax 
collection. This way, you could intercept the Taliban when they came to pick 
up the stockpiled opium from the mirabs. The thing that made threat finance 
difficult in Afghanistan was that many people in the United States had this 
We had a lot of really smart 
young people, a lot of whom 
were military analysts who 
never really got to think outside 
the box. We unleashed them.
When the Karzai government 
eradicated opium or tried 
to substitute crops, it often 
worked against the individual 
farmers who owed debt in 
opium, and possibly made 
them into Taliban supporters.
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image of a big Arab donor who was going to fly into the Kabul airport with a bag 
of money for the insurgents. Maybe that happened more with al Qaeda, but the 
local Taliban commanders were required to find their own funding sources. So 
these people used the funding sources that were available to them. In some areas 
it was kidnapping, and in other areas it was chromite or cedar smuggling. In 
other areas it was drug trafficking. The local commanders had to find their own 
funding, so they were constantly doing a variety of things to bring in cash, and 
frankly they didn’t need a lot of money to operate. 
Some young analysts—one was Treasury, one was a Navy lieutenant, and a third 
was a military contractor—did really detailed work, where they looked at the 
district-level expenses of Taliban commanders, with the understanding that these 
commanders had to raise their money locally. Prior to this, nobody else had done 
this district-level analysis. The analysts reviewed things like the troops in contact 
reports, the number of rounds fired, the types of IEDs used in the district, and 
other Taliban operational costs. The analysts would sit with the military experts 
on IEDs and have them explain the different components for each type of IED 
and each component’s cost. Then they would look at the intelligence on what 
salaries the Taliban commanders were paying their soldiers, because there was 
always this argument—and I am assuming it was true—that the majority of 
Taliban soldiers were not ideologues but were there for financial reasons. Then 
these analysts explained to the military commanders that they didn’t have to 
completely eradicate a local Taliban commander’s funding stream. Instead, all 
they had to do was interdict enough of the funding so that the commander had 
to make a decision between paying and feeding his troops and launching attacks. 
I thought that was brilliant thinking, and that was the right way to go, but I am 
just not sure how many people embraced it. 
FREEMAN: What sort of personal lessons did you learn? What is your takeaway 
from your time as the director of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell? What did it 
mean to you?
MEYER: I got to work with a lot of great people. I got a view of the U.S. govern-
ment that somebody at my level normally wouldn’t have had. I made several trips 
to the White House. I briefed (then-Secretary of State) Hillary Clinton in the 
same room where she met with heads of state, and numerous other high-ranking 
American and foreign officials. All the ATFC staff, at one time or another, 
briefed senior leaders like General David Petraeus, General Stanley McChrystal, 
and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry.9 We had a lot of interaction with the upper 
management of the war effort in both Afghanistan and the United States. 
The biggest thing that stands out for me is that there was no plan when the 
United States arrived in Afghanistan. Similar to Iraq, I think that if we are 
going to go into these kinds of actions, we need to do a little bit more up-front 
work and understand what we are getting into. There are a lot of variables that 
aren’t easily understood on the surface, but that come out later. For example, I 
interacted with a lot of Afghans who said that when the United States first went 
into Afghanistan, we had a small window of opportunity because not only were 
the Taliban in hiding, but the warlords also were afraid of us. But when they saw 
how we were plodding around and that they could do what they wanted, that 
fear went away. We lost the momentum. I am glad I stayed in Afghanistan for 
five years. I made many Afghan friends, but I am not sure I see a great future for 
the country, unfortunately. 
The local Taliban commanders 
had to find their own funding, 
so they were constantly doing 
a variety of things to bring in 
cash, and frankly they didn’t 
need a lot of money to operate.
All the ATFC staff, at one time or 
another, briefed senior leaders 
like General David Petraeus, 
General Stanley McChrystal, and 
Ambassador Karl Eikenberry.
I don’t think you can 
understand Afghanistan unless 
you understand Dubai.
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AMINA KATOR-MUBAREZ: Is that because of the Afghan leadership? If there 
was a change in leadership, do you think it could make a difference?
MEYER: A lot of the people who should be the leaders have been and still are 
moving their resources out of the country. I don’t think you can understand 
Afghanistan unless you understand Dubai. Afghanistan had a huge diaspora that 
ended up in Dubai. A lot of the economic decisions for Afghanistan are made 
in Dubai—they are not made in Afghanistan. A lot of the political decisions 
are made in Dubai, not in Afghanistan. These decisions are made among elite 
Afghan businessmen who have been based in Dubai since the Russian occupa-
tion. I think that if the Taliban start to really turn the war in their favor, then 
these elites have already feathered their nests for the escape and are going to leave 
the regular Afghan people to survive what comes. 
We saw that a lot when we looked at the corruption. You have all these Afghan 
government officials who have houses in Dubai on places like the Palm Jumeirah, 
which is a group of manmade islands that were built to resemble a giant palm 
tree. Well, we know a lot of Afghan officials make only a few hundred dollars a 
month. Where did they get all that extra money? I met with some Emirati of-
ficials once, who told me that the former vice president of Afghanistan, Ahmad 
Zia Massoud, had brought $53 million in cash through the airport in Dubai. 
He was a soldier most of his life, and then served for a couple of years as vice 
president. Where did he get that money? All that money is gone, and it is not 
being invested in Afghanistan. I hope it works out. I just think it is going to be a 
hard road for a long time.  v
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Ryan Stuart In any war story, but especially a true one, it’s difficult to separate 
what happened from what seemed to happen. What seems to 
happen becomes its own happening and has to be told that way.
 — Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried 1
People aren’t supposed to look back. I’m certainly not going to 
do it any more. I’ve finished my war book now. … This one is a 
failure, and had to be, since it was written by a pillar of salt.
 — Kurt Vonnegut, introduction to Slaughterhouse-Five2
A lot of veterans are disinclined to tell war stories. They rightly say, “You 
wouldn’t understand. You weren’t there.” Tim O’Brien, author of The Things 
They Carried, seems pretty convinced that you can’t tell a true war story. Kurt 
Vonnegut was equally convinced: it took him years and many, many drafts to 
write Slaughterhouse-Five, and you can see his estimation of the book in the 
preceding quote. Yet they both told war stories (about Vietnam and World 
War II, respectively), as have thousands of others in history. 
So why tell war stories? Why read them? And who has the right to hear them?
Phil Klay has taken a stab at this difficult subject in Redeployment. It’s a lot easier 
to say what this book isn’t rather than what it is: It’s not a Marlboro-Man, swash-
buckling, heroic tale of manly courage. It’s neither a play-by-play nor the dissec-
tion of a battle. It’s not a bitterly satiric takedown of war. It’s not even The Things 
They Carried, which was a more earnest book than this one. This book is dry as a 
desert, but it has an emotional subtlety and range that is unusual in published war 
fiction. Klay does his best to tell all the truth, but he tells it very slant, which may 
be the only way to get at the reality of such unfathomable circumstances. 
The short stories that Klay tells cover many types of people not generally found 
in a war book until now: the guy who spends his entire tour behind a desk in 
Baghdad’s Green Zone; the mortuary man; the chaplain; the soldier who got out 
of the Army, went to college, and can’t decide whether he misses Iraq or not. The 
perspectives and points of view vary, too, from men who’ve been on the business 
end of a rifle or the targets of IEDs, to others who were never in the military at all. 
Klay wrote about his book: “People sometimes talk about the civilian-military 
divide, but there are also radical differences in the experiences of different Ma-
rines in different jobs who were in different places in Iraq at different times. The 
veteran experience is not a unified experience.”3 Except for the complete absence 
of women’s viewpoints, Redeployment offers a kaleidoscopic illustration of the U.S. 
experience in Iraq within this specific slice of time, following the 2003 invasion. 
In the title story, “Redeployment,” a Marine ponders shooting dogs. Sent home 
from Iraq to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, all he can think about on the 
flight is (the unofficial) Operation Scooby, during which his unit shot a lot 
Phil Klay 
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of Iraqi dogs. He finds it difficult to reconcile his Iraq 
reality of danger and stress and intense alertness with his 
homecoming reality of air conditioning and shopping. 
What is more, his own dog, he discovers, has become 
covered with tumors since he left home.
Following this story of two realities, Klay takes us into 
Iraq. The piece called “FRAGO,” for example, is a second-
by-second narrative of an operation to clear a building of 
suspected IED makers. “After Action Report” is a surreal 
tale in which one soldier takes responsibility for another’s 
kill. “Bodies” tells the story of a Marine who works in 
Mortuary Affairs and is trying desperately to come to grips 
with what the flesh means—his own, his ex-girlfriend’s, the 
bodies of the dead.
“OIF” is, I think, a story about words, and what flimsy 
vehicles they are for telling war stories. None of the flood of 
acronyms in this piece gets explained—if you don’t know 
what one means, you can’t understand the events. If you’re 
not in the military, every seventh or eighth or tenth word is 
fundamentally in a foreign language. 
“Money as a Weapons System” is told from the point of 
view of a Foreign Service officer, not a soldier. This story 
reads like satire—Catch-224 updated—but the reader gets 
a queasy feeling that the absurd events it relates (having 
to do with a water treatment plant, a women’s health 
clinic, and a senator’s push for baseball) might in fact have 
happened.
“In Vietnam They Had Whores” is a deeply disturbing ru-
mination at the nexus of eros and thanatos. “Prayer in the 
Furnace” is about a chaplain trying very hard to do right, 
but ultimately unable even to do good, and his helpless-
ness in a cyclone of suffering. “Psychological Operations” 
brings us a returned vet who is trying to get at the truth of 
his experience while talking with a fellow college student. 
Like the combat soldier in the title story who was unable 
to overcome his survival reactions in a stateside shopping 
mall, this speaker can’t stop manipulating his listener long 
enough to simply tell his truth.
“War Stories,” which centers on a disabled vet burned to 
disfiguration after an IED attack, is about trying to speak—
and trying to listen. “Unless It’s a Sucking Chest Wound” 
describes a vet who has graduated from law school and is 
about to go out and make a lot of money, but who finds 
himself continuously returning to his memories of Iraq, 
unable to feel in his current life the sense of shared purpose 
he had there. The final story, “Ten Kliks South,” is a war 
story at a remove—an artilleryman’s first kill, which he is 
unable to witness because it’s so far away. This story closes 
with a deeply moving homage to the fallen.
I think there must be a lot of truth in these stories because 
they are told with such raw clarity and a deep—what’s the 
word I’m looking for: ambivalence? frustration?—as if the 
author were scratching hard at the paper, trying to make the 
thing come out right. Klay takes no position on the moral 
rightness or wrongness of the war, only on the effects of the 
deeds done in the context of a war, which, I think, might be 
the only honest way to approach the experience. Klay said 
of writing the book: “Not trading in unexamined clichés 
turns out to be devilishly hard,” but I believe that he suc-
ceeded. Ultimately, the book is a deeply felt and beautifully 
written interpretation of a chaotic, fragmented, sometimes 
surreal, sometimes appalling, and very human war experi-
ence and its sequela.
So why tell war stories? Why read them? And who has the 
right to listen?
The latter two questions are easier to answer than the first. 
People read war stories for the same reason they read any 
story: to understand some aspect of human experience. 
Klay said:
“What we think about war says a lot about 
what we think about America, about 
American politics, about citizenship, about 
violence, and about masculinity. It says a lot 
about what we think about people in other 
countries and our responsibilities to them 
as human beings. It says a lot about what we 
think of death, and sacrifice, and patriotism, 
and cruelty. It says a lot about our limits as 
humans, our ability to endure and our ability 
to break. It says a lot about the stories we tell 
ourselves so we don’t have to examine what 
we think about war too closely.”5
Whether any given war, or any act within it, is “good” or 
“bad,” people will continue to start and fight wars, and end 
them, and send the soldiers home. Those of us who don’t 
participate can’t understand any of these aspects of the 
human tapestry if we don’t read the stories. And we can’t 
come to any meaningful moral conclusions about warfare 
if those who have experienced war don’t write about their 
experiences.
Again, why write war stories? Most veterans don’t do so 
out of some abstract duty to readers, or for setting records 
straight, or to record history. Serious writers write because 
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they are trying to make sense of their own experience. Writing is a way of getting 
one’s arms around an experience—maybe to hold it close, or maybe to strangle 
it—in order to let it go. I think this is particularly true of people who write war 
stories: there is an urgent need to master the experience. As Klay put it: “What 
I wanted to say, what I felt the need to write, it was important for me to say it 
now.”6 It’s certainly not the only way to come to terms with deep emotion, but 
for centuries, writing has been a very effective way of leashing the demons that 
are born from extreme experience.
So why not write? You—yes, I’m talking to you, reader: Why not put your ex-
perience on paper? What have you got to lose? It’s only a little time, a little ink. 
Your work may be a small, private journal, or it may be a huge bestseller; that’s up 
to the time you want to put into it and the gods of commerce. But you will, like 
readers of war stories, come to better understand this particularly fraught and 
difficult aspect of your own, very human experience. As Tim O’Brien said: “All 
you can do is tell it one more time, patiently, adding and subtracting, making up 
a few things to get at the real truth.”7 v
Resources
Veteran’s Writing Project: http://veteranswriting.org/
Writers Guild Foundation’s Veterans Writing Project: https://www.wgfounda-
tion.org/programs/military-veterans-writing-workshop/  
Veterans Writing Workshop: http://www.veteranswritingworkshop.org/  
O-Dark-Thirty: http://o-dark-thirty.org/  
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Militant Groups in South Asia
Surinder K. Sharma and Anshuman Behera 
New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014 
ISBN: 978-8274-754-8 Hardcover 
290 pp.
Excerpt from the Foreword: South Asia has been witnessing the proliferation of 
militant groups of all kinds for the last several decades. These militant groups 
defy national frontiers and often indulge in acts of violence, which have both 
regional and international ramifications. While some of these groups operate 
within the territorial limits of one particular country, many of them have inter-
national linkages and are transnational in character. They can be divided into 
different categories on the basis of their ideological orientation as well as their 
socio-political and economic objectives. This study, initiated by the Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses, aims at collating information about important 
militant groups operating in the region. The book updates information on 
several of these groups and also widens the scope of the study to cover important 
militant groups operating in the entire region. The authors gather detailed 
information on the groups’ genesis, ideology, objectives, cadre strength, training, 
alliance, areas of operation, leadership, funding sources, weapons they use, links 
with other militant groups, and their current status.
Opposing Perspectives on the Drone Debate
Bradley Jay Strawser, ed.  
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, June 2014 
Print ISBNs: 9781137432612 HB 9781137432629 
Ebook ISBNs: 9781137432636 PDF 9781137432629 EPUB 
220 pp.
Does the lethal use of drones pose any new or difficult moral problems? Or is 
the controversy over these weapons merely a distraction from deeper questions 
regarding the justice of war and the United States’s bellicose foreign policy? Op-
posing Perspectives on the Drone Debate pulls no punches in answering these ques-
tions as five scholars square off in a lively debate over the ethics of drones and 
their contentious use in a point-counterpoint debate. The contributing authors 
are some of the foremost thinkers in international affairs today, spanning the 
disciplines of philosophy, sociology, political science, and law. They debate topics 
ranging from the United States’s contested policy of so-called “targeted killing” 
in Pakistan’s tribal regions to fears over the damaging effects such weaponry has 
on our democratic institutions, to the more abstract moral questions raised by 




These new JSOU Press publications are available electronically in the 2013 and 2014 publications sections of the JSOU 
Public website: https://jsou.socom.mil . They are also available in the JSOU Library Management System: 
https://elibrary6.eosintl.com/U60005/OPAC/Index.aspx .
Strategic Culture Partners or Competitors? The Evolution of the Department of Defense/Central 
Intelligence Agency Relationship since Desert Storm and Its Prospects for the Future  
David P. Oakley  
Issue Date: May 2014
To understand the historical and contemporary context of the CIA/DoD relationship, MAJ David Oakley drew on 
secondary sources for his initial academic research, which he supplemented with personal interviews, government docu-
ments, and written first-person accounts. His interviewees include two former chairmen of the United States Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence and previous and current DoD and CIA leaders. Although the CIA and DoD relation-
ship expanded significantly following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, its foundation was laid 10 years earlier in the aftermath of 
Operation Desert Storm and the twilight glow of the Cold War. During this period, congressional policy decisions and 
organizational changes within both institutions increased the communication and liaison partnerships between the CIA 
and DoD, which enabled greater interoperability after 1992. These changes established conditions that have promoted the 
blossoming of the relationship since 2001.
Persistent Engagement in Colombia  
Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, and Wil R. Griego  
Issue Date: June 2014
In this monograph, Dr. Mark Moyar, Brigadier General (retired) Hector Pagan, and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Wil R. 
Griego analyze U.S. Special Operations Forces’ (SOF) assistance to Colombia in the context of decades of counterinsur-
gency and counternarcotics operations. While the case of Colombia is often cited as an exemplar of global SOF foreign 
engagement, the details of the engagement and the reasons for its success have not previously been addressed in a scholarly 
publication. This study represents the first comprehensive analysis of the persistent SOF engagement in Colombia. It 
draws on the collective wisdom of numerous U.S. and Colombian government personnel, and the authors’ own decades of 
experience in Colombia and other countries where the United States has undertaken prolonged partnership. This mono-
graph provides insights that should be valuable to any special operators involved in capacity-building endeavors. It also 
demonstrates once more the value of SOF in advancing U.S. security objectives through a global SOF network.
U.S. Military Deployments to Africa: Lessons from the Hunt for Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
James J.F. Forest  
Issue Date: July 2014
Dr. James Forest’s monograph explores lessons and observations from the recent U.S. SOF effort to help Ugandan and 
other African regional forces locate and apprehend Joseph Kony and members of the violent insurgent group, the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). Dr. Forest examines the context behind the decision to deploy U.S. military advisors to the region 
and the significant public pressure placed on the Barack Obama administration to help stop the LRA’s depredations. The 
author identifies four themes as important for the success or failure of future U.S. military deployments to sub-Saharan 
Africa: (1) preparations and logistics, (2) perceptions and expectations management, (3) partnerships and relationship 
management, and (4) policy and politics. He argues that in the case of Uganda it is critical that any successes derived 
from collaborative operations must be owned by the Ugandans. Dr. Forest’s concluding chapter offers some thoughts 
about further research and implications for policy and SOF education. This report makes a meaningful contribution to the 
effectiveness of future U.S. SOF teams deploying to sub-Saharan Africa.
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